Forum

Olivier Berruyer du site les crises a interviewé Roland Dumas, qui se souvient de cette réunion, information de première main donc, qui ajoute sa pierre à l'édifice de la mémoire défaillante de nos chers fact-checkers. 
Il y a aussi un CR du discours de Manfred Worner du 17 Mai 1990 sur le site de l'OTAN dont malheureusement l'URL visible sur l'image n'est plus à jour, mais que j'ai retrouvé.

https://www.les-crises.fr/comment-l-occident-a-promis-a-l-urss-que-l-otan-ne-s-etendrait-pas-a-l-est-par-roland-dumas-ex-ministre-1990-promesse/
Comme vous dites, tous ceux qui visitent Dedefensa n'ont aucun doute là-dessus (je suppose), mais il est important de le répéter sans se lasser, et collectionner toutes les sources possibles à opposer à ceux qui ré-écrivent l'histoire.

Comme wikipedia par exemple : 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manfred_W%C3%B6rner et les liens vers lesquels il renvoie.

Je trouve ces discours , où le terme "tendre la main" est un peu ambigu
https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1990/s900705a_f.htm

https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1990/s901003a_f.htm 

et enfin le fameux discours du 17 Mai : 
https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1990/s900517a_e.htm 

German Membership

The other primary task is to anchor a united Germany firmly into the institutional structures of the West, the EC and NATO.

Three basic considerations determine our Alliance policy:

Neutrality or non-alignment of the united Germany are not acceptable for us. They would destabilize Europe and take us back to the days of balance of power diplomacy, of alliances and counter-alliances.


The united Germany must not be subjected to any discriminatory special regimes. They would only produce resentment sooner or later. On this point too, history teaches us a sobering lesson.


We have to find solutions that respect the legitimate security interests of all the participants - including the Soviet Union. I emphasize: all participants; in other words not only the Soviet Union. That nation has a right to expect that German unification and Germany's membership of the Atlantic Alliance will not prejudice its security. But it is also clear that it cannot expect us to put NATO's existence on the line and thus give it something that it never succeeded in obtaining in the past, even at the height of its power. The West cannot respond to the erosion of the Warsaw Pact with the weakening or even dissolution of the Atlantic Alliance; the only response is to establish a security framework that embraces both alliances : in other words one that draws the Soviet Union into a cooperative Europe.

We are already in the process of examining our strategy and our Alliance tasks, and of adapting them to changed circumstances. Yet nobody can expect us to deprive NATO of its core security function and its ability to prevent war. Our strategy and our Alliance are exclusively defensive. They threaten no-one, neither today nor tomorrow. We will never be the first to use our weapons. We are prepared for radical disarmament, right down to the minimum level that we must retain to guarantee our security.

This will also be true of a united Germany in NATO. The very fact that we are ready not to deploy NATO troops beyond the territory of the Federal Republic gives the Soviet Union firm security guarantees. Moreover we could conceive of a transitional period during which a reduced number of Soviet forces could remain stationed in the present-day GDR. This will meet Soviet concerns about not changing the overall East-West strategic balance. Soviet politicians are wrong to claim that German membership of NATO will lead to instability. The opposite is true. Europe including the Soviet Union would gain stability. It would also gain a genuine partner in the West ready to cooperate.

We have left behind us the old friend/foe mind-set and the confrontational outlook. We do not need enemies nor threat perceptions. We do not look upon the Soviet Union as the enemy. We want that nation to become our partner in ensuring security. On the other hand, we expect the Soviet Union not to see us as a military pact directed against it or even threatening it. Instead we wish the Soviet Union to see our Alliance as an open and cooperative instrument of stability in an over-arching European security system. We are not proposing something to the Soviet Union which is against its interests. What we have to offer can only be to its advantage. I am confident that this insight will gradually gain ground in Moscow, especially as the other Warsaw Pact countries see things the same way as we do.

Nicolas