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Bonjour et merci pour votre excellent travail d’information.
Cela m’a sans doute échappé mais pourquoi les USA ferait-il un guerre à la Chine?
Expriment-ils une quelconque motivation autre que l’autodestruction? Car pourquoi attaquer la main qui nourrit votre déficit et donc votre train de vie?

Peacekeepers in Sudan to get EU military aid
By Graham Bowley International Herald Tribune TUESDAY, MAY 24, 2005
BRUSSELS The European Union agreed Monday to offer military equipment for the African Union’s peacekeeping mission in the Darfur region of Sudan.
The agreement came before a meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on Thursday of the United Nations, EU and NATO to discuss the conflict in Darfur.
EU foreign ministers said they would cooperate with NATO to offer technical support. They played down fears of a rift with NATO after France had signaled that it wanted its aid to be channeled only through the EU.
Separately, the EU stepped up critical pressure on Uzbekistan after clashes between protesters and government troops that left hundreds of protesters dead.
The EU ministers issued a statement demanding that the Uzbekistan government allow an independent international inquiry into the clashes. The EU had been under pressure to take a critical line against Uzbekistan.
On Sudan, the EU would not offer troops, EU foreign ministers meeting in Brussels decided, but would contribute equipment such as transport planes to airlift soldiers from Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal and Nigeria, which have offered military personnel.
“As soon as the troops are ready, we will be ready to transport them” to the theater of operations, said Javier Solana, the EU’s chief diplomat.
John Reid, the British defense secretary, said in a press conference that Britain was offering 600 vehicles, headquarters support, and logistics.
The French government offered air transport for troops, as well as help for training. “There is no question of rivalry between the EU and NATO,” said Michèle Alliot-Marie, the French defense minister.
On Uzbekistan, the EU foreign ministers they were “profoundly concerned” by the violence there this month.
They said that the EU strongly condemned “the reported excessive, disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force by the Uzbek security forces, and calls upon the Uzbek authorities to act with restraint in order to avoid further loss of life.”
The EU deeply regrets the failure of the Uzbek authorities “to respond to the UN’s call for an independent international inquiry, and urges the Uzbek authorities to reconsider their position,” the ministers said.
In a further sign of increasing cooperation between EU nations in the sensitive area of defense, seven European countries agreed Monday to commit more troops to new EU “battle groups,” part of a new style of military cooperation between European countries.
The battle groups are designed to be deployed quickly into crisis regions around the world. France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, Finland, Estonia and Norway, which is not an EU member, pledged more troops.
The meeting of foreign ministers in Brussels was overshadowed by the result of the German regional elections in North Rhine-Westphalia on Sunday, where the government of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder suffered defeat and called a general election for later this year.
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/23/news/union.php

Tout à fait.
Le oui est un vote pour découdre davantage, le non pour recoudre.
Le oui abat davantage les protections locales, les particularismes, l’état national complet (par là, une responsabilité, concernée). L’échelle continentale appelle bien sûr ces “automatismes de normalisations”, fluidifiant: se sont ses vertues (intégratrices.)L’echelle continentale est aussi impériale, c.a.d de ‘ravages aveugles’ sur les ‘complétudes’ (on peut illuster avec un petit écosystème, comme une baie, complète également), dont les complexités lui échappent, par leurs simple nombres. Un effet statistique en qque sorte, là où l’échelle nationale est plus ‘intîme’, proche donc concernée, tout en étant suffisemment puissante, large d’assise et raffinée dans ses objectifs et moyens. Le oui ‘impérial’ hyper-centralise les ‘compétences managériales’, petit palace au milieu des steppes, qu’il ‘arpente’ et trame de façon grossière, mais irrésistible. Toujours grossière quelque soit le ‘serrage’ du maillage, vain mais inévitable. Là où l’échelle nationale, combine simplement quelques-unes de ces ‘entités organiques’, liées à une certaine terre, les hommes qui y sont, le travail accomplis et en cours, dons et handicaps.L’état national n’à comme mission que de jouer au mieux sur ces quelques ‘données’, qu’il connait bien et ne peut ignorer, tenu de les envisager et combiner au mieux. Il se peut que celà soit une vision nouvelle de la nation, postérieure à la réalité d’une échelle supérieurs, continentale. Le oui l’interdit. Que se soit du pont de vue ‘ultra-libéral globaliste’ - nous sommes gérés, effectivement, plus que gouvernés dans ce processus, que du point de vue ‘socialo-francmaçon’, de ‘coupe réglée’, éradicatrice, de plans hypertrophiés (pharaoniques?)dans l’espace et le temps, ainsi que le ‘soucis du détail’. Ces trois ‘toujours-plus’ sont caractéristiques, avec leurs contreparties de libre échangisme ‘sacré’ de ‘l’Europe de Bruxallia’ qui est en place et qu’il faut ‘calmer’. Le ‘club anti-chrétien’, pour détourner (lui retourner!) le mot de Michel Rocard…

Le oui découds, à tous les étages, ou presque, tout en se parrant bien sûr de ‘légalisme’, séduction de l’autorité, comme vous l’analysez si bien (comme toujours!).

Le non veut d’abords arrêter celà quand il en est encore temps, mais s’antiche bel et bien de ‘volonté constructiviste’, même si le ‘isme’ est peut-être de trop…
Bien à vous, merçi encore
l’Omnivore Sobriquet

Merci pour cette excellente info.

Je tiens à remercier l’ensemble de votre équipe qui nous offre un regard critique et original sur l’actualité. Votre travail journalistique s’appuie sur une comparaison de textes et d’articles de journaux que nous n’avons pas l’occasion de consulter, votre grille d’analyse est principalement, si j’ai bien compris, le virtualisme et vous tenez compte du facteur psychologique des acteurs de la société ; facteur, qui me semble aussi primordial pour comprendre ce qui se passe aujourd’hui, mais qui est cependant généralement négligé par les journalistes traditionnels .
Je ne manque pas de conseiller votre site à des amis qui s’intéressent à l’actualité.

Mais d’ailleurs, je ne suis pas le seul à apprécier votre travail, sachez que le site http://www.nonsocialiste.fr/ a repris intégralement votre article, mais il semble avoir oublié de mentionner les auteurs et la source… Ce qui me pousse à vous écrire et, peut-être, vous informer à mon tour.

Voici une analyse au vitriol de “Strategic Forecasting”, agence privé (du Texas) d’analyse géopolitique. La France aurait désormais perdu les chances de batir l’Europe-puissance. Vos impressions?

—
France and the EU Vote: Oui or Non? Dream On

—Summary—

French voters decide May 29 whether to approve the proposed EU Constitution.
Public opinion has favored a no vote over the past four weeks. But regardless
of how the vote turns out, the French dream of using a united Europe to
magnify Paris’ influence globally will remain just that: a dream.

—Analysis—

The French vote May 29 on whether to approve the European Union’s new
constitution. Far from the easy victory the government—and France’s fellow
Europeans—expected, however, the constitution’s naysayers have
consistently led in opinion polls over the past four weeks.

In a union of 25 states, there is little that everyone can agree on. But one
thing our sources across the Continent seem to be in agreement on is this: if
the French reject the constitution, the charter dies.

Unlike previous treaties, this one will not be renegotiated. Not only is the
text as integrationist as Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, etc., would allow, the constitution is the best that Paris could
possibly hope for—after all, a Frenchman wrote it. Valery Giscard
d’Estaing, the document’s author, has campaigned for the constitution in a
bit of a fog, stunned that any sane Frenchman might suggest that he could
have eked more out of the marathon negotiations.

So a French “non” leaves only one route for the constitution to be salvaged:
resubmission in hopes of receiving the “correct” result. Hardly the vote of
confidence that France, a founding member of a united Europe, was expected to
provide.

Many pundits have attributed the lack of French enthusiasm for the
constitution to the love deficit they feel toward the current government.
Similar perceptions nearly defeated France’s approval of previous EU treaty
law and have led many to call the constitution vote a “Raffarindum” on the
popularity of Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, which a survey published
May 20 puts at 21 percent.

That is an easy explanation, but it represents a cop out. It also does not
explain why French politicians on the left and right—some even from within
the ruling party—are both campaigning for the “non” forces. In fact,
French agonizing is so acute that Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude
Juncker, currently wearing the mantle of the EU presidency, resorted April 19
to saying that the French should vote for the constitution if for no other
reason than because the Americans want them to vote no.

What all this misses is that this referendum is fundamentally different from
previous EU votes. France stands at a crossroads and quite literally has no
idea which path to follow.

France and “Europe”

When the French government first jumped into the European experiment in the
early days after World War II, the idea of a “united” Europe was simple: make
another European war unthinkable. After France’s initial postwar political
stability issues were sorted out with the ascendance of Charles de Gaulle,
however, the focus quickly changed.

Under Gaullism, the French sense of centrality, extant since the pre-1871
period, returned. Formerly, Paris was for all practical purposes the capital
of Europe, even while the British were far more active in global affairs. The
reascendance in French political thought of the importance of French power
left Paris—and in particular, de Gaulle—outraged at the political
balance of the Cold War.

Far from calling the shots—or even having a say—in Europe, France found
itself relegated to the sidelines as just another European state undergoing
massive American-funded and -directed reconstruction. Washington created the
Bretton Woods system to manage European economic affairs. Washington created
NATO to manage European security affairs. Politics were left to the Europeans
so long as they did not clash with either Bretton Woods or NATO. For a
Gaullist, such an arrangement was intolerable.

De Gaulle’s reaction was twofold. First, France needed to take command of its
own security affairs, so in 1966, Paris withdrew from the NATO Military
Committee, ordering NATO forces off French soil. Second, it needed a
potential counterweight to the United States. Something that could in time
ultimately challenge the West’s superpower.

That something became “Europe.”

At first, everything went blissfully according to plan. France’s original
five European partners—Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands—perhaps represented the perfect match for France’s
geopolitical ambitions. The Low Countries—ravaged in both world wars—
were in no mood to rock the boat and demand much of anything. And given their
diminutive size, France had little problem overshadowing them politically.

As for the other two, Western attitudes toward German behavior during the
Second World War ensured that Bonn would spend at least a generation
apologizing for its actions, allowing Paris to slip into Germany’s shoes and
speak for Bonn, too. Finally, there was Italy which was, well, Italy.

And so in this little Europe, the French had their first soapbox. Paris
wasted no time in working to establish a middle ground between Washington and
Moscow. A key policy of the time were efforts to convince their European
partners that American security guarantees were meaningless, and that Europe
should seek an accommodation with the Soviets under a French-led security
partnership.

In retrospect, Americans may find this almost farcical, but one must remember
the context and the times.

While pitching itself as the ultimate guarantor of European security, the
United States suffered from an unavoidable and equally inconvenient fact: it
was on the wrong side of the Atlantic. Any conventional NATO-Russian conflict
was destined to end with the Soviets overrunning Western Europe, as the
Americans simply could not relocate forces in time. That meant that the core
pillar of the American security guarantee was the nuclear option—which
would, of course, result in a Soviet counterstrike annihilating the United
States.

Why, the French would ask, should we believe that the Americans would be
willing to guarantee their country’s destruction to protect us? Countering
that argument forced the United States to fight any fight the Soviet Union
chose, at the time and place of the Soviet Union’s choosing. As such, the
United States found itself sucked into conflicts in places such as Korea,
Vietnam and Cambodia.

But in time, France’s ability to speak for Europe rapidly degraded. The core
logic behind Gaullism and French foreign policy in the post-World War II era
was that Paris had to matter. Countries should need to come to France for
guidance and arbitration. French troops should be needed in strategic
locations. For that to happen, France needed a core group of states willing
to let France speak and act on the group’s behalf. In a Europe of six, that
was possible.

But not as Europe expanded.

The key year when France’s dream of a French-led Europe began to falter was
1973, the year Denmark, Ireland, and most of all, the United Kingdom, joined
the European Community, the forbearer of today’s European Union. Unlike
France’s existing partners, London would neither admit to French centrality
nor submit to French authority. The United Kingdom—a country with a vested
interest in being part of Europe so it could prevent the development of a
Europe strong enough to threaten its independence—became Europe’s poison
pill. It should be no surprise that Paris did not cease vetoing the United
Kingdom’s membership application until after de Gaulle left office.

Every state that the European Community—which morphed into the European
Union in 1993—accepted as a member for the next 22 years complicated
France’s vision. Greece was in effect a European island with security
concerns far from France’s; Spain and Portugal enjoyed strong relations with
Latin America and ultimately the United States; Austria, Finland and Sweden
—all officially neutral states—made the idea of a French-led common
European security force problematic at best.

Russia and a “Greater Europe”

But what is often missed is the centrality that Moscow played in French
plans, and how efforts to broaden and deepen the European Union—a
prerequisite for a stronger Europe capable of countering the United States—
made it impossible for Russia to participate in realizing French ambitions.

Paris fully understands that the United States’ overwhelming economic heft—
at the beginning of 2005 the U.S. economy stood at more than $11 trillion
versus the European Union’s $7 trillion—means that successfully
challenging the United States requires some flavor of a “greater Europe.”
Considering the dearth of options available, such an entity by default
required a close strategic partnership with Russia.

In many ways a Franco-Russian partnership is a match made in heaven. The two
are far enough removed from each other that they have few points of contact,
and therefore few points of friction. That became even more the case with the
implosion of Russian influence globally during the 1990s. Both are resentful
of what they perceive as the intrusion of American power into their backyard
—and front yard. Both feel, with considerable justification, that they
would be far more powerful both at home and abroad if the United States were
taken down a peg or 30.

During the Cold War, European security arrangements with the United States
made any broad Franco-Russian alliance impractical. With the end of the Cold
War, however, the European security dynamic changed sufficiently enough that
it was possible to consider not just a Franco-Russian partnership, but
perhaps even a European-Russian grouping. Despite the problems of brokering
agreements among a Europe of 12, and as of 1995, 15 members, suddenly the
building blocks for a larger “Europe” came tantalizingly within reach.

But two unrelated events directly linked to French efforts to strengthen
Europe soon fully killed the French dream to create a rival superpower—and
both had to do with Russia.

The first occurred Jan. 2, 2002, when the European Union formally adopted the
euro as the Continent’s common currency. Although since that time the
financial strictures undergirding the euro have been watered down and
creatively interpreted, one thing that all EU states readily agree on is that
post-Soviet collapse Russia is incapable of meeting the financial rigors
necessary to qualify for euro membership within a human lifetime. Since
meeting those requirements is embedded within EU membership requirements,
Russia is barred from EU membership because of technical reasons. In other
words, assuming both Paris and Moscow were interested in solidifying an
alliance under the aegis of the European Union—which would constitute the
ideal scenario for Paris given its assumption that it would lead an EU with
Russia as a member—the implementation of the common currency regime
essentially rendered this economically impossible.

The second discriminating event occurred on May 1, 2004 when the EU expanded
to bring in 10 Central European and Mediterranean states. Seven of the 10
states the European Union absorbed in 2004 had been directly occupied by the
Russians since World War II, and none of them trust Moscow. The problem
introduced by U.K. membership was suddenly magnified tenfold, and a common
Russian-French foreign policy, determined by Paris of course, is now a
political impossibility.

Without the population, geographic heft and resources of Russia, Europe
remains dependent on the United States for security, markets and—via
American global military commitments—also on U.S. military force to
guarantee European access to global resources and markets alike.

For all practical purposes, from the French viewpoint, the idea of a greater
Europe realistically capable of challenging the United States is dead.

Of Constitutions and Betrayal

Which brings us back to the issue at hand: the French Constitution. While
Paris continued to attempt to use Europe to further its geopolitical goals,
it knew full well that Europe would lack the size and strength to challenge
the United States in its current form without Russia’s help. The question
then became: How does France make due with the building blocks it has on
hand?

The constitution was supposed to answer that question. As French thinking
went, having a common European constitution would bind the member states into
a firm alliance that paid heed to French wisdom, expertise and goals. As
such, Paris pulled every string it had to put a Frenchman in charge of
putting the critical document together.

While that process was under way, however, the world threw France a curveball
in the form of the 2003 Iraq war. Paris recognized straightaway that a world
in which the United States could launch Iraq-style operations without consent
or consequence would be a world in which France neither mattered nor was
respected. Paris, feeling secure in its position as the leader of “Europe,”
worked with the Germans and various EU bureaucrats nominally responsible for
EU foreign policy and publicly challenged the United States’ motives and
methods on all things Iraqi.

The result was that nearly all of the rest of Europe broke ranks with the
Franco-German (and to a lesser degree, Russian) axis. In January 2003, almost
a year after France took it upon itself to represent Europe as a power facing
off against the United States, a host of other European countries—Denmark,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United
Kingdom—issued an open letter in the world’s newspapers applauding the
United States’ role in Europe. The letter also opposed French efforts
regarding Iraq and mocked the idea of a common European foreign policy.

Within days, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia indicated that they also would have signed the letter
if asked. The Netherlands chimed in that it had wanted to sign but was
concerned that it would create an appearance of European disunity.

Paris perceived the statements as betrayals of European (read: French) values
and a (successful) challenge to the idea of French leadership. Suddenly, the
entire European experiment had been turned on its head, and instead of Europe
meekly allowing France to wax philosophic about the wonders of Parisian
culture and statesmanship, a very different “Europe” began to take shape.
That Europe became codified into the document the French will consider May
29.

In this Europe, foreign policy would be largely relegated to the hands of
each member state. Common European positions could be crafted, but they would
first have to receive unanimous support from the 25 EU members. Estonia or
Hungary could counter French efforts to ally with Russia. Cyprus or Greece
could block French efforts to court Turkey. Bulgaria or the United Kingdom
could halt French efforts to isolate the United States. Suddenly, instead of
an enabler, the European Union had become a cage.

And the cage has a mind of its own. The French statist/socialist model (still
highly popular among the French) always has clashed with Anglo-style
capitalism, which more closely resembles American economic practices. Nearly
all of the states that joined in 2004, as well as Bulgaria and Romania who
will join in 2007, fall on the side of the United Kingdom in thinking.
Combined with a European Commission that took office in late 2004, Paris
finds its entire economic model under constant criticism. And unlike the
realm of foreign policy, EU economic initiatives do not require a unanimous
vote—except in issues of taxation, a category where high French taxes put
French business at a permanent disadvantage.

As such, the constitution put before the French populace in the May 29
referendum represents the worst of all worlds for France.

It constitutionally isolates France within a union of broadly pro-American
states, it gives other states the potential to impose on France what the
French perceive as a hostile economic structure and it essentially destroys
any hope France once had for forming a French-led union.

No wonder then that the French are hesitant about voting for the
constitution. Doing so not only would put them on the defensive within
Europe, it would consign dreams of global influence to history’s proverbial
dustbin.

Making matters even worse (yes, it can get worse), rejecting the constitution
would not help. Should any single state—say, France—vote no, the
constitution will not take effect. This would mean that existing EU treaty
law, which the constitution would have superceded, would remain intact. The
voting provisions laid out by the Nice Treaty represent the most important
provisions a no vote would preserve.

To be approved, the constitution demands that decisions be approved by 55
percent of the European Union’s states representing at least 65 percent of
the European Union’s population. Under such an arrangement, France and
Germany voting together could be overruled, but it would take near EU
unanimity to do so.

Under Nice, however, the smaller states have far more power in proportion to
their populations. Spain, for example, has 27 votes to France’s 29, despite
only having 41 million people to France’s 59 million. As the states get
smaller, the distortion grows. The three Baltic states and the Czech Republic
—with a combined population of less than 20 million—voting together
wield as many votes as the proud Fifth Republic.

The European Union has now become too large to be safely controlled, and too
hostile to French aspirations to be trusted. The French truly are damned
whether they do or do not.

Bonjour,

Fidèle lecteur depuis plus de deux ans maintenant (inscrit liste diffusion), je n’ai qu’un regret concernant votre site: L’utilisation de la langue anglaise, que je ne maitrise pas assez.

Je ne vous demande pas de traduire les articles que vous reprenez, mais juste les citations que vous incluez dans vos pertinentes analyses.

Ce serait super !

Merci.

François ;o)

Je relève que l’extrait que vous faites du traité de Nice “La politique de l’Union au sens du présent article n’affecte pas le caractère spécifique de la politique de sécurité et de défense de certains Etats membres ...” me paraît rigoureusement identique au texte proposé comme Constitution, dans le même article 41, paragraphe -2- second alinéa.
Il n’y aurait donc pas, à mon sens, d’avancée d’écrevisse, mais un statu-quo.

111° pays du monde en PIB par habitant ( en parité de pouvoir d’achat)
30 milliards de dollars de budget militaire annuel moitié moins que le Japon, un douziéme du budget US , où est le danger ?
en fait un régime centralisé un pouvoir fort
ah que ce serait rassurant une Chine balkanisée

un resserrement du noyau europeen d’un point de vu politique me semble essentiel pour eviter un total blocage de la mise en place d’un projet europeen coherent politiquement militairement economiquement….

Un essai sur les changements géopolitiques autour de la Mer Noire:

http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=302&language_id=1

encore bravo pour avoir denicher cette info

comme d’hab’

excellent !!!

Ainsi Mandy “chercher[ait] à mettre en place au nom de l’Europe et à l’exemple de ces chers Américains, des tarifs douaniers et des quotas contre les textiles chinois”... euh… on ne doit pas parler du même commissaire européen qui s’oppose résolument à l’adoption de toute mesure de sauvegarde…

US ‘backed illegal Iraqi oil deals’

Report claims blind eye was turned to sanctions busting by American firms

Julian Borger and Jamie Wilson in Washington
Tuesday May 17, 2005
The Guardian

The United States administration turned a blind eye to extensive sanctions-busting in the prewar sale of Iraqi oil, according to a new Senate investigation.
A report released last night by Democratic staff on a Senate investigations committee presents documentary evidence that the Bush administration was made aware of illegal oil sales and kickbacks paid to the Saddam Hussein regime but did nothing to stop them.

The scale of the shipments involved dwarfs those previously alleged by the Senate committee against UN staff and European politicians like the British MP, George Galloway, and the former French minister, Charles Pasqua.

In fact, the Senate report found that US oil purchases accounted for 52% of the kickbacks paid to the regime in return for sales of cheap oil - more than the rest of the world put together.

“The United States was not only aware of Iraqi oil sales which violated UN sanctions and provided the bulk of the illicit money Saddam Hussein obtained from circumventing UN sanctions,” the report said. “On occasion, the United States actually facilitated the illicit oil sales.

The report is likely to ease pressure from conservative Republicans on Kofi Annan to resign from his post as UN secretary general.

The new findings are also likely to be raised when Mr Galloway appears before the Senate subcommittee on investigations today.

The Respect MP for Bethnal Green and Bow arrived yesterday in Washington demanding an apology from the Senate for what he called the “schoolboy dossier” passed off as an investigation against him.

“It was full of holes, full of falsehoods and full of value judgments that are apparently only shared here in Washington,” he said at Washington Dulles airport.

He told Reuters: “I have no expectation of justice ... I come not as the accused but as the accuser. I am [going] to show just how absurd this report is.”

Mr Galloway has denied allegations that he profited from Iraqi oil sales and will come face to face with the committee in what promises to be one of the most highly charged pieces of political theatre seen in Washington for some time.

Yesterday’s report makes two principal allegations against the Bush administration. Firstly, it found the US treasury failed to take action against a Texas oil company, Bayoil, which facilitated payment of “at least $37m in illegal surcharges to the Hussein regime”.

The surcharges were a violation of the UN Oil For Food programme, by which Iraq was allowed to sell heavily discounted oil to raise money for food and humanitarian supplies. However, Saddam was allowed to choose which companies were given the highly lucrative oil contracts. Between September 2000 and September 2002 (when the practice was stopped) the regime demanded kickbacks of 10 to 30 US cents a barrel in return for oil allocations.

In its second main finding, the report said the US military and the state department gave a tacit green light for shipments of nearly 8m barrels of oil bought by Jordan, a vital American ally, entirely outside the UN-monitored Oil For Food system. Jordan was permitted to buy some oil directly under strict conditions but these purchases appeared to be under the counter.

The report details a series of efforts by UN monitors to obtain information about Bayoil’s oil shipments in 2001 and 2002, and the lack of help provided by the US treasury.

After repeated requests over eight months from the UN and the US state department, the treasury’s office of foreign as sets control wrote to Bayoil in May 2002, requesting a report on its transactions but did not “request specific information by UN or direct Bayoil to answer the UN’s questions”.

Bayoil’s owner, David Chalmers, has been charged over the company’s activities. His lawyer Catherine Recker told the Washington Post: “Bayoil and David Chalmers [said] they have done nothing illegal and will vigorously defend these reckless accusations.”

The Jordanian oil purchases were shipped in the weeks before the war, out of the Iraqi port of Khor al-Amaya, which was operating without UN approval or surveillance.

Investigators found correspondence showing that Odin Marine Inc, the US company chartering the seven huge tankers which picked up the oil at Khor al-Amaya, repeatedly sought and received approval from US military and civilian officials that the ships would not be confiscated by US Navy vessels in the Maritime Interdiction Force (MIF) enforcing the embargo.

Odin was reassured by a state department official that the US “was aware of the shipments and has determined not to take action”.

The company’s vice president, David Young, told investigators that a US naval officer at MIF told him that he “had no objections” to the shipments. “He said that he was sorry he could not say anything more. I told him I completely understood and did not expect him to say anything more,” Mr Young said.

An executive at Odin Maritime confirmed the senate account of the oil shipments as “correct” but declined to comment further.

It was not clear last night whether the Democratic report would be accepted by Republicans on the Senate investigations committee.

The Pentagon declined to comment. The US representative’s office at the UN referred inquiries to the state department, which fail to return calls.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1485649,00.html
—-
Le kiosque
The Guardian
Selon le quotidien anglais, ce sont essentiellement des firmes américaines qui ont contourné le programme pétrole contre nourriture, sans que l’administration Bush intervienne.

Par Libération.fr
mardi 17 mai 2005 (Liberation.fr - 12:27)

Le quotidien britannique The Guardian lève mardi un nouveau lièvre dans l’affaire des petits arrangements pétroliers de Saddam Hussein avec les Occidentaux. Il s’agit d’un nouveau rapport de la commission sénatoriale américaine, démocrate celui-là. La semaine dernière, un rapporteur républicain du Sénat américain montrait du doigt deux parlementaires européens, accusés d’avoir touché des pots-de-vins du dictateur irakien: le Français Charles Pasqua et l’Anglais George Galloway. Cette fois, explique l’article, ce sont les compagnies américaines qui sont visées. Les achats de pétrole par des firmes US «se sont montés à 52% des dessous-de-table versés au régime contre les droits de vente de brut bon marché – plus que tous les autres pays réunis», écrit The Guardian. En clair, les pétroliers américains ont contourné en toute illégalité et sous l’œil bienveillant de l’administration Bush, le programme «pétrole contre nourriture» mis en place par l’Onu pour permettre aux Irakiens d’écouler sur le marché une partie des leurs barils et d’acheter des biens de première nécessité.
Pour obtenir le droit d’exporter le pétrole, ces compagnies versaient au clan Saddam de 10 à 30 centimes de plus par baril irakien. Le rapport vise en particulier une entreprise du Texas, Bayoil, pour le détournement de 37 millions de dollars vers les poches du président irakien sans que le Trésor américain n’y trouve rien à redire. Il explique aussi comment les Marines censés surveillés la bonne application de l’embargo pétrolier contre l’Irak, ont fermé les yeux sur les tankers (américains) remplis de brut qui quittait le port de Khor-al Amaya pour la Jordanie. La Jordanie, alliée des Etats-Unis dans la région, a ainsi pu se fournir en pétrole irakien à bon prix, contre ristourne et sans que l’Onu n’en sache rien.

http://www.liberation.fr/page.php?Article=297126

Je vous envoie à nouveau ce petit texte d’introduction envoyé en Décembre. Le texte de MacDonald est maintenant accessible gratuitement en ligne. Il contient plusieurs détails sur les ‘néo-cons’ que l’on ne retrouve pas ailleurs

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Dans le contexte du récent raid du FBI sur les bureaux de l’AIPAC et du texte sur les réseaux de “néo-cons” de Janine R. Wedel, j’ai pensé que cette analyse pourrait vous intéresser même si l’auteur n’est pas quelqu’un aux opinions “respectables”. Mais comme certains ‘néo-cons’ n’hésitent pas a traiter leur adversaires d’anti-sémites, il fallait s’attendre à ce que quelqu’un finisse par noter que leur passion pour Israel a probablement une cause ethnique et non pas idéologique (Douglais Feith par exemple est le fils d’un disciple de l’ultra-nationaliste juif Jabotinsky).

Kevin MacDonald est un auteur controversé. Il est enseignant de psychologie dans une université Californienne. On peut le placer dans l’équivalent américain de la mouvance que l’on appelle en Europe la Nouvelle Droite. Il a analysé sans gants blancs ni pincettes l’activisme juif au 20e siècle dans un livre intitulé “The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements”, le 3e livre d’une trilogie sur le peuple juif. C’est ce livre qui rend beaucoup de gens inconfortables puisque l’auteur se positionne contre les intérêts juifs et le fait dans des termes raciaux dans la préface du livre, que l’on peut lire ici:

http://www.csulb.edu/~kmacd/books-Preface.html

Il a commencé a faire parler de lui après avoir témoigné en faveur de l’historien révisioniste David Irving a la demande de celui-ci lors du procès en diffamation initié par l’historien contre l’auteur américaine Deborah Lipstadt. Il explique les raisons de sa décision ici:

http://www.csulb.edu/~kmacd/Irving.html

On peut lire sa déposition ici:

http://www.csulb.edu/~kmacd/irving-statementCourt.html

et le texte des échanges à la cour ici:

http://www.csulb.edu/~kmacd/irving-testimony.html

Pour résumer, le thème principal de sa trilogie (que je n’ai pas encore lu en entier cependant) est que la culture juive a “eugénisé” les juifs pour les rendre aptes à l’activité intellectuelle et à la “compétition sociale” contre les autres groupes ethniques et que l’anti-sémitisme au cours de l’histoire n’est pas un phénomène irrationnel et fut plus souvent qu’autrement une réaction contre cette minorité à la nature différente. C’est un des reproches principaux contre ses livres: on dit qu’il fait porter le blâme de ces conflits ethniques sur les victimes. Mais c’est une thèse similaire à celle de Benjamin Ginsberg, l’auteur du livre “The Fatal Embrace: the jews and the state”, publié par l’Université de Chicago. On peut lire une critique de ce livre a cette page :

http://www.thornwalker.com/ditch/deadlyenemy.htm

Son analyse du néo-conservatisme en est une que personne d’autre que lui n’oserait écrire ou n’aurait les connaissances pour le faire. Ce n’est pas kasher du tout mais avec 274 notes de références c’est du sérieux.

Understanding Jewish Influence III: Neoconservatism as a Jewish Movement

http://theoccidentalquarterly.com/vol4no2/km-understandIII.html

“The thesis presented here is that neoconservatism is indeed a Jewish intellectual and political movement. This paper is the final installment in a three-part series on Jewish activism and reflects many of the themes of the first two articles. The first paper in this series focused on the traits of ethnocentrism, intelligence, psychological intensity, and aggressiveness.1 These traits will be apparent here as well. The ethnocentrism of the neocons has enabled them to create highly organized, cohesive, and effective ethnic networks. Neoconservatives have also exhibited the high intelligence necessary for attaining eminence in the academic world, in the elite media and think tanks, and at the highest levels of government. They have aggressively pursued their goals, not only in purging more traditional conservatives from their positions of power and influence, but also in reorienting US foreign policy in the direction of hegemony and empire. Neoconservatism also illustrates the central theme of the second article in this series: In alliance with virtually the entire organized American Jewish community, neoconservatism is a vanguard Jewish movement with close ties to the most extreme nationalistic, aggressive, racialist and religiously fanatic elements within Israel.2”

Les deux précédents articles:

Understanding Jewish Influence I: Background Traits for Jewish Activism

http://theoccidentalquarterly.com/vol3no2/km-understanding.html

Understanding Jewish Influence II: Zionism and the Internal Dynamics of Judaism

http://theoccidentalquarterly.com/vol3no3/km-understandII.html

Sur le site de MacDonald il y a les coordonnées pour commander un petit livre (monograph) qui regroupe les trois articles ci-dessus, 142p, 12 $us :

http://www.csulb.edu/~kmacd/books.html

La constitution permet-elle encore l’opposition de la France (comme elle l’a fait pour l’Irak) à un conflit décidé par les membres de l’OTAN ?
Merci