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Très bon article sur la Commission. A mon avis cela démontre, une fois de plus, comment les Américains et les atlantistes agissent sans difficulté dans l’UE. Ceux qui pensent que l’UE puisse limiter l’hégémonie états-unienne en Europe et dans le monde, se trompent. En fait, l’UE détruit les souverainétés nationales, qui sont la seule garantie de démocratie et de justice sociale, pour les remplacer avec une oligarchie amorphe, très influencée par Washington.
Il faut retourner à une politique EN Europe, et laisser tomber toute idée d’Union intégrée, qui ne fait que ruiner les peuples européens.

Une dépêche d’Associated Press relayée par Yahoo! nous apprend qu’un homme politique important des US,le gouverneur du New Jersey, démissionne après avoir reconnu “honteusement” une relation homosexuelle adultère.

Quand verrons-nous enfin un homme politique américain assumer plenement et librement sa sexualité, fût-elle “déviante” par rapport à la moyenne statistique de la population globale ?

Faudra-t-il que tous, comme le fit Clinton, nous abreuve de leurs écoeurants actes de contrition ?

Bon Dieu de bon sang, ces hommes-là n’ont-ils plus aucune tripes, plus aucune couilles, pour ainsi s’avilir dans le plus obscène repentir ?

Quand on voit à quel point un peuple peut être coincé au niveau de la braguette, pas étonnant qu’il lui arrive les déboires qui lui arrivent. ( Et on a envie d’ajouter : on récolte ce que l’on sème) Nietzsche aurait pu nous écrire des pages et des pages inoubliables sur ce sujet…

Pas une once de fierté, pas un fifrelin de force morale ou plutôt, de force vitale, pour pouvoir simplement dire “Eh oui, j’aime baiser, que ce soit avec une stagiaire de bureau ovale ou que ce soit avec un homme ! C’est ainsi, que cela vous plaise ou non ! Et de toutes façons c’est pas vos oignons !” Au lieu de cela, la plus abjecte contrition, la plus veule repentance, la pratique consciencieuse et appliquée de l’autoflagellation, les vains regrets, les remords les plus vifs, dans un nauséabond besoin de confession publique.

Que ne demande-t-il pas, tant qu’il y est, sa lapidation publique ???

Beeuuurkkk !

http://fr.news.yahoo.com/040812/5/408ou.html

“jeudi 12 aout 2004, 22h50

Le gouverneur du New Jersey démissionne après avoir reconnu une liaison adultère avec un autre homme

TRENTON, New Jersey (AP) - Le gouverneur démocrate du New Jersey a annoncé jeudi sa démission après avoir reconnu avoir eu une relation extra-conjugale avec un autre homme.

“Ma vérité, c’est que je suis un gay américain”, a déclaré James McGreevey. Cet homme marié et père de deux enfants a précisé que sa démission prendrait effet le 15 novembre.

“Honteusement, j’ai eu des relations adultes consentante avec un autre homme, ce qui viole les liens du mariage”, a ajouté le gouverneur. “C’était mal, c’était inconscient, c’était inexcusable”, a-t-il lancé, expliquant qu’il avait décidé de démissionner car ce secret, sur sa sexualité et sa liaison adultère, rendait trop vulnérable sa fonction de gouverneur. AP”

Pauvre type ! Pauvre Amérique…

http://www.courrierinternational.com/article.asp?obj_id=25414&provenance=accueil&bloc=02

Revue de presse   PRÉSIDENTIELLE AMÉRICAINE - L’angoisse de la fraude   A trois mois du scrutin présidentiel, un arsenal de mesures a été mis en place pour réduire au minimum le risque de fraude et d’erreurs. Une seule obsession : ne pas reproduire le scénario chaotique de l’an 2000. Pourtant, organisation du scrutin et commission de surveillance électorale restent sujets à polémique.

“Le 2 novembre 2004, environ 96 millions d’électeurs américains (sur un total de 115) vont désigner leur futur président à l’aide d’un système informatisé piratable de manière totalement invisible par les programmeurs des sociétés privées qui gèrent les élections”, s’inquiète The Nation

. Selon le magazine de gauche américain, “la conséquence pourrait être l’échec de la présidentielle américaine et son effondrement, provoqué par une avalanche de soupçons, d’accusations, et le déclenchement d’une colère publique telle que les événements de 2000 en Floride auront l’air d’avoir été une banale querelle de famille.”

Selon The Nation, revue d’opinion, confier le compte des voix à des entreprises privées ouvre “un champ impressionnant de fraude et d’erreurs possibles”. D’après l’hebdomadaire, “les quatre sociétés qui gèrent le vote automatique ne sont pas fiables et impartiales”. Par exemple, affirme le magazine, “les machines de l’entreprise texane Diebold Election Systems, qui se revendique républicaine, n’ont pas bien fonctionné en 2004 lors d’une élection en Californie”. Une autre entreprise, Hart InterCivic, d’Austin, au Texas, a pour principal investisseur Tom Hicks, un des hommes qui a aidé George W. Bush à devenir millionnaire.

De plus, ajoute The Nation, malgré le secret qui entoure le codage des programmes, il existerait toujours une ‘trappe’, une porte d’entrée cachée que les pirates utilisent pour pénétrer dans le système. Enfin, aucune trace papier ne sera disponible pour recompter les votes. L’ordinateur émettra une liste qui pourra être truquée ou tout simplement faussée par une erreur incontrôlable. Selon l’hebdomadaire, “il existe la possibilité que 30 % des votes de novembre soient impossibles à vérifier, à recompter et à contrôler”.

Or l’un des soucis majeurs est d’éviter de reproduire le chaos électoral vécu en Floride lors de la précédente élection présidentielle, en 2000. En obtenant la majorité des voix dans cet Etat, George W. Bush avait remporté le scrutin, devenant président des Etats-Unis. Toutefois, le décompte des voix avait été particulièrement contesté et aujourd’hui encore nul ne sait de manière incontestable si George W. Bush a réellement obtenu plus de votes que son adversaire Al Gore en Floride en 2000.

Les aléas de ce scrutin devenu par la force des choses historique furent nombreux. Machines à voter qui fonctionnaient mal, bulletins incompréhensibles, “jusqu’à des votes d’électeurs, en particulier ceux provenant de minorités ethniques, qui n’ont pas été comptabilisées faute de listes électorales correctes”.

La crainte de voir le même scénario se reproduire a conduit au vote de la loi HAVA (Help America Vote Act), en 2002. “La loi HAVA a aggravé la situation”, estime pourtant The Nation. “Créée à la suite de cette loi, la commission de surveillance des élections doit définir le mode de fonctionnement du recomptage, mais quatre mois avant l’élection, elle manque toujours de personnel et son action est controversée”, dénonce le magazine. “Le 17 juin 2004, la commission a envoyé 861 millions de dollars à 25 Etats, principalement pour qu’ils s’équipent de machines pour lesquelles aucune norme technique n’a encore été définie”, affirme le journal new-yorkais.

Outre l’automatisation quasi totale du vote, “une autre modification du système électoral pourrait empêcher la comptabilisation de tous les votes : certaines personnes vont devoir faire la preuve de leur identité avant de voter”, note The Nation. En effet, les personnes votant pour la première fois dans une juridiction après s’être inscrites sur Internet, où la vérification de l’identité n’est pas effectuée, devront présenter une pièce d’identité. Cela peut poser des problèmes pour les Indiens qui vivent dans les réserves et qui n’ont pas de pièce d’identité où figure leur photo. “Il y a plusieurs manières d’exclure des électeurs du scrutin, en omettant de leur donner la liste des pièces d’identité sans photo permettant de voter, par exemple”, note le magazine.

“Les militants des droits civiques craignent que seuls les membres des minorités se voient demander une pièce d’identité par les employés des bureaux de vote”, explique le journal. Une autre des mesures mises en place par la commission est “la possibilité d’enregistrer un vote provisoire pour les électeurs qui ne sont pas correctement inscrits sur les listes électorales”, relate le New York Times

. “Le but est de comptabiliser le maximum de votes et de ne pas écarter des gens sous prétexte d’une irrégularité administrative”, précise le quotidien américain. Mais, ce qui risque de coincer, “c’est le manque d’habitude et de qualification des employés des bureaux de vote”, ajoute le journal.

De même, USA Today

assure que “la plus grande menace pour l’élection présidentielle de novembre 2004 est la désorganisation et les erreurs potentielles du million et demi d’employés vieillissants des bureaux de vote, d’après les conclusions de la commission de surveillance”. “Il manque 2 millions de personnes pour mener à bien une élection d’une telle envergure et la moyenne d’âge des employés des bureaux de vote est de 72 ans”, s’inquiète le quotidien américain. La commission demande le recrutement de nouveaux employés “dans les lycées, les universités, les conseils municipaux”. Un guide à l’usage de ces salariés qui vont encadrer le scrutin a été créé, recommandant par exemple d’“inciter les gens à s’entraîner sur la machine sur laquelle ils voteront”. “C’est la première fois que le gouvernement fédéral s’implique autant dans des élections nationales, traditionnellement gérées par les Etats”, note USA Today. L’enjeu : “Ne pas répéter les mêmes erreurs qu’en Floride.”

Ainsi les Etats-Unis sont même allés jusqu’à accepter, pour la première fois de leur histoire, la présence d’observateurs internationaux de l’OSCE (Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe) pour s’assurer du bon déroulement du scrutin. “Les démocrates, menés par la députée Corrine Brown, de l’Etat de Floride, ont souhaité le recours à des observateurs de l’ONU après les résultats controversés de l’élection de 2000”, rapporte le Boston Globe

. “Le département d’Etat américain a salué la décision de l’OSCE d’envoyer une équipe et a démenti l’existence du moindre doute sur la transparence de l’élection à venir.”

  Hamdam Mostafavi

en fin d’article de l’IHT, on apprend les relations cordiales qui animent les mebres de la Force Multi Nationale ...

In Copenhagen, The Associated Press said that the Danish military in Iraq had suspended handing over prisoners to British forces after the Iraqi government reinstated capital punishment.

http://www.iht.com/articles/533415.html

Il faut relativiser, les pilotes américains ont en effet l’habitude de se faire “ratatiner” durant les exercices…ce n’est pas vraiment nouveau.

En Inde, on parle de combat tournoyant. Or les pilotes de su-30 sont équipés de viseurs de casque (meme s’ils sont rudimentaires) et de missiles R-73 qui sont assez nettement supérieurs à l’aim-9L en terme de manoeuvrabilité (pour la fiabilité c’est sans doute autre chose mais comme ce sont des combats simulés cela ne rentre pas en ligne de compte).

Cela donne un avantage décisif aux indiens pour le combat tournoyant…avantage qui serait sans doute largement comblé si les pilotes de F-15 avaient été équipés de viseurs HMS et d’aim-9x.

La meme chose est arrivé récemment aux français : Les combats tournoyants entre mirage 2000 français et F-16 Belges sont fréquents et assez équilibrés.

Il y a peu, les Belges ont testé le missile aim-9X couplé à un viseur de casque américain…resultat, les mirages se font tailler en pièces…

Tout cela pour dire qu’en combat tournoyant, le moindre avantage est déterminant mais ne vient pas forcément de l’avion lui meme.

Pour en revenir à l’USAF, il ne faut pas oublier que la guerre aérienne moderne est surtout une question de AEW (détection longue portée) de BVR (combat hors de la portée visuelle) et de brouillage (guerre électronique)...3 domaines dominés par les américains (et les européens). pour l’heure, les Indiens (comme la plupart des forces aériennes du monde) ne fabriquent à grande échelle ni leurs missiles BVR, ni leurs contremesures, ni leur radars…ils sont donc extremement vulnérables lors d’engagement BVR.

Je dirais que ce ne serait pas la première fois que les pilotes de l’Air Force se font botter le derrière…
La première, c’était vers la fin des années 80, avec des mirages F1CR français participants a red flag.
Plus récemment, les Rafales de la marine ont surclassé les F14 et F18 en combat aérien.
Enfin, un exercice mettant en oeuvre 4 F15 contre un unique F22, s’est achevé par la victoire complète du F22, sans même que les pilotes de F15 n’aient pu localiser l’origine de la menace…

Que faut-il en retenir ?

Un: F15, F14, F18 première génération, F16 première génération, sont des appareils dépassés face aux 2000-5, Rafale, Gripen, SU-30 M/K/I. Il y a un rattrapage US sur l’électronique (antenne à balayage, contre mesure) mais ce qui est mis en défaut ici se sont bien les qualités de vol (taux virage, rayon de virage, incidence ...).

Deux: en conséquence une vitoire US ou une dérouillée dépend du scénario de l’exercice. En combat tournoyant, il est clair que les appareils US (sauf peut-être certains F16 E/F et F8 E/F) sont surclassés (manque de jus, qualité de vol inférieure) Dans un scénario d’engagement longue distance, les choses s’équilibrent. Je dis s’équilibrent car une appareil comme le SU-30 MKI indien possède, comme l’amraam US, des missiles d’origine russe (R-77) de qualité équivalente (tout comme le MICA français).
La différence se situera au niveau de la qualité du radar et sa sensibilité au brouillage.
Dans le cas indien, il semble que le scénario engagé fut celui d’un combat tournoyant. Et en effet, F15 vs SU-30 MKI, il n’y a pas photo, le sukhoi vire bien plus serré, possède plus de puissance motrice, et l’agilité naturelle de l’avion est encore plus impressionante grace à ses tuyères orientables.

Trois: en effet, les scénario d’entrainement type RED FLAG, MAPPLE FLAG ou COPER THUNDER ne correspondent pas à la réalité du combat aérien moderne, dans le sens combat aérien, c’est à dire avion contre avion.
90% des scénarii concernent l’attaque au sol dans la profondeur, où des assaillants doivent délivrer un armement de précision en essayant de passer au travers de la défense adverse. Il ne s’agit pas réellement d’ affrontements de défense aérienne à défense aérienne en vue d’acquérir la supériorité.

Quatre: les agresseurs sont en général équipés d’appareils qui ont une voire, deux générations de retard sur les matériels en ligne. Les spécialistes US semblent oublier, que des forces aériennes comme le Qatar, les Emirats, les Indiens, les égyptiens, les Russes, les Chinois sont relativement bien équipée de machines aux qualités équivalentes ou supérieure au F16 et F15. C’est une réalité quelque peu “oubliée” ou “ignorée”.

Cinq: la supériorité aérienne est un art, qui ne s’apprend pas en standardisant un cursus de formation dans une ecole, aussi prestigieuse soit-elle. Le combat aérien est une confrontation d’expérience, or, a part deux ou trois migs isolés abattus durant les campagne du kosovo ou la Gulf War I, il me semble (avis personnel) que les pilotes US perdent cette expérience acquise durant les années vietnam. Ce qui entraine, un manque d’inittiative, des formations formattés et à la carte ... qui ne sont pas adapatée face à une force aérienne moderne.

Six: les tactiques US de défense aérienne et d’engagement face à des agresseurs multiples non jamais été mise à l’épreuve, si ce n’est au cours d’exercice bien délimité ou chacun se doit, d’une certaine manière, d’accepter les règles strictes d’un jeu quelque peu faussé par rapport à la réalité. En général le scénario est un peu taillé sur mesure pour les machines US.

Sept: les forces aériennes étrangères ont envoyé de nombreux pilotes dans les pays occidentaux, cela fait partie des contrats de vente. Exemple: les singapouriens s’entrainent souvent avec les français, beaucoup de pilotes du moyen orient sont passé par les cursus de formation US; idem puor la force aérienen indienne. Ces pilotes ont été bien formés, et connaissent les tactiques US, l’état d’esprit US, et ont de bonnnes infos sur la qualité de leur matérielle. On oublie souvent de dire que c’est aussi la qualité des pilotes et des commandants d’unités de ces forces aériennes qui ont enormément progressé ces dernières années pas uniquement les pilotes US qui se sont ramollis. Les USA retrouvent lors de ces exercices des unités moins complexées, des pilotes plus agressifs, plus audacieux, des tactiques mieux construites et surtout mieux éxécutées (plus de discipline).

Que faut-il en retenir ?
L’USAF s’est fait l’apôtre depuis les années 80 de la doctrine de “Air Dominance”, il est clair aujurd’hui que cette doctrine a du plmob dans l’aile: les matériels ont pris un énorme coup de vieux face aux nouveaux modèles de Sukhoi, face au Rafale… Les pilotes US s’embourbent dans des formations un peu stéréotypées aux engagements beaucoup trop formattés et surtout, les gouffres financiers du F22 et F35 oblitèrent complètement le débat en le déplaçant sous le seul regard de la technologie.
Ces deux appareils ne correspondant pas aux futures menaces, et leur coût prohibitf font qu’ils ne seront déployés qu’en petite quantité, et donc si chers, qu’on ne va les engager que dans des scénarios où ils pourront a coup sur emporter la victoire.
Je terminerai par l’état d’esprit de l’USAF.

Souvenez-vous, au Kosovo, un F117A avait été descendu par la défense sol-air serbes. L’analyse de cette perte, à montré que les serbes avaient mis au point une véritable tactique anti-furtif. Certes, elle était rudimentaire, très empirique, et un peu aveugle. Mais ce qui a permis d’abattre cet avion, c’était que les responsables US faisaient passer leur F117A toujours aux memes endroits, toujours par les mêmes couloirs de pénétration sans même s’imaginer que la défense adverse aurait la possibilité d’exploiter cette faiblesse dans les conditions d’emploi du F117. Alors, s’agissait-il d’arrogance ? Je ne pense pas, mais il s’agissait surtout de routine, on les fait passer par ces couloirs car on a toujours fait comme ça ... Point. C’est bien un manque de formation et de souplesse qui est à l’origine de cette perte.
Voilà, ce que je voulais dire à propos de l’USAF tatouille. :)

Je dirais que ce ne serait pas la première fois que les pilotes de l’Air Force se font botter le derrière…
La première, c’était vers la fin des années 80, avec des mirages F1CR français participants a red flag.
Plus récemment, les Rafales de la marine ont surclassé les F14 et F18 en combat aérien.
Enfin, un exercice mettant en oeuvre 4 F15 contre un unique F22, s’est achevé par la victoire complète du F22, sans même que les pilotes de F15 n’aient pu localiser l’origine de la menace…
Que faut-il en retenir ?
Un: F15, F14, F18 première génération, F16 première génération, sont des appareils dépassés face aux 2000-5, Rafale, Gripen, SU-30 M/K/I. Il y a un rattrapage US sur l’électronique (antenne à balayage, contre mesure) mais ce qui est mis en défaut ici se sont bien les qualités de vol (taux virage, rayon de virage, incidence ...).
Deux: en conséquence une vitoire US ou une dérouillée dépend du scénario de l’exercice. En combat tournoyant, il est clair que les appareils US (sauf peut-être certains F16 E/F et F8 E/F) sont surclassés (manque de jus, qualité de vol inférieure) Dans un scénario d’engagement longue distance, les choses s’équilibrent. Je dis s’équilibrent car une appareil comme le SU-30 MKI indien possède, comme l’amraam US, des missiles d’origine russe (R-77) de qualité équivalente (tout comme le MICA français).
La différence se situera au niveau de la qualité du radar et sa sensibilité au brouillage.
Dans le cas indien, il semble que le scénario engagé fut celui d’un combat tournoyant. Et en effet, F15 vs SU-30 MKI, il n’y a pas photo, le sukhoi vire bien plus serré, possède plus de puissance motrice, et l’agilité naturelle de l’avion est encore plus impressionante grace à ses tuyères orientables.
Trois: en effet, les scénario d’entrainement type RED FLAG, MAPPLE FLAG ou COPER THUNDER ne correspondent pas à la réalité du combat aérien moderne, dans le sens combat aérien, c’est à dire avion contre avion.
90% des scénarii concernent l’attaque au sol dans la profondeur, où des assaillants doivent délivrer un armement de précision en essayant de passer au travers de la défense adverse. Il ne s’agit pas réellement d’ affrontements de défense aérienne à défense aérienne en vue d’acquérir la supériorité.
Quatre: les agresseurs sont en général équipés d’appareils qui ont une voire, deux générations de retard sur les matériels en ligne. Les spécialistes US semblent oublier, que des forces aériennes comme le Qatar, les Emirats, les Indiens, les égyptiens, les Russes, les Chinois sont relativement bien équipée de machines aux qualités équivalentes ou supérieure au F16 et F15. C’est une réalité quelque peu “oubliée” ou “ignorée”.
Cinq: la supériorité aérienne est un art, qui ne s’apprend pas en standardisant un cursus de formation dans une ecole, aussi prestigieuse soit-elle. Le combat aérien est une confrontation d’expérience, or, a part deux ou trois migs isolés abattus durant les campagne du kosovo ou la Gulf War I, il me semble (avis personnel) que les pilotes US perdent cette expérience acquise durant les années vietnam. Ce qui entraine, un manque d’inittiative, des formations formattés et à la carte ... qui ne sont pas adapatée face à une force aérienne moderne.
Six: les tactiques US de défense aérienne et d’engagement face à des agresseurs multiples non jamais été mise à l’épreuve, si ce n’est au cours d’exercice bien délimité ou chacun se doit, d’une certaine manière, d’accepter les règles strictes d’un jeu quelque peu faussé par rapport à la réalité. En général le scénario est un peu taillé sur mesure pour les machines US.
Sept: les forces aériennes étrangères ont envoyé de nombreux pilotes dans les pays occidentaux, cela fait partie des contrats de vente. Exemple: les singapouriens s’entrainent souvent avec les français, beaucoup de pilotes du moyen orient sont passé par les cursus de formation US; idem puor la force aérienen indienne. Ces pilotes ont été bien formés, et connaissent les tactiques US, l’état d’esprit US, et ont de bonnnes infos sur la qualité de leur matérielle. On oublie souvent de dire que c’est aussi la qualité des pilotes et des commandants d’unités de ces forces aériennes qui ont enormément progressé ces dernières années pas uniquement les pilotes US qui se sont ramollis. Les USA retrouvent lors de ces exercices des unités moins complexées, des pilotes plus agressifs, plus audacieux, des tactiques mieux construites et surtout mieux éxécutées (plus de discipline).
Que faut-il en retenir ?
L’USAF s’est fait l’apôtre depuis les années 80 de la doctrine de “Air Dominance”, il est clair aujurd’hui que cette doctrine a du plmob dans l’aile: les matériels ont pris un énorme coup de vieux face aux nouveaux modèles de Sukhoi, face au Rafale… Les pilotes US s’embourbent dans des formations un peu stéréotypées aux engagements beaucoup trop formattés et surtout, les gouffres financiers du F22 et F35 oblitèrent complètement le débat en le déplaçant sous le seul regard de la technologie.
Ces deux appareils ne correspondant pas aux futures menaces, et leur coût prohibitf font qu’ils ne seront déployés qu’en petite quantité, et donc si chers, qu’on ne va les engager que dans des scénarios où ils pourront a coup sur emporter la victoire.
Je terminerai par l’état d’esprit de l’USAF. Souvenez-vous, au Kosovo, un F117A avait été descendu par la défense sol-air serbes. L’analyse de cette perte, à montré que les serbes avaient mis au point une véritable tactique anti-furtif. Certes, elle était rudimentaire, très empirique, et un peu aveugle. Mais ce qui a permis d’abattre cet avion, c’était que les responsables US faisaient passer leur F117A toujours aux memes endroits, toujours par les mêmes couloirs de pénétration sans même s’imaginer que la défense adverse aurait la possibilité d’exploiter cette faiblesse dans les conditions d’emploi du F117. Alors, s’agissait-il d’arrogance ? Je ne pense pas, mais il s’agissait surtout de routine, on les fait passer par ces couloirs car on a toujours fait comme ça ... Point. C’est bien un manque de formation et de souplesse qui est à l’origine de cette perte.
Voilà, ce que je voulais dire à propos de l’USAF tatouille. :)

THE CONFLICT IN IRAQ

U.S. Is Accused of Playing Role in Chalabi Case

A member of the former ally’s party says Iraqi charges against him are part of a plot to weaken the government.

By Henry Chu and Paul Richter
Times Staff Writers

August 10, 2004

BAGHDAD — A top supporter of embattled former Iraqi exile leader Ahmad Chalabi accused the United States on Monday of backing bogus counterfeiting charges against the onetime American ally in order to neutralize Chalabi politically and install an “impotent” government.

Mithal Alusi, a member of Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress party, said arrest warrants issued by an Iraqi court over the weekend were part of an international plot that is “bigger than anyone could imagine” to strip Chalabi of his popularity.

The charges come a week before a conference of Iraqi civic and tribal leaders that will appoint an interim national assembly. Chalabi, who was shut out of the interim government that took power in June, was expected to play a lead role at the gathering.

“The warrants were issued by a government that is lacking in will and authority,” Alusi said. “Every Iraqi government institution and facility is being run by so-called U.S. advisors who are under the control of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. The people behind this plot want an impotent Iraqi government, not capable of doing anything.”

Chalabi and his nephew, Salem Chalabi, were named in the arrest warrants issued by Zuhair Maliky, chief investigative judge of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq.

Salem Chalabi, who has been overseeing the effort to try deposed dictator Saddam Hussein on war crimes charges, was accused of murder in connection with threats made to a Finance Ministry official who was investigating Chalabi family real estate holdings. The official was later assassinated.

Both of the Chalabis issued new denials of the charges Monday, pledging to return to Iraq to fight them. Salem Chalabi was in London and Ahmad Chalabi was in Iran when the warrants were announced.

Ahmad Chalabi is accused of counterfeiting old Iraqi dinars. But Alusi said only about 3,000 counterfeit dinars, worth approximately $2, were found in Chalabi’s office, and they were marked as forgeries with a red stamp from the Iraqi Central Bank. Chalabi, who headed the Finance Committee of the now-defunct Iraqi Governing Council, has said he was engaged in an effort to stem counterfeiting. Alusi said Chalabi held the forged dinars as part of that effort.

A Central Bank official said his agency never sought the counterfeiting charges.

“The Central Bank has not lodged a complaint against any individual regarding money counterfeiting and never requested that such charges be brought,” Sinan Shabibi, the bank’s governor, told the French news agency Agence France-Presse.

As Chalabi’s supporters in Iraq insisted that the charges were politically motivated, U.S. officials in Washington sought to distance themselves from him in an estrangement that began this spring.

Chalabi worked closely with U.S. officials in the years before the Iraq war and was the top choice of the Bush administration for assuming leadership in a new Iraqi government.

But administration officials grew wary of him this year amid reports that he had contacts with Iran that may have included passing U.S. secrets. American officials also have been concerned that Chalabi has cultivated ties to militant Iraqi cleric Muqtada Sadr and his militia, who have been battling U.S. and Iraqi forces in renewed fighting since Thursday.

On Monday, the White House took a hands-off attitude to a onetime friend.

“His future will be decided by the people of Iraq, if he wants to continue to be involved in Iraq ‘s future,” White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan said. “This latest investigation, that is a matter for Iraqi authorities to handle.”

The State Department, never as close to Chalabi as the White House or Pentagon, also distanced itself. Adam Ereli, a State Department spokesman, said the charges “are certainly new to us. This is a question of the Iraqi justice system at work. And we are going to play the appropriate role, which is to let that process take its course.”

At the Pentagon, civilian officials have long supported Chalabi. As recently as May, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz defended him, saying that intelligence he had provided saved American lives and helped troops. But a Wolfowitz spokesman did not return a call seeking comment.

Meanwhile, Democratic presidential candidate Sen. John F. Kerry pressed for more information about Chalabi and his activities.

“Serious questions about Ahmad Chalabi remain, including his role in providing misleading information about Iraqi weapons and his connections to Pentagon officials,” a Kerry spokesman said Monday. “We need a full and frank accounting of the administration’s relationship with Chalabi.”

Still, the warrants for the Chalabis brought a strong defense from some of their allies in Washington, and illustrated the divisions over him among the war’s supporters.

Richard N. Perle, a former top advisor to Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and a leader of the so-called neoconservatives who embraced Chalabi and the war, said in an interview that he believed the warrants were part of an effort against Chalabi undertaken by the Iraqi government with the support of the U.S. government.

“I’m sure it’s been encouraged by the U.S.,” Perle said in an interview from Europe.

He said CIA and State Department officials have long opposed Chalabi and have convinced others in the government to move against him. Now officials in the White House oppose Chalabi as well, Perle said.

“It was those reports that led to a decision to destroy him,” Perle said, adding that he believed there was no basis to the reports that Chalabi passed classified information to Iran.

Michael Rubin, a former advisor to the U.S.-led occupation authority in Iraq now at the American Enterprise Institute think tank, said the judge who issued the warrant was unqualified, and that the Bush administration and government of interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi wanted to keep Chalabi from gaining influence.

Rubin said the Allawi government had moved against Chalabi to prevent him from gaining a role in the upcoming conference. Maliky, the investigative judge, told The Times on Monday that politics had played no part in the issuance of the warrants.

LA Times staff writers T. Christian Miller and Edwin Chen in Washington and Janet Stobart in London contributed to this report.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-chalabi10aug10.story
—-
July 9, 2004
Defectors’ Reports on Iraq Arms Were Embellished, Exile Asserts
By JIM DWYER

Shortly after President Bush declared war on terrorism in the fall of 2001, the Iraqi National Congress, the exile group led by Ahmad Chalabi, sent out a simple, urgent message to its network of intelligence agents: find evidence of outlawed weapons that would make Saddam Hussein a prime target for the United States.

Inevitably, that request reached Muhammad al-Zubaidi, himself an Iraqi exile who had been working to undermine Mr. Hussein for 24 years from posts in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and northern Iraq. Under the playful name of Al Deeb - Arabic for The Wolf - Mr. Zubaidi, now 52, served as a field leader for about 75 to 100 people who collected information on the machinations of Iraq’s police state.

Over the next three months, Mr. Zubaidi and his associates gathered statements from defectors who said they had knowledge of Mr. Hussein’s military facilities and who had fled Iraq for neighboring countries.

In short order, that same group of defectors took their stories to American intelligence agents and journalists. The defectors spoke of a nation pocketed with mobile weapons laboratories, a new secret weapons site beneath a Baghdad hospital, a meeting between a member of Mr. Hussein’s government and Osama bin Laden - accounts that ultimately became potent elements in Mr. Bush’s case for war.

Those accusations remain unproven. In fact, Mr. Zubaidi said in interviews last week in Lebanon, the ominous claims by the defectors differed significantly from the versions that they had first related to him and his associates. Mr. Zubaidi provided his handwritten diaries from 2001 and 2002, and his existing reports on the statements originally made by the defectors.

According to the documents, the defectors, while speaking with precision about aspects of Iraqi military facilities like its stock of missiles, did not initially make some of the most provocative claims about weapons production or that an Iraqi official had met with Mr. bin Laden.

The precise circumstances under which the stories apparently changed remains unclear. The defectors themselves could not be reached for comment.

Mr. Zubaidi contends that the men altered their stories after they met with senior figures in the Iraqi National Congress. Mr. Zubaidi, who acknowledged that he had a bitter split with the I.N.C. in April 2003, said officials of the group prepped the defectors before allowing them to meet with the American intelligence agents and journalists.

“They intentionally exaggerated all the information so they would drag the United States into war,” Mr. Zubaidi said. “We all know the defectors had a little information on which they built big stories.”

Yesterday, Nabil Musawi, one of Mr. Chalabi’s deputies who met with the defectors, said that Mr. Zubaidi’s assertions were “childish,” and bore no relation to reality. He said it was not the role of Mr. Zubaidi or his associates to do full debriefings of the defectors. Nor was it the responsibility of the I.N.C. to grade the reliability of each defector, he said.

“Whether the defector failed or succeeded, it meant nothing to us,” Mr. Musawi said, speaking by phone from Jordan. “There’s no question we wanted to indict the regime, but I wish we had someone clever enough to sit down and come up with stories.”
For a short time last year, Mr. Zubaidi was in the spotlight, immediately after the old government was toppled in April 2003. Acting in the power vacuum of those early days, he tried to form a civil administration in Baghdad with himself as the executive, an effort that lasted about two weeks before he was taken into custody by the United States military for 12 days and ordered to desist. He later was arrested again and held for about five months. He said he believed his former colleagues at the Iraqi National Congress were behind his jailing, an assumption Mr. Musawi says is not true.

Since February, Mr. Zubaidi has been living quietly outside Beirut. He said he had not publicly discussed details of his role in locating defectors until he was contacted by The New York Times last month. He agreed to be interviewed at length, and to make available any records that had not been confiscated by the American military forces.
Francis Brooke, an adviser to Mr. Chalabi in Washington, said yesterday that Mr. Zubaidi had been an effective agent but maintained that he had never raised concerns about the credibility of the defectors. “Sounds to me like the guy is a loony,” Mr. Brooke said. “Who knows who he is working for now? He was working closely for us. He never indicated anything to me like that. It’s completely inconsistent with any other knowledge I have of how things worked.”

Mr. Zubaidi said he decided to speak out not because of bad feelings against individuals, but to correct the record. “I’m not trying to defame those people, although they betrayed the cause,” Mr. Zubaidi said. “Now they are bearing the consequences. I’m a witness. This is something for history.”

Mr. Brooke said the I.N.C.‘s quest to obtain information on outlawed weapons in Iraq became more pressing after the Sept. 11 terror attacks. On Sept. 20, 2001, with the Pentagon hallways still reeking of smoke and disaster, Mr. Chalabi met with the Defense Policy Board, a group of private citizens that advises the secretary of defense. The clear consensus was that Mr. Hussein had to be removed from power in Iraq, in the interests of stabilizing the region and thwarting his support for terrorists, according to Mr. Brooke, who accompanied Mr. Chalabi to the Pentagon.
For the Iraqi National Congress, which was created in 1992 with United States financial support, the attacks presented an opportunity to define their cause - overthrowing Saddam Hussein - within the newly redrawn agenda of the United States.

Mr. Brooke, an American citizen who works in Washington, said he moved quickly to seek fresh details from the group’s agents on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. “I say to everybody, and that includes everybody in my intelligence network, now is a real good time for information on those two subjects,” Mr. Brooke said. He instructed them, he said, to “highlight it, put it in red and send it to me right away.”

Mr. Zubaidi said he and his associates got that message. “My role during the process was to bring in the person, to write reports of what he said, and to give my personal information and opinion about what they were saying.”
Among the first, and most important, defectors was Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, a civil engineer who left Iraq in November 2001 and made his way to Syria. There, Mr. Zubaidi said, he had a chance encounter with one of Mr. Zubaidi’s associates in a travel agency, and they struck up a conversation. Mr. Saeed had run into legal problems with Iraqi officials, he said, and was eager to move his family to Australia, where his brother lives.

Over a period of weeks, Mr. Zubaidi said, Mr. Saeed disclosed that he had contracts with the government’s Military Industrial Organization that involved building and repairing concrete shelters and wells, which he believed were for biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. He provided several hundred pages of documents, and had gone to school with an I.N.C. official who vouched for him.

Mr. Saeed, while financially comfortable, needed logistical help getting out of the Middle East because of problems with his travel documents, Mr. Zubaidi said. Mr. Saeed paid his family’s way to Bangkok, according to Mr. Zubaidi.

He was accompanied by Mr. Zubaidi’s associate, who was interviewed in Damascus last week but asked that he not be named. After several days in Bangkok, two I.N.C. officials arrived from London and spent about a day with Mr. Saeed. Their purpose, Mr. Brooke said, was to put the defector at ease before interviews with a reporter from The Times and a freelance television journalist who had worked occasionally for the I.N.C. but was filming Mr. Saeed for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation.
During his sessions with reporters, Mr. Saeed mentioned for the first time the facility underneath the hospital, according to both Mr. Zubaidi and his associate. Like other defectors, Mr. Saeed recounted his story to American intelligence agents. In Mr. Saeed’s case, the White House specifically mentioned his account in a background paper that accompanied a speech by Mr. Bush.

Inspectors from the United States government tried to find the facility in the hospital that Mr. Saeed described but could not, according to David Kay, who was appointed by Mr. Bush to lead the search for outlawed weapons.

“It wasn’t there, didn’t pan out, so people took that to mean that nothing else he said was true,” Mr. Kay said yesterday by telephone. He said that the war and uncontrolled looting created a “margin of error” about a number of suspected sites, but the hospital was not disturbed.

Mr. Musawi, one of the I.N.C. officials who prepared Mr. Saeed for his interview, said that he could not have coached Mr. Saeed because his information was far too technical. “What can you coach a chemical engineer who specializes in concrete sealing?” he asked.

Also in November 2001, Mr. Chalabi’s group arranged for press interviews with an Iraqi Army lieutenant general to whom Mr. Zubaidi had spoken. A reporter for The Times flew to Beirut to meet with the general, Jamal al-Ghurairy, who said groups of Islamic terrorists were training on an airplane fuselage to simulate hijackings.
“We were training these people to attack installations important to the United States,” Mr. Ghurairy said. During the interview, the general acknowledged his own involvement in the execution of thousands of Shiite Muslim rebels after the Persian Gulf war of 1991.

Before Mr. Ghurairy met with the reporter, Mr. Zubaidi had tried to get him to write out his account, but the general held out, according to a report provided by Mr. Zubaidi and dated Nov. 11, 2001. In that report, Mr. Zubaidi said that Mr. Ghurairy “played sick. He was being evasive so that he would get guarantees for facilitating his trip” to Europe or the United States.

Mr. Musawi, who had flown from London to Beirut to take part in the session, “assured him that we will secure their trip as soon as possible to any destination they want,” the report stated.
Mr. Zubaidi did not have a high opinion of the general’s probity. He wrote of Mr. Ghurairy, “He is an opportunist, cheap and manipulative. He has poetic interests and has a vivid imagination in making up stories.”

In February 2002, a third defector, Harith Assaf, a major in the Iraqi intelligence service, was filmed by the CBS News program “60 Minutes” speaking about mobile biological weapons laboratories that he said were put into seven refrigerated trucks. Mr. Assaf also described a meeting between a member of the Iraqi government and Mr. bin Laden in Afghanistan.

When Mr. Zubaidi objected and tried to stop the interview, Mr. Musawi, who had come with the television crew from London, said he insisted that it continue. “I told him, ‘It’s not your call. I’m allowing the story to be told,’ ” Mr. Musawi said.

Mr. Zubaidi said that the major, Mr. Assaf, had not revealed the purported bin Laden meeting and the mobile laboratories during discussions that had begun three months earlier. His diary entry for Feb. 11, 2002, says: “After the interview, an argument with Nabil about their way of working, especially the connection with bin Laden.” In a follow-up story in March 2004, “60 Minutes” reported that Mr. Assaf had been deemed unreliable by American intelligence. In addition, the commission investigating the 9/11 attacks has said that while there were reports of contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda, they did not appear to have “resulted in a collaborative relationship.”

Mr. Musawi said the risk to the I.N.C. of coaching defectors was considerable, because it had enemies in Washington. If a story was quickly disproved, he said, “We would look pretty stupid.”

Despite this, Mr. Kay said that during the hunt for weapons last year, a number of the defectors admitted they were lying after being put through a polygraph test. “Some of them claimed to have been coached by the I.N.C., and some of them claimed to have been coached on how to pass polygraphs,” Mr. Kay said.

Mr. Zubaidi said, “I don’t want to criticize U.S. agencies, but it’s strange that the U.S. with all its powerful agencies, the C.I.A., could not manage to know the truth from the lies in these people.”

Samar Aboul-Fotouh contributed reporting from Syria and Lebanonfor this article.

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FA0C15FA385F0C7A8CDDAE0894DC404482
—-
For further journalistic inquiry, see this link :

http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=3057

Miller Brouhaha  
The New York Times’ Judith Miller has been pummelled unmercifully for her reporting on the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. But coverage of this murky subject has hardly been the finest hour for the news media in general.
By Charles Layton
Charles Layton is an AJR contributing writer.   

Ce qu’en dit le India Daily

Mais sans être totalement machiavelique ne pourrait-on pas supposer que les Américains ont préféré se laisser battre afin d’avoir des arguments pour obtenir plus de fric pour renouveler leur équipement ???

http://www.indiadaily.com/editorial/06-18-04.asp

The real story behind Indian Air Force Superiority over US Air Force - USAF underestimated Indians as Iraqis or Iranians

Balaji Reddy, Special Correspondent
June 18, 2004
“Surprising sophistication of Indian fighter aircraft and skill of Indian pilots” stunned the US Air Force. A June 2 article in the magazine Inside the Air Force reported –“The exercise, in which US F-15Cs were said to have been defeated more than 90 per cent of the time in direct combat exercises against the IAF, is causing US Air Force officials to re-evaluate the way the service trains its fighter pilots while bolstering the case for buying the F/A-22 as a way to ensure continued air dominance for the United States.”
The magazine quoted US officials who participated in the exercise as saying it should “provide a reality check for those who had assumed unquestioned US air superiority.”

What really happened is as follows: US Air Force underestimated the India Air force Pilots and their numerical skill. They thought these are another set of Iraqi or Iranian Pilots. The numerical analysis and problem solving capability of IAF Pilots are well known and are probably the best in the world. In absence of signal intelligence, satellite guidance and automated software control, USAF faced Indians who were world class and
far superior than their US counterpart. IAF recruits the country’s best brains in Air Force. It is prestigious too. USAF can only recruit willing average or slightly above average. In addition, in absence of superior communication and jamming, Indians proved absolutely formidable.

On the face of it, the performance of the IAF, with its oft-reported air crashes in an aging, non-American fleet, might seem surprising. But US officials told the magazine that the Indians were much better than they had bargained for.

“What happened to us was it looks like our red air training might not be as good because the adversaries are better than we thought,” the article quoted Col. Mike Snodgrass, commander of the 3rd Wing at Elmendorf Air Force Base, as saying. “And in the case of the Indian Air Force both their training and some of their equipment was better than we anticipated.”

“Red air” refers to the way the US Air Force simulates enemy capability in air combat training. US officials emphasised that such simulation deliberately handicap US planes and pilots against the enemy because the service has assumed for years that its fighters are more capable than enemy aircraft.

In Cope Thunder, four F-15Cs were pitted against 10 or 12 of same model Indian fighters such as the Mirage 2000, MIG-27 and MIG-29s in offensive and defensive counter air scenarios. But the two most formidable IAF aircraft proved to be the MIG-21 Bison, an upgraded version of the Russian-made baseline MIG-21, and the Sukhoi SU-30K Flanker, US officials said.

“What we faced were superior numbers, and an IAF pilot who was very proficient in his aircraft and smart on tactics. That combination was tough for us to overcome,” the magazine quoted a US airman who took part in the exercise as saying.

While acknowledging the performance of their Indian colleagues, who they will meet again in another air combat exercise in Alaska next month, the US airmen also made a major pitch for the F/A-22 aircraft that the US government has been slow to embrace because of its cost and lack of a perceived threat.

“The major takeaway for the Air Force is that our prediction of needing to replace the F-15 with the F/A-22 is proving out as we get smarter and smarter about other [countries’] capabilities around the world and what technology is limited to in the F-15 airframe,” Col. Snodgrass said. “We’ve taken [the F-15] about as far as we can and it’s now time to move to the next generation.”

IAF flies high on Uncle Sam’s accolades
RAJAT PANDIT

TIMES NEWS NETWORK[
Effectivement, j’ai trouvé confirmation de cette étonnante défaite apéricaine à différents endroits,notamment sur le site du Times of India

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/754545.cms

SATURDAY, JUNE 26, 2004

02:21:12 AM ]

NEW DELHI: For a force constantly under heavy fire for its unusually high rate of accidents, the Indian Air Force now finally has something to cheer about: accolades for its sophisticated fighters and, of course, the tactical skills of the men behind the machines.

What adds to the “feel-good” factor is that the praise is emanating from the world’s most advanced force, the United States Air Force.

“The Americans exercised against our Sukhoi-30s… they are yet to get a taste of the our new Sukhoi-30MKI air dominance fighters acquired from Russia,” brags a young officer.

Well, IAF officers certainly have a reason to feel smug. Reports say the USAF was rudely jolted out of its complacency during the first-ever joint air combat exercise with India, “Cope India-04”, held in Gwalior in February.

The Indian pilots, flying Sukhoi-30s and other jets, simply outgunned the top-gun American pilots on their F-15Cs during the exercise, recording most of the “kills” in direct air combat.

The exercise broke new ground by pitting top-notch Russian and American fighters against each other for the first time.

“The Great Himalayan Eagles proved deadlier than American Bald Eagles. The two eagles, incidentally, were the symbols of the exercise,” said an officer. 

A part ce qu’il en est dit dans le livre de ce général indien, a-t-on bien confirmation par d’autres sources de cette défaite de l’avion US au cours d’un match amical avec les sukoi de l’aviation indienne ?

Une défaite 9-1, ça paraît quand même peu croyable, non ?

“la décision a été prise à la suite d’un ordre du général américian” ... je me demande ce qu’ils ont demandé aux polonais ? ... un bel ordre d’attaque sans doute ... les polonais ne doivent pas adhérer pleinement au fameux : “it was necessary to destroy the village in order to save it”

Les forces polonaises remettent Najaf et Qadissiyah aux Américains
AFP | 09.08.04 | 18h32

Les forces polonaises en Irak ont remis aux troupes américaines le contrôle des provinces irakiennes de Najaf et de Qadissiyah, au sud de Bagdad, a annoncé lundi la division multinationale dirigée par la Pologne dans un communiqué cité par l’agence de presse polonaise PAP.La décision a été prise à la suite d’un ordre du général américain George Casey, cité par le colonel Artur Domanski, porte-parole de la division multinationale commandée par la Pologne.Des combats font rage à Najaf, une ville sainte chiite où plus de 360 miliciens chiites et quatre soldats américains ont été tués depuis cinq jours, selon l’armée américaine à Bagdad.

THE RACE TO THE WHITE HOUSE

Allies Not in Formation on Kerry’s Troops Plan

Nations have a hard time supporting his proposal to use their soldiers to fill out the force in Iraq.

By Paul Richter and Maria L. La Ganga
LA Times Staff Writers

August 9, 2004

WASHINGTON — Democratic presidential candidate John F. Kerry has staked much of his campaign on a proposal he hopes will convince voters that he can extricate the United States from Iraq more quickly and at less cost than President Bush.

But Kerry’s plan, which promises to effectively shift much of the Iraq war burden from America to its allies, so far is failing to receive the international support the proposal must have to succeed.

Kerry in recent appearances and interviews has been intensifying his effort to spotlight what he sees as the Bush administration’s mistakes in Iraq — especially the failure to broaden international involvement — as a fundamental difference between the two candidates. But Kerry’s proposals depend on changing the minds of foreign leaders who do not want to defy their electorates by sending forces into what many consider to be a U.S.-made mess.

“I understand why John Kerry is making proposals of this kind, but there is a lack of realism in them,” Menzies Campbell, a British lawmaker who is a spokesman on defense issues for the Liberal Democratic Party, said in a typical comment.

Many allied countries may welcome a new team in Washington after years of friction with the Bush administration. But foreign leaders are making it clear they don’t want to add enough of their own troops to allow U.S. forces to scale back to a minority share in Iraq, as Kerry has proposed.

Allies say they are ready to consider further financial aid and other help for the fragile new Iraqi government. But some officials overseas already are fretting about Kerry’s talk of burden-shifting.

“Some Europeans are rather concerned that Mr. Kerry might have expectations for relief [from abroad] that are going to be hard to meet,” said one senior European diplomat in a statement echoed in several capitals.

In an interview with The Times last week, Kerry said that by building up international support, it would be a “reasonable goal” to replace most U.S. troops in Iraq with foreign forces within his first term. There are now about 140,000 U.S. troops stationed there, or 88% of a total international force of about 160,000.

In the last several days, Kerry has begun arguing that he could substantially reduce the number of U.S. troops within the first six months of a Kerry administration. In an interview with National Public Radio on Friday, Kerry said: “I believe that within a year from now, we could significantly reduce American forces in Iraq, and that’s my plan.”

The proposal could be accomplished by increasing the number of foreign troops and boosting the size of the Iraqi security force, Kerry aides say.

Yet some key countries have already ruled out providing troops, and others are badly strained from the deployments they have already made.

The French and German governments have made clear that sending troops is out of the question. British officials have made no such categorical statement, but they have expressed concern that their troops are overstretched.

Although Japan has supplied a 550-member noncombat force as a symbol of its international commitment, analysts there see little chance the nation would agree to send more.

Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations, Andrei Denisov, ruled out a commitment of troops. “We are not going to send anybody there, and that’s all there is to say,” Denisov said.

“From the major European countries, there’s simply not a lot of available troops out there, for both practical and political reasons,” said Christopher Makins, president of the Atlantic Council of the United States, which supports U.S. engagement abroad.

Many allied countries have a limited number of troops suitable for the Iraq mission, and most of those are already deployed on other missions, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Africa, Makins said.

Dana Allin of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London said, “I think there’s no question, in general, you’ll find it easier to get cooperation from allies if there is a new [U.S.] administration.” But Allin added that if new troops were to be sent to Iraq “it’s unclear where they would come from.”

Kerry has at times said he would particularly like to bring in troops from Arab countries. But diplomats, including those from Arab nations, say they consider the scenario unlikely. The Iraqi interim government has for months excluded the possibility of any peacekeeping troops coming from immediate neighbors, in part because the Iraqi people would be suspicious of neighbors’ intentions.

The recent collapse of a Saudi proposal to bring in peacekeeping troops from other Arab and Muslim countries also indicates the long odds against the idea.

Senior Iraqi officials told U.S. officials this summer that they opposed the idea of bringing in additional troops from any foreign country.

Campbell, the British lawmaker, added that Kerry “has to overcome the very considerable barrier of the fact that he himself voted for military action in support of President Bush.”

Analysts said, moreover, that if the United States was able to reduce its military by substantial numbers in Iraq, at least one or two major nations — such as France or Britain — would have to accept a lead role.

Kerry’s proposal comes at a time when the Bush administration is struggling to convince about 30 countries to keep their troops in Iraq. Late last month, Ukraine announced that it would start negotiations to pull out some of its 1,650 troops in Iraq, the fourth-largest non-U.S. contingent.

Kerry, however, insists that he can gather international support by showing leadership and by giving other countries decision-making authority they have not had before now.

But the Massachusetts senator has repeatedly declined to say how he would find the added support, saying it is unwise to get into the details of diplomacy. “No future president should ever lay this out on the table,” he has said.

A senior foreign policy advisor to Kerry, who asked to remain unidentified, said that campaign officials knew through foreign contacts that other governments would cooperate.

“There are enough indications through enough channels that we wouldn’t be saying it if we didn’t think we could do it,” the advisor said.

A spokesman for the Bush campaign scoffed at the Democrats’ claim to have such support. Steve Schmidt recalled the highly publicized squabble early in the campaign in which Kerry claimed the support of unspecified foreign leaders.

“He won’t name the foreign leaders,” Schmidt said. “He won’t disclose the conversations.”

Kerry has proposed two other measures he has said would help draw support — convening an international conference on Iraq and naming through international consultations a “high commissioner,” with U.N. backing, to give other countries more say.

Several diplomats said allies would probably welcome signals of new interest in consultation. But they said that, with sovereignty now assumed by an interim Iraqi government, there was no longer a demand for an international authority that could give the occupation a legitimacy that was missing under U.S. military control.

“Nine months or a year ago, this could have made a difference,” said the senior European diplomat. “Now, it’s too late.”

At this point, he said, many of the allies think it would be better to concentrate on providing help directly to the new Iraqi government to improve its chances of creating a stable democracy.

Makins, of the Atlantic Council, said he thought the Kerry proposal for a conference and joint leadership would have limited value in drawing allies into a new partnership.

“I don’t think it would be a deal maker, as far as European participation,” he said. “I think major governments are looking for ways to build up the Iraqi government and constitutional process.”

Another Kerry proposal is to rebuild relationships with foreign governments by permitting them to bid for U.S. reconstruction contracts. Under Bush, companies from countries that didn’t take part in the Iraq war coalition were excluded from bidding for prime contracts.

But now, the administration has announced it will allow all comers to bid for a new tranche of contracts in September. Yet some of the European countries that were excluded from the earlier rounds have said for months that their industries never clamored for permission to seek such contracts.

Leaders from allied countries emphasized that they would be ready to reconsider financial aid and other assistance to Iraq under either a Kerry or Bush administration. Some said that they already had stepped up financial assistance to Iraq, even as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization military alliance agreed to Iraqi requests to begin training local security forces.

As they assess Kerry’s proposal, foreign leaders also are trying to decipher where he stands philosophically on Iraq. Similar questions have followed Kerry in his campaign at home.

Kerry, even when he supported the congressional resolution in October 2002 that authorized the war, has been consistent in pressing for more international backing for U.S. policies toward Iraq and reconstruction efforts there.

“The international community’s support will be critical because we will not be able to rebuild Iraq single-handedly,” Kerry said in an October 2002 Senate speech in which he outlined steps he thought Bush should take. “We will lack the credibility and the expertise and the capacity.”

In an address at UCLA in late February, 16 months later, Kerry said, “It is time to return to the United Nations and return America to the community of nations and share both authority and responsibility in Iraq.”

Addressing the Democratic National Convention on July 29, Kerry echoed the same themes. “I know what we have to do in Iraq,” he told delegates. “We need a president who has the credibility to bring our allies to our side and share the burden, reduce the cost to American taxpayers and reduce the risk to American soldiers.”

But while he has criticized the Bush administration’s competence, he has not challenged the fundamentals of its policy, nor the path it is following toward Iraq’s own upcoming elections.

Still, polls suggest that many Europeans and Asians would prefer a new administration. A recent survey found 77% of Germans prefer Kerry, to 10% for Bush; another found that 13% of Russians “like” Bush as a politician, while 60% dislike him.

There is a widespread public expectation in Europe — despite what U.S. polls show — that Bush will be ousted in November because of the troubled course of the Iraq war, analysts said.

But many European diplomats say they are coming to the conclusion that Bush and Kerry are close on key international issues and that there would be substantial continuity between the administrations.

Kerry, like Bush, insists that U.S. troops should not be tried before the International Criminal Court, the multinational tribunal that has been a contentious subject between Europe and the United States. The U.S. has not ratified creation of the court.

On another issue that divides the United States and Europe, Kerry has signaled that he would track the Bush administration on dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, although he has said he would more aggressively seek a solution.

One German newspaper, the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, suggested Europeans were in for a rude awakening if Kerry becomes president. Under the headline “The Big Kerry Illusion,” the newspaper said Kerry would diverge from Bush, but any hope that he would more fully embrace the “global village” was “wishful thinking that will get a cold shower.”

By contrast, there is a widespread belief in Russia that a Kerry win would launch a new era of U.S.-European goodwill — a prospect Russian leaders view with alarm.

The Russian government is happy with tensions between Bush and Europe, which gives Moscow an opening to build its own relations with European governments and distracts world attention from its own difficulties, analysts said.

“The Kremlin feels very comfortable with the notion that Bush is playing the enfant terrible in the world arena, because of his Middle East policy, and thus he keeps distracting the world from, for example, problems in Russia,” said Stanislav Belkovsky, general director of the National Strategy Council, a think tank considered close to Russian security services. “The Kremlin is not at all interested in the Democrats’ victory in the presidential polls.”

*

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Times staff writers Bruce Wallace in Tokyo, Jeffrey Fleishman in Berlin, Kim Murphy in Moscow, Janet Stobart in London, Achrene Sicakyuz in Paris, Michael Finnegan in St. Louis and Maggie Farley in New York contributed to this report.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-kerryiraq9aug09.story

GEOPOLITICS - OPINION
Turkey’s Chill Further Isolates Israel

Ankara’s terrorist-state charge sets back a relationship that once was expanding. The change is laid in part to internal Turkish concerns.

By Henri J. Barkey

Henri J. Barkey, chairman of the international relations department at Lehigh University, was on the State Department’s policy planning staff (1998-2000).

August 8, 2004

BETHLEHEM, Pa. — In May, when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan characterized Israel’s incursions into the Rafah refugee camp in Gaza as the actions of a terrorist state, there was no mistaking that something had gone terribly awry in Turkish-Israeli relations. Their correct but standoffish relationship began to blossom in 1996. So numerous were their military agreements and commercial deals that it appeared, certainly in the Arab world, that the two countries were entering a strategic relationship.

Turkey’s changed tone doesn’t signify the end of the relationship, but it augurs a time of greater differences ahead, as well as underlining Israel’s increasing isolation. The worsening situation in the Palestinian territories and the rise of the post-Sept. 11 terrorist threat have contributed to the falling-out. But the transformation in Turkish attitudes also stems from internal developments in Turkey.

The most important domestic change is the political ascent of Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party. Yet despite its leaders’ desire to be moderate and centrist, the party cannot escape its roots in Turkey’s Islamist movement. To its credit, the party has charted a liberal and reformist agenda to facilitate Turkey’s entry into the European Union. At the same time, Justice and Development has had to be careful not to rile Turkey’s military establishment, which is anxious about Erdogan’s growing power. For example, the party has backed down on such divisive religious issues as relaxing the ban on women wearing headscarves in government offices, schools and universities.

Erdogan’s blast at Israel similarly gives his party some political maneuvering room. First and foremost, it signals to his bedrock supporters that though the party at times makes concessions to the military, it can hold its own when it comes to Tel Aviv. On this the Turkish public is solidly behind the Justice and Development Party, because the Palestinian issue has always been important to Turks. Furthermore, limiting contacts with Israel puts the military on the defensive. Many Turks, especially Erdogan’s rank and file, regard the Israeli-Turkish relationship as the creation of the military, which needed access to weaponry, and Israel’s staunchest friend, Washington.

There are other reasons for Turkey’s new ambivalence toward Israel. The Turkish government is more self-confident than at any time in recent history. Reflecting a palpable transformation in Europe’s attitude toward it, Turkey’s prospect for getting a date to begin accession negotiations with the EU is excellent. No longer is the country perceived as crisis-prone. Turkish views are well received, and Turkey’s leaders enjoy greater esteem. As a result, the Justice and Development Party doesn’t need to curry favor with either Israel or its powerful supporters in Washington.

Second, the party wants to cash in Turkey’s new respectability for a greater say in international institutions. It was no coincidence that Erdogan’s criticism of Israel came soon after Ankara succeeded in landing the secretary-general office in the Organization of Islamic Countries.

Finally, Turkey’s harsher attitude toward Tel Aviv coincides with an unprecedented anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic diatribe in the Turkish press. Conspiracy theories, many of them with origins in Sept. 11, abound about Israel’s abilities and intentions everywhere in the world. My favorite one was in a recent column in Turkey’s most pro-government paper. It claimed that the events in Darfur, Sudan, were the result of Israel’s desire to claim the waters of the Nile. The Israelis, the conspiracy asserts, induced its Ethiopian Christian allies to rebel against the Sudanese government. Not only did the columnist not know where Darfur is, but he also was ignorant of the fact that the genocide in Darfur is perpetrated by Arab Muslim Sudanese on African Muslims.

Exaggerated, if not unsubstantiated, reports in the U.S. media about Israeli activities in northern Iraq have fed this frenzy. Israel’s long-standing connections to Iraq’s Kurds have added to the anxiety among Turks, who believe that Israel wants another like-minded non-Arab state in the region in the hope of undermining Arab unity. Ankara fears that such a Kurdish state would inspire Turkey’s Kurds, who make up about 20% of the country’s population, to seek independence of their own. Although it’s in Israel’s interests that Iraq remain a unified — albeit federal — state devoid of fundamentalist impulses a la Iran, few in Turkey would believe this.

The developments in Turkey, as important as they are in altering its attitude toward Tel Aviv, are also another manifestation of Israel’s growing isolation. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s unilateralist policies and seeming indifference to their political costs have erased much of the goodwill his predecessors had built up in parts of the world. One only need to return to August 1999, when Israeli rescue teams, credited with saving many lives, were the first on the ground after a terrible earthquake in Turkey. Today, those efforts have disappeared from the collective Turkish memory.

The change in Turkey-Israeli atmospherics is not a welcome development for Washington, which had hailed and supported the two countries’ rapprochement. It means that Washington’s role as Israel’s lone supporter, and all the attendant consequences, will only grow.

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-op-barkey8aug08.story

THE NATION
Private, Public Roles Overlap in Washington

Insiders are advising officials and working for businesses that profit from government contracts. It’s a growing pattern of networking.

By Walter F. Roche Jr.
Times Staff Writer

August 8, 2004

WASHINGTON — Suzanne H. Woolsey is a trustee of a little-known defense consulting group that had inside access to senior Pentagon leaders directing the Iraq war. Last January, she joined the board of California-based Fluor Corp.

Soon afterward, Fluor and a joint venture partner won about $1.6 billion in Iraq reconstruction contracts.

Her husband, former CIA Director R. James Woolsey, a leading advocate for the war, is serving as a government policy advisor. He too works for a firm with war-related interests.

The Woolseys’ overlapping affiliations are part of a growing pattern in Washington in which individuals play key roles in quasi-governmental organizations advising officials on major policy issues but also are involved with private businesses in related fields.

Such activities generally are not covered by conflict of interest laws or ethics rules. But they underscore an insiders network in which contacts and relationships developed inside the government can meld with individual financial interests.

Suzanne Woolsey, 62, is a former executive with the National Academies, the institution that advises the government on science, engineering and medicine. In October 2000, she was named a trustee of the Institute for Defense Analyses, a nonprofit corporation paid by the government to do research for the Pentagon.

James Woolsey, 62, who headed the CIA from 1993 to 1995, is a member of the Defense Policy Board, an unpaid advisory panel serving Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and other senior Pentagon officials. Woolsey is also on CIA and Navy advisory boards and was a founding member of the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, a private advocacy group set up in 2002 at the instigation of the White House to build public support for the war.

He is also a vice president at Booz Allen Hamilton, a consulting firm that co-sponsored a May 1, 2003, conference on business opportunities in the reconstruction of Iraq. Woolsey was one of the keynote speakers for the event.

Booz Allen is a subcontractor on a $75-million telecommunications project in Iraq. The firm does extensive work for the Defense Department as well. It was recently awarded $14 million in contracts by the Navy. The former CIA director said in an interview that he had not been involved in Booz Allen’s Iraq contracts.

Last month, Woolsey appeared at a Capitol Hill news conference to announce the creation of a group called the Committee of the Present Danger, which he said would try to focus public attention on the threat “to the U.S. and the civilized world from Islamic terrorism.”

Others with war-related overlapping interests include Richard N. Perle and Christopher A. Williams.

Perle, assistant secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration, was chairman of the Defense Advisory Board but stepped down from that post and eventually the board itself after questions were raised about possible conflicts between his advisory role and his private business interests.

Christopher A. Williams, a former aide to Sen. Trent Lott (R-Miss.), is another Defense Policy Board member. He has registered as a lobbyist for Boeing and other defense contractors.

In Suzanne Woolsey’s case, during the U.S.-led attack on Iraq, the Institute for Defense Analyses provided senior Pentagon officials with assessments of the operation.

Personnel from the institute formed part of an 18-member civilian analysis team working from the Joint Warfighting Center in Virginia.

The operation was described in a June 3, 2003, briefing by Army Brig.Gen. Robert W. Cone. “This team did business within the Centcom headquarters on a daily basis by observing meeting and planning sessions, attending command updates, watching key decisions being made, watching problems being solved and generally being provided unrestricted access to the business of the conduct of this war,” Cone said, according to a transcript of the session.

Tax records show Suzanne Woolsey was paid $11,500 in trustee fees for serving on the Institute for Defense Analyses board last year.

A spokesman for Fluor declined to discuss why she had been invited to become a director or what role if any she played in the company’s Iraq contracts. Fluor pays its outside directors $40,000 a year, plus stock options and additional fees for attending meetings, according to Securities and Exchange Commission records and the Fluor spokesman.

At the National Academies, Suzanne Woolsey served as chief operating officer from 1993 to 2000 and as chief communications officer from 2000 to 2003. She also is a former newspaper editorial writer and holds degrees in psychology.

Her appointment to Fluor’s board came in late January 2004, while Fluor and its joint venture partner, AMEC, were competing for two federal contracts to do reconstruction work in Iraq.

A little over a month after her appointment, Fluor and AMEC got both contracts, with a combined value of $1.6 billion.

Records show Fluor’s stock has risen steadily since the war began; it has a price of about $42 a share, up from about $30 a share in March of 2003.

According to reports filed with the SEC, Woolsey owns 1,500 shares of Fluor stock and could gain an additional 800 shares under a deferred compensation program.

In a Jan. 27 news release announcing Woolsey’s appointment to Fluor’s board, the company noted that she was a trustee for the Institute for Defense Analyses. Fluor’s chairman and chief executive, Alan L. Boeckmann, said, “Sue’s expertise in and passion for government policy, private industry and science will be important enhancements to our board.”

Earlier, Fluor had won two other government contracts for reconstruction work in Iraq. These contracts had a potential value of more than $1.5 billion over the next five years, according to company spokesman Jerry Holloway. They covered a range of assignments including power generation, construction of a U.S. military camp and a subcontract to renovate an Iraqi military facility.

Holloway said all the contracts — the first one dates to April of last year — were awarded on a competitive basis. He noted that many of Fluor’s contracts were awarded before Woolsey’s appointment.

Holloway said the actual amount paid to Fluor under its Iraq contracts may never reach the company’s potential $2.5-billion share; the ultimate amount will depend on the individual work orders issued to the company by federal agencies.

Still, Fluor considered the Iraq contracts an important element in its financial performance. In a recent SEC filing, the company reported that its revenue for the first quarter of the current fiscal year from work in Iraq totaled “approximately $190 million. There was no work in Iraq in the comparable period in 2003.”

The quarterly report concluded that increased profits in the first quarter were primarily due to work in Iraq along with the purchase of a new company.

According to other filings with the SEC, Suzanne Woolsey is also affiliated with other firms, including the Paladin Capital Group, a Washington venture capital firm in which her husband is a partner.

Suzanne Woolsey did not respond to messages left for her at Paladin and at Fluor.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-woolsey8aug08.story