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Finalement, tout compte fait, les insurgés irakiens seraient nettement plus nombreux que ce que l’on disait, et n’auraient pas de liens particuliers avec Al Quaeda. Et il se pourrait bien qu’ils soient extrêmement difficiles à battre…. Mais les militaires américains qui sontsur le terrain semblent avoir bien du mal à faire passer ce constat, tant est puissant le virtualisme en vigueur à Wahington.

Dépèche d’Associated Press reprise par Yahoo!

“AP: Iraq Insurgency Larger Than Thought
Fri Jul 9, 6:54 AM ET
By JIM KRANE, Associated Press Writer
BAGHDAD, Iraq - Contrary to U.S. government claims, the insurgency in Iraq (news - web sites) is led by well-armed Sunnis angry about losing power, not foreign fighters, and is far larger than previously thought, American military officials say.
The officials told The Associated Press the guerrillas can call on loyalists to boost their forces to as high as 20,000 and have enough popular support among nationalist Iraqis angered by the presence of U.S. troops that they cannot be militarily defeated.

That number is far larger than the 5,000 guerrillas previously thought to be at the insurgency’s core. And some insurgents are highly specialized — one Baghdad cell, for instance, has two leaders, one assassin, and two groups of bomb-makers.

Although U.S. military analysts disagree over the exact size, the insurgency is believed to include dozens of regional cells, often led by tribal sheiks and inspired by Sunni Muslim imams.

The developing intelligence picture of the insurgency contrasts with the commonly stated view in the Bush administration that the fighting is fueled by foreign warriors intent on creating an Islamic state.

“We’re not at the forefront of a jihadist war here,” said a U.S. military official in Baghdad, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The military official, who has logged thousands of miles driving around Iraq to meet with insurgents or their representatives, said a skillful Iraqi government could co-opt some of the guerrillas and reconcile with the leaders instead of fighting them.

“I generally like a lot of these guys,” he said. “We know who the key people are in all the different cities, and generally how they operate. The problem is getting actionable information so you can either attack them, arrest them or engage them.”

Even as Iraqi leaders wrangle over the contentious issue of offering a broad amnesty to guerrilla fighters, the new Iraqi military and intelligence corps have begun gathering and sharing information on the insurgents with the U.S. military, providing a sharper picture of a complex insurgency.

“Nobody knows about Iraqis and all the subtleties in culture, appearance, religion and so forth better than Iraqis themselves,” said U.S. Army Lt. Col. Daniel Baggio, a military spokesman at Multinational Corps headquarters in Baghdad. “We’re very optimistic about the Iraqis’ use of their own human intelligence to help root out these insurgents.”

The intelligence boost has allowed American pilots to bomb suspected insurgent safe houses over the past two weeks, with Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi saying Iraqis supplied information for at least one of those airstrikes. But the better view of the insurgency also contradicts much of the popular wisdom about it.

Estimates of the insurgents’ manpower tend to be too low. Last week, a former coalition official said 4,000 to 5,000 Baathists form the core of the insurgency, with other attacks committed by a couple hundred supporters of Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and hundreds of other foreign fighters.

Anthony Cordesman, an Iraq analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the figure of 5,000 insurgents “was never more than a wag and is now clearly ridiculous.”

“Part-timers are difficult to count, but almost all insurgent movements depend on cadres that are part-time and that can blend back into the population,” he said.

U.S. military analysts disagree over the size of the insurgency, with estimates running as high as 20,000 fighters when part-timers are added.

Ahmed Hashim, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College, said the higher numbers squared with his findings in a study of the insurgency completed in Iraq.

One hint that the number is larger is the sheer volume of suspected insurgents — 22,000 — who have cycled through U.S.-run prisons. Most have been released. And in April alone, U.S. forces killed as many as 4,000 people, the military official said, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militiamen fighting under the banner of a radical cleric.

There has been no letup in attacks. On Thursday, insurgents detonated a car bomb and then attacked a military headquarters in Samarra, a center of resistance in the Sunni Triangle 60 miles north of the capital, killing five U.S. soldiers and one Iraqi guardsman.

Guerrilla leaders come from various corners of Saddam’s Baath Party, including lawyers’ groups, prominent families and especially from his Military Bureau, an internal security arm used to purge enemies. They’ve formed dozens of cells.

U.S. military documents obtained by AP show a guerrilla band mounting attacks in Baghdad that consists of two leaders, four sub-leaders and 30 members, broken down by activity. There is a pair of financiers, two cells of car bomb-builders, an assassin, separate teams launching mortar and rocket attacks, and others handling roadside bombs and ambushes.

Most of the insurgents are fighting for a bigger role in a secular society, not a Taliban-like Islamic state, the military official said. Almost all the guerrillas are Iraqis, even those launching some of the devastating car bombings normally blamed on foreigners — usually al-Zarqawi.

The official said many car bombings bore the “tradecraft” of Saddam’s former secret police and were aimed at intimidating Iraq’s new security services.

Many in the U.S. intelligence community have been making similar points, but have encountered political opposition from the Bush administration, a State Department official in Washington said, also speaking on condition of anonymity.

Civilian analysts generally agreed, saying U.S. and Iraqi officials have long overemphasized the roles of foreign fighters and Muslim extremists.

Such positions support the Bush administration’s view that the insurgency is linked to the war on terror. A closer examination paints most insurgents as secular Iraqis angry at the presence of U.S. and other foreign troops.

“Too much U.S. analysis is fixated on terms like ‘jihadist,’ just as it almost mindlessly tries to tie everything to (Osama) bin Laden,” Cordesman said. “Every public opinion poll in Iraq ... supports the nationalist character of what is happening.”

Many guerrillas are motivated by Islam in the same way religion motivates American soldiers, who also tend to pray more when they’re at war, the U.S. military official said.

He said he met Tuesday with four tribal sheiks from Ramadi who “made very clear” that they had no desire for an Islamic state, even though mosques are used as insurgent sanctuaries and funding centers.

“‘We’re not a bunch of Talibans,’” he paraphrased the sheiks as saying.

At the orders of Gen. John Abizaid, the U.S. commander of Mideast operations, Army analysts looked closely for evidence that Iraq’s insurgency was adopting extreme Islamist goals, the official said. Analysts learned that ridding Iraq of U.S. troops was the motivator for most insurgents, not the formation of an Islamic state.

The officer said Iraq’s insurgents have a big advantage over guerrillas elsewhere: plenty of arms, money, and training. Iraq’s lack of a national identity card system — and guerrillas’ refusal to plan attacks by easily intercepted telephone calls — makes them difficult to track.

“They have learned a great deal over the last year, and with far more continuity than the rotating U.S. forces and Iraqi security forces,” Cordesman said of the guerrillas. “They have learned to react very quickly and in ways our sensors and standard tactics cannot easily deal with.””

Pentagon Outlines Troop Rotation Plan for Iraq

New units, to be deployed over several months, will include more reservists. The Army denies it is being stretched too thin.

By Esther Schrader
Times Staff Writer

July 8, 2004

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon is planning for the “worst-case” scenario in Iraq over the next year, preparing to send in more armored units to battle an unrelenting insurgency, a senior Army official told Congress on Wednesday.

Defense officials laid out a detailed roadmap of how they plan to deploy troops over the next year, replacing 140,000 soldiers and Marines now in Iraq with 135,000 troops being sent from bases in the U.S. and Europe in a third rotation of forces starting in November and lasting four months.

The proportion of reservists in Iraq will increase — from 39% to 42% of U.S. forces — as commanders try to bolster critical specialties where they are short and where civilian contractors can no longer be used because of the dangers. Other gaps will be plugged with the call-up of more than 5,600 recent military retirees.

Meanwhile, commanders are looking for ways to fill thousands of openings in military intelligence operations. Overall, of troops going to Iraq beginning this fall, a majority — 55% — will be serving a second time.

Taken together, the plans presented to members of the House Armed Services Committee portrayed a military scrambling to meet future troop needs for the conflict in Iraq and confronting the recurring criticism that they are trying to do too much with too little.

Gen. Richard A. Cody, the Army’s new deputy chief of staff, and other defense officials testified that the Army did not want or need a permanent troop increase, saying they could make do with the soldiers they have.

Lawmakers continued to question that assessment, with Rep. Ike Skelton of Missouri, the committee’s ranking Democrat, calling the Pentagon’s announcement last week that it is calling up 5,600 members of the Individual Ready Reserve of military retirees a sign that the Pentagon is “wearing our people out.” The troops, Skelton said, “are not pawns on a chessboard. They are our treasure.”

Rep. John Kline (R-Minn.) called the number of reservists fighting in Iraq “just too high,” saying employers of called-up reservists had complained to members of Congress.

But Pentagon officials defended the use of the ready reserve, a pool of roughly 118,000 former soldiers who are not members of a specific reserve unit and do not train regularly, yet who have unexpired obligations to complete their military service. Ready reserve soldiers have not been called up in significant numbers since 1990, amid preparations for the Persian Gulf War.

“The fact that its use is rare does not mean that it is inappropriate,” David S.C. Chu, undersecretary of Defense for personnel and readiness, told the committee.

Chu said that of the 5,674 Individual Ready Reserve members mobilized to deploy to Iraq, he expected about 4,000 would go. He said the Pentagon opted to mobilize more troops than it needs because of the likelihood that some of the former service personnel, who had not been undergoing training since they left the service, would not be prepared for combat.

The military officials acknowledged that the Army had to scramble to “backfill” in some areas where it is short of qualified people.

“Our entire force,” Cody testified, “is doing missions other than what we designed them for.”

The most acute shortages, he said, are in military intelligence units, where Army planners calculate they are short 9,000 specialists to man the Army’s new Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition units, as well as its new unmanned aerial vehicles.

“We’re looking for some relief there,” Cody said.

The increasing dangers of being in Iraq have also made it more difficult for Army planners to hire contract workers to drive trucks and repair vehicles, Cody said, forcing the Army to reach deeper into the pool of reservists and individual ready reservists.

He said the planned troop rotation was a “worst-case plan” that required more work from combat service support troops, such as heavy-equipment drivers and engineering units.

“We had to keep more engineer units over there because of the roads as well as some of the bridges, and we had to keep more truck drivers over there because the level of violence was such you couldn’t get the civilian contractors to do some of that stuff,” Cody said.

That, “quite frankly, is what drove us to have to go back to more transportation units … that we had not planned on; more engineer units the second time that we hadn’t planned on” in the past several months, Cody said.

With the insurgency making duty in Iraq more dangerous for U.S. troops, Pentagon planners have chosen to outfit the force rotating into the conflict with 200 additional tanks, more than 6,000 Humvees specially equipped with armor plating, and dozens more Bradley Fighting Vehicles.

“The divisions going in will be more lethal,” Cody said.

The 3rd Infantry Division, for example, which fought to take Baghdad and is slated to begin returning to Iraq in November, will be outfitted this time with 48 Apache helicopters, up from 18 the first time around, along with 38 Black Hawk and 12 Chinook helicopters.

Also slated to join the fight in Iraq is the 10th Mountain Division’s 2nd Brigade; two Marine expeditionary units; a Marine expeditionary force; the Army’s 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division, outfitted with new Stryker wheeled vehicles; the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment; and several National Guard combat brigades, including the 42nd Infantry Division from New York, the 155th Armored Brigade from Mississippi and the 29th Brigade from Hawaii.

*

Troop rotation

Starting in November, 135,000 troops will be sent to Iraq from bases in the United States and Europe, replacing 140,000 soldiers and Marines in Iraq.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-troops8jul08,1,6303323.story?coll=la-headlines-nation

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Army to call up 5,600 IRR Soldiers By Joe Burlas Army News Service July 01, 2004

WASHINGTON—The Army plans to order 5,600 Soldier in the Individual Ready Reserve to active duty for possible deployment with the next Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom rotations.Mailgrams notifying those Soldiers to expect mobilization orders within a week could hit their mailboxes as early as July 6, according to officials who announced the measure in Pentagon press briefing June 30. Those Soldiers called up will have 30 days from the date the orders were issued to take care of personal business before having to report to a mobilization site, officials said. The orders call for 18 months of active duty, but that could be extended for a total of 24 months if needed, they said.The IRR call-up does not impact retired Soldiers, contrary to several civilian media reports on the subject that appeared on television and newspapers June 29 and 30.“We’re dipping into an available manpower pool,” said Robert Smiley, principal assistant for Training, Readiness and Mobilization, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. “This is just good personnel management.“The IRR primarily consists of Soldiers who have served their contracted time on active duty or in an Army Reserve Troop Program Unit, but still have a military service obligation to fulfill, said Col. Debra Cook, commander for Human Resources Command – St. Louis, the Reserve’s personnel management center.Congress mandates under Title 10 of the U.S. Code that all services have an IRR.Every Soldier, enlisted or commissioned, has an eight-year military service obligation when he or she joins the Army, Cook said. Often, that commitment is divided between active duty or a TPU assignment and the IRR.“You might have one Soldier sign up for four years on active duty, who then has a four-year IRR commitment, and another Soldier who signs up to serve with a Ready Reserve unit for six years and two years in the IRR—both have IRR commitments to meet their military service obligations,” Cook said. “The enlistment contract spells out exactly what the division is between how long they serve on active duty or a Ready Reserve unit and how long in the IRR.“This is not the first time the Army has used the IRR to fill its manpower needs. During the Gulf War, more than 20,000 IRR Soldiers were mobilized and deployed. Since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the Army has called up more than 2,500 IRR Soldiers—the majority through IRR volunteers, though some have been involuntary call-ups.The main purpose of this IRR call-up is to fill personnel shortfalls in a number of Army Reserve and National Guard units that have been tagged to deploy overseas as part of the OIF 3 and OEF 6 rotations planned for late fall, Smiley said. Many of the personnel shortfalls are for Soldiers already assigned to the deploying units who are not deployable due to medical, family or legal issues, he said.The actual mobilization and deployment requirement is for about 4,400 Soldiers, but personnel officials expect to find some of the IRR Soldiers with similar medical, family and legal issues that may keep them from being deployable. Historically speaking, the Army needs to mobilize about 13 IRR Soldiers to get 10 deployable Soldiers, said Raymond Robinson, G1 chief of Operations.The called-up IRR Soldiers will spend about 30 days at a mobilization installation, getting checks to see if they are qualified for deployment, getting individual weapons qualification, conducting Common Task Testing and receiving training in a number of warrior tasks that reflect the realities of today’s operating environment, including how to recognize an improvised explosive devise and reacting to an ambush.Those who do not pass the readiness muster at the mobilization installation for reasons including anything from medical and legal reasons to physical challenges may be disqualified and sent home, Robinson said. Those who pass the muster will be sent on to military occupational specialty schools to get refresher training, normally lasting between two to four weeks. The final stop is joining the deploying unit at least 30 days before deployment for collective training as a unit.While the specific jobs the called-up Soldiers will fill are varied, Cook said the heaviest requirements include truck drivers, mechanics, logistics personnel and administrative specialists.“We will not deploy any Soldier who is not trained or ready,” said Bernard Oliphant, deputy for the Army Operations Center’s Mobilization Division, G3.As of June 22, the IRR contained slightly more than 111,000 Soldiers.
http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,usa1_070104.00.html?ESRC=dod.nl
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Action Alert: Army to Recall Thousands?

Digging deeper for help in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is recalling about 5,600 people. According to an Associated Press article, the Army is recalling to active duty about 5,600 people who recently left the service and still have a reserve obligation. “In a new sign of the strain the insurgency in Iraq has put on the U.S. military, Army officials said last week the involuntary callups will begin in July and run through December. It is the first sizable activation of the Individual Ready Reserve since the 1991 Gulf War, though several hundred people have voluntarily returned to service since the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks.” To read the full Associated Press article, click here. Do you agree or disagree with this action? Let you representatives at the DoD know how you feel—your voice matters! Share your view on this issue. Send an email directly to your representatives now through our system. To read past letters to leaders concerning issues in the military, click here. To read more action alerts, click here.
http://www.military.com/MilitaryReport/0,12914,MR_Action_070504,00.html?ESRC=dod.nl
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Army Recalling Thousands Associated Press June 30, 2004

WASHINGTON - Digging deeper for help in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is recalling to active duty about 5,600 people who recently left the service and still have a reserve obligation. In a new sign of the strain the insurgency in Iraq has put on the U.S. military, Army officials said Tuesday the involuntary callups will begin in July and run through December. It is the first sizable activation of the Individual Ready Reserve since the 1991 Gulf War, though several hundred people have voluntarily returned to service since the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks. Unlike members of the National Guard and Reserve, individual reservists do not perform regularly scheduled training and receive no pay unless they are called up. The Army is targeting its recall at those who recently left the service and thus have the most up-to-date skills. “This was inevitable when it became clear that we would have to maintain significant combat forces in Iraq for a period of years,” said Dan Goure, a military analyst at the Lexington Institute, a think tank. The Army is pinpointing certain skills in short supply, like medical specialists, military police, engineers, transportation specialists and logistics experts. Those selected for recall will be given at least 30 days’ notice to report for training, an Army statement said. Vietnam veteran Chuck Luczynski said in an interview Tuesday that he fears his son, Matt, who is getting out of the Army after four years, will be called back to active duty as part of the individual reserves. The son returned home in March after a one-year tour in Iraq with the 101st Airborne Division, and he’s planning to start a computer programming business. “I think that’s on everybody’s mind right now, that they took their turn and they would hope everybody took a turn so that a few don’t carry the many,” said the elder Luczynski, of Omaha, Neb. The Army is so stretched for manpower that in April it broke a promise to some active-duty units, including the 1st Armored Division, that they would not have to serve more than 12 months in Iraq. It also has extended the tours of other units, including some in Afghanistan. “It is a reflection of the fact that the (active-duty) military is too small for the breadth of challenges we are facing,” Goure said. The men and women recalled from the Individual Ready Reserve will be assigned to Army Reserve and National Guard units that have been or soon will be mobilized for deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan, unless they successfully petition for exemption based on medical or other limitations. Members of Congress were notified Tuesday and a formal Army announced was scheduled for Wednesday. Those in the Individual Ready Reserve are former enlisted soldiers and officers who have some nonactive-duty military service obligation remaining, under terms they signed when they signed on but who chose not to fulfill it in the Guard or Reserve. The Pentagon had hoped to reduce its troop levels in Iraq to about 105,000 this spring, but because of increasingly effective and deadly resistance the level has risen to about 140,000. Military officials have said they may need to stay at that level for at least another year or two, a commitment of forces that could not be maintained by the active force alone. The Army frequently must integrate reservists with its active-duty forces, but it rarely has to reach into the Individual Ready Reserve. The Army has about 117,000 people in this category of reservist; the Navy has 64,000, the Marine Corps 58,000 and the Air Force 37,000. The military has relied heavily on National Guard and Reserve soldiers in Iraq, in part because some essential specialties like military police are found mainly in the reserves rather than the active-duty force and partly because the mission has required more troops than planned. Reserve troops make up at least one-third of the U.S. force in Iraq, and this month they have accounted for nearly half of all troops killed in combat. In January, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld authorized the Army to activate as many as 6,500 people from the Individual Ready Reserve, drawing on presidential authority granted in 2001. Not until May did the Army begin looking in detail at the available pool of people. At that point some Army recruiters caused a controversy when they contacted members of the Individual Ready Reserve and suggested they would wind up in Iraq unless they joined a Reserve or Guard unit. Some complained that they were being coerced to transfer into a Reserve unit.
http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,FL_army_063004,00.html

——-Message d’origine——-
De : Marjorie Gibson [mailto:

]
Envoyé : mardi 6 juillet 2004 19:29
À : Undisclosed-Recipient:;
Objet : SUBMISSION FROM JOHN CHUCKMAN

July 6, 2004
A DEAFENING SILENCE OF MEANING
John Chuckman
Recently, John Kerry and his wife held a barbecue at the Pennsylvania White House. Never heard of the Pennsylvania White House? It’s actually the homestead of Kerry’s wife, a white-columned mansion on a tailored estate outside Pittsburgh built from the proceeds of a billion cans of spaghetti and bottles of ketchup. Kerry wants everyone to know he’s an ordinary guy so he’s holding barbecues these days instead of crystal-and-candlelight dinners. People who normally never would get past the front gate have now been allowed on the rolled greens to chomp hot dogs.
Those attending a down-home get-together recently were greeted with hay bales designed by a team of Neiman-Marcus window dressers; a custom-made silk flag, gigantic enough to use for hang-gliding, flapped over the mansion in breezes generated by rented Hollywood wind machines; a band subtly suggested the Marines Corps Band playing “Hail to the Chief”; and, as if in homage to Ronald Reagan, a rented soldier home from occupation-duty in Iraq led the crowd through a heart-rending Pledge of Allegiance. They may well have served jelly beans along with the tapioca pudding, but reports don’t tell us.
The new class of visitors to the estate was not allowed to enjoy the hot dogs without receiving a dose of inspiration from the campaign trail, almost the way poor men at a Salvation Army shelter get scripture between bites of doughnut. Kerry enjoined guests to leave the hallowed grounds “with the spirit in an uplifting sense that we’re going to change this country.” Yes, those were his very words, much as we might have received from that other source of constant inspiration, the President himself, down in Crawford, Texas, over some smoldering cows and cold root beer.
Guests apparently left with puzzled faces over what they were being asked, but they merely joined the swelling ranks of puzzled Americans who have attended Kerry’s rallies and speeches.
Kerry likes to say, “This is the most important election of our lifetime,” and his guests heard it again over dollops of tapioca in Dixie Cups. It’s his best line when he doesn’t muff it, although he never explains why the claim should be true. Its threadbare, re-tread quality begins to suggest Richard Nixon’s “It’s time for a change!” a line that got him elected in 1968 so he could vastly expand the pointless killing and destruction in Vietnam.
Everyone understands, though, that Kerry’s slogan is about “anyone but Bush,” exactly the kind of substitute for thinking that gave the world Bush in the first place. Anybody-but-Bush is about the only positive adjective you can apply to the candidacy of John Kerry.
If you want to read some indigestible stuff, finish whatever it is you’re eating and then go to John Kerry’s Town Hall Meeting Internet site. Other than a few slabs of party boilerplate, there is nothing there, absolutely nothing, to inspire Americans and others in the world about the future. On many of the site’s “on the issues” topics, when you go to subtopics, you find nothing of substance. The headlines themselves are the most encouraging words, and they do not even fairly describe what is contained under them. In several cases, there are statements that are positively depressing.
Here is Kerry’s summary statement on Iraq:
Winning the Peace in Iraq…A Strategy for Success
To establish security and move forward with the transition to Iraqi sovereignty, the President must show true leadership in going to the major powers to secure their support of Lakhdar Brahimi’s mission, the establishment of a high commissioner for governance and reconstruction, and the creation of a NATO mission for Iraq. These steps are critical to creating a stable Iraq with a representative government and secure in its borders. Meeting this objective is in the interests of NATO member states, Iraq’s neighbors and all members of the international community. True leadership means sharing authority and responsibility for Iraq with others who have an interest in Iraq’s success. Sharing responsibility is the only way to gain new military and financial commitments, allowing America to truly share the burden and the risk.
This is Kerry-speak for saying that NATO allies should pay part of the human and material cost for America’s mess in Iraq. Why? In case, Kerry hadn’t noticed, Bush has been trying to accomplish this very thing for some time, applying a good deal of nasty pressure to allies, but Iraq, as Bush was pointedly told recently by Europeans, has nothing whatever to do with NATO’s mandate.
I suspect the phrase “true leadership,” apart from being a totally unwarranted advertising claim about the Senator’s dreary career, means Kerry sees himself playing good cop in the old good cop-bad cop routine used by police to break down suspects, but friends and allies aren’t usually regarded as suspects.
Consider the words, “winning the peace.” At first glance, they suggest heroic purpose like that of World War Two, providing a gloss of worthiness to the utter human and material waste of Iraq. The words were undoubtedly selected also to suggest for some Americans, the Planet-of-the-Apes crowd, slogans like “winning in Vietnam.” The word “peace”
was selected with entirely another group of Americans in mind, mostly wishful thinkers and harmless dreamers.
If putting together the words “winning”
and “peace”
suggests to you George Orwell’s “war is peace,” you are not alone, particularly when you consider that Iraq already had peace and was a genuine threat to no one before the United States smashed it.
Tucked under the topic on Iraq at Kerry’s site is an item “Protecting Our Military Families in Times of War: A Military Family Bill of Rights.” Here’s an advertising pitch for tossing a tiny packet of sugar at each military voter, recalling, at one and the same time, scenes in World War Two films where GIs toss sticks of gum to hungry refugees and microphone reminders to shoppers for today’s special at Wal-Mart - all with a suitably sentimental nod to all the Jimmy Stewarts serving at spots like Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo’s human dog cages. Well, a packet of sugar is better than nothing, because God knows Kerry’s view of foreign policy promises a future with plenty of the same duty.
We could analyze the rest of the stuff on Kerry’s site - all of it trying to make it appear he has something new to say and all of it about as helpful and clear as the fine print on a prescription-drug brochure - but it just isn’t worth the effort. I’ll only note further that Kerry had a featured item there about China, accusing Bush of letting Americans down about China. Please, Senator, say that we are not being promised another years-long chorus of American hectoring and carping about a proud but poor people working hard to earn their place in sun. Good God, what hypocrisy that was under Clinton.
It is important to remember that George Bush, while a top contender for title of Biggest Flop in American History, is largely a spent force. It is difficult to see what else he could possibly do to damage the planet. Once, not very long ago, his presidential Brain Trust, the neo-con Nazis, advocated mopping up Syria, Iran, and other places whose names they couldn’t even pronounce as soon as they finished up in Iraq. Well, things are not going to finish up any time soon in Iraq. America has spent herself silly trying to stabilize Iraq after de-stabilizing it.
There is a distasteful quality about Bush that people all over the world instinctively feel, and Bush’s efforts, we may all be thankful, will continue being hindered by that perception. Kerry has the advantage of being utterly boring instead of distasteful, but his ideas about the world are remarkably similar to Bush’s. If Americans elect Kerry, they will get a fresh, new Bush who may actually be able to leverage some of the world’s recent weariness and desperate desire for change to carry right on with more destructive stupidity.

U.S. Response to Insurgency Called a Failure
Some top Bush officials and military experts say the Pentagon has no coherent strategy. Little change is expected with Iraq’s new sovereignty.
By Mark Mazzetti
Times Staff Writer

July 6, 2004

WASHINGTON — Almost a year after acknowledging they were facing a well-armed guerrilla war in Iraq, the Pentagon and commanders in the Middle East are being criticized by some top Bush administration officials, military officers and defense experts who accuse the military of failing to develop a coherent, winning strategy against the insurgency.

Inadequate intelligence, poor assessments of enemy strength, testy relations with U.S. civilian authorities in Baghdad and an inconsistent application of force remain key problems many observers say the military must address before U.S. and Iraqi forces can quell the insurgents.

“It’s disappointing that we haven’t been able to have better insight into the command and control of the insurgents,” said one senior official of the now-dissolved Coalition Provisional Authority, recently returned from Baghdad and speaking on condition of anonymity. “And you’ve got to have that if you’re going to have effective military operations.”

It was July 16, 2003, when Army Gen. John Abizaid stood at a Pentagon podium during his first news conference as head of U.S. Central Command and declared — after weeks of Pentagon denials — that U.S. troops were fighting a “classic guerrilla-type war” in Iraq.

Now, after a year of violence and hundreds of U.S. combat deaths, some officials and experts are frustrated that a more effective counterinsurgency plan has not materialized and that the hand-over of power to an interim Iraqi government last week was unlikely to significantly improve the security situation.

“We’re going to have the same cast of characters in Washington and the same commander [Abizaid] in the field,” said Andrew Krepinevich of the Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, an expert on counterinsurgency warfare. “What gives you a sense of confidence we’re going to become a lot more competent at something we haven’t shown a great deal of competence at doing for a year?”

Some top American officials bristle at the criticism and say the U.S.-led coalition’s plan has been consistent from the beginning: to bring security to Iraq in preparation for an eventual hand-over to Iraqi forces.

“Our strategy is not complicated. It is to train Iraqis as quickly as we possibly can and as efficiently as we possibly can, and to set the conditions so they can take charge of their own security,” said a senior official, speaking on condition of anonymity.

And, the administration argues, U.S. forces handed a strategic defeat in April to both Shiite and Sunni Muslim insurgents, forcing them to lower their sights. Rather than confronting U.S. forces, those insurgents have turned to bombing Iraqi infrastructure and attempting to assassinate leaders of the new Iraqi government.

“They now cannot defeat us on the battlefield, so they are changing their tactics,” the official said.

Yet one of the biggest problems for U.S. military and intelligence officials remains the paucity of hard intelligence about the structure of the insurgency.

For example, when Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked recently during Senate testimony whether the Iraqi insurgency was being coordinated from a central hub, he responded: “The intelligence community, as far as I know, will not ... give you an answer, because they can’t give me an answer.”

Military experts point out that a counterinsurgency is the most difficult type of war to wage. With the exception of the successful British effort in Malaya in the 1950s, history is littered with examples of unsuccessful counterinsurgency strategies carried out by great powers. As the French learned in Algeria in the 1950s, the United States in Vietnam a decade later and the British in Northern Ireland, the most difficult part of any such operation is to separate the insurgents from the civilians from whom they draw strength. This, some top Pentagon officials say, has been one of the U.S. military’s difficulties in Iraq.

“The hope that the Iraqi people, upon having Saddam [Hussein] deposed, would step forward enthusiastically and embrace this new opportunity, turned out to be more optimistic than it should have been,” Marine Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently told Congress.

“That, I think, has led to the opportunity for the terrorists then to be able to operate without fear of being exposed by the population.”

The three-week desert war during the spring of 2003, ending in the collapse of Hussein’s regime, vindicated the idea that a small U.S. ground force, combined with billions of dollars worth of military technology, could make quick work of a larger, yet hollow, enemy army. It was a conventional war that the U.S. military had trained and been equipped for since emerging from the jungles of Vietnam three decades ago; a strategy executed with success during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

What came afterward was far more difficult, and U.S. commanders over the last year have used what critics call a trial-and-error strategy against the insurgency, with varying degrees of success.

Immediately after the fall of Baghdad, U.S. commanders set their sights on capturing the biggest stars in the Baath Party constellation, creating the notorious deck of cards depicting the most wanted people from Hussein’s regime. Brigades of the Army’s 4th Infantry Division carried out raids throughout the so-called Sunni Triangle in search of Hussein loyalists such as Izzat Ibrahim, vice chairman of the Baath Party’s Revolutionary Command Council.

The raids netted some important figures. Yet U.S. officials now concede that focusing too much on the top regime members did not have the expected impact on the insurgency.

“I think there was probably too great a willingness to believe that once we got the 55 people on the blacklist, the rest of those killers would stop fighting,” Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz told Congress recently.

Defenders of American counterinsurgency efforts argue that the violence in Iraq over the last year is part of a calculated plan by members of Hussein’s former regime, not the result of missteps by the U.S.-led occupation authority.

“It is the military and intelligence and secret police that never surrendered. And they are continuing the fight,” said the senior administration official.

After a string of bombings last summer — most significantly, the destruction of the United Nations compound in August — U.S. commanders adopted a get-tough approach in central Iraq. Troops used barbed wire to encircle entire villages, including Al Auja, where Hussein was born. In November, the U.S. launched bombing raids on suspected insurgent hide-outs in Baghdad.

Ground troops scored successes during the period, developing better intelligence about the Baathist insurgents. The 4th Infantry Division drew up complex family trees of suspected party loyalists, ultimately leading to Hussein’s capture in December.

With the new year, the Marines began developing a “velvet glove” strategy for their imminent deployment to the Sunni Triangle — in contrast to the more confrontational approach of the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, which had responsibility for that area until March. Relying on the Marine Corps “Small Wars Manual,” the 1st Marine Division planned to carry out more foot patrols in cities such as Fallouja and send Marine platoons into villages to live for extended periods. They also planned to shun the use of aerial bombardment or artillery.

But that strategy went by the boards with the killing and mutilation of four American contractors, which precipitated a Marine assault on Fallouja in April. That offensive was cut short after U.S. officials in Baghdad and Washington decided the bloody campaign was having a negative impact on the larger American effort in Iraq. The Marines pulled back, marking another swerve in the counterinsurgency effort.

“We were winning, but we didn’t get a win. It’s a hard pill to swallow,” complained one Marine operations officer who recently returned from Iraq, speaking on condition of anonymity. “Now, nobody knows what’s going on inside the city.”

In many cases, U.S. troops have been able to adapt on the ground over the past year. The Army’s 101st Airborne, which fought to Baghdad, then assumed responsibility for Kurdish territories after the war, is praised by Pentagon officials for bringing Kurdish leaders into the U.S. fold and keeping the level of violence in northern Iraq to a minimum.

More recently, the Army’s 1st Armored Division is credited with successfully putting down revolts by Shiite Muslim cleric Muqtada Sadr’s militia in Najaf and other southern towns with a comparatively limited use of force.

“It was a strategic defeat for Sadr,” said the senior administration official. The commander of the 1st Armored, Maj. Gen. Martin Dempsey, “put that mob action down quickly and decisively,” the official said.

Some top U.S. commanders express optimism that as the U.S. military continues to adjust to the difficult warfare conditions in Iraq, the counterinsurgency efforts will produce more positive results.

“I think we’re in good shape going forward,” said Maj. Gen. Charles H. Swannack Jr., commander of the 82nd Airborne Division. “It will all come out well if we stay the course.”

At the same time, many experts point out that counterinsurgency work is as much a political mission as it is a military one, requiring a comprehensive strategy involving civilian officials planning reconstruction projects and elections and military officers gathering intelligence and carrying out raids against suspected insurgents.

In Iraq, some top military officials say, the relationship between the U.S. military and the Coalition Provisional Authority was often tense, making such close coordination difficult.

“CPA representatives would not get out in the field to get on-the-spot input for assessment,” Swannack said.

Maj. Gen. James N. Mattis, who commands the 1st Marine Division in Al Anbar province in western Iraq, has argued for months with U.S. civilians in Baghdad over the pace of reconstruction and the status of U.S. forces after the hand-over of power, Marine sources say. “He did not pull any punches in his communications” to Baghdad, said one Marine operations officer, speaking on condition of anonymity.

U.S. military officials hope dissolution of the CPA and creation of an embassy in Baghdad will help mend fences and engender the cooperation that, experts say, is critical for the counterinsurgency effort.

Although the Army recently has been incorporating counterinsurgency work into its training of young soldiers, experts say that for decades after Vietnam, the Army focused almost entirely on fighting large tank battles in the desert, not armed militias in Third World cities.

After the Sept. 11 attacks, however, when the doctrine of overwhelming force against an enemy became less relevant, the Army found it needed to change course, and quickly. Back it went into the counterinsurgency business.

Said analyst Krepinevich: “It’s like telling General Motors to stop building cars, and then 25 years later telling them you want them to build a car.”

Times staff writers John Hendren and Doyle McManus contributed to this report.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-counterinsurgency6jul06.story

Pour la version STOVL, vous remarquerez qu’elle est censée arriver en 2012 au mieux alors que le porte-avions britannique arrivera en 2013. Pensez donc au confort actuel dans lequel doivent baigner nos amis anglais, puisque l’architecture du porte avions dépend bien de la version de l’avion qui sera in fine embarqué.

Public debate on Turkey to come
01.07.2004 - 09:01 CET | By Honor Mahony EUOBSERVER / THE HAGUE - The Dutch EU Presidency has pledged to be fair on the question of whether Ankara is ready to start EU membership negotiations amid concerns that the EU may not be ready for Turkey.

“The Netherlands feels a responsibility to make sure that our decision is well-reasoned and rock-solid”, said Dutch prime minister Jan Peter Balkenende on the eve of the Dutch EU Presidency.

While the European Commission will decide in the autumn whether Ankara has met the political criteria for joining the 25-nation block, Mr Balkenende says this is just one of two types of debate that will take place.

The Dutch leader said that discussion on the political criteria is “technical”.

The second discussion amongst the European public is likely to centre around whether “an Islamic country belongs to Europe”.

However, the Dutch are insisting that this debate, as well as whether the EU is actually ready for a country the size of Turkey, should not be additional criteria.

“We need fair play … the rules of the game are clear”, said Mr Balkenende referring to the fact that if the European Commission decides that Ankara is ready, it will then be up to leaders in December to actually decide, on the basis of the report, to open negotiations without delay.

Late debate
With French leadership ambivalent on Turkish EU membership, the opposition Christian Democrats in Germany actively opposing it and the Austrians also making negative sounds, the Dutch do feel that a debate will come - it is just later than it should have been.

Referring to 1999, when EU leaders actually decided to give Turkey candidate status, Dutch Europe minister Atzo Nicolaï said, “that was the time for debate”.

He added, “I think the leaders knew what they decided but the public didn’t know”.

However, it is too late for the “principle debate” of whether Turkey should join the EU, he concluded.

“We have to realise Turkey has to be ready and the European Union has to be ready”.

Mr Nicolaï also conceded that there is a risk that the planned Dutch referendum on the Constitution, which is set to happen in the same timeframe as a decision on Turkey, may be linked to the issue.

“That is always a risk”, he said.

http://www.euobserver.com/?aid=16787&rk=1
—-

Realism on possibility of Turkey meeting EU criteria

24.06.2004 - 10:22 CET | By Mark Beunderman
EUOBSERVER / BRUSSELS - EU and Turkish politicians and experts seem increasingly prepared to admit that it will be impossible for Turkey to meet the EU’s political criteria before the end of the year.

During a debate organised yesterday (23 June) by the European Policy Centre and Turkish NGO, the ARI Movement, it emerged that within both EU political and research circles, as well as from the Turkish side, the belief in full Turkish compliance with EU democracy and human rights criteria is lacking.

Formally, the fulfilment of the EU’s democracy and human rights standards is a precondition for Ankara to start accession talks with the EU.

EU leaders will decide in December whether or not to start formal accession negotiations on the basis of a crucial report by the European Commission to be released in October.

However, many believe the process has gone far and it would be counterproductive to reject Turkey now.

Dutch foreign minister Bernard Bot underlined the importance of the political criteria yesterday stating that the political criteria “are the sole measuring stick that should be applied” to Turkey.

Getting the green light anyway?
But Murat Mercan, Turkey’s representative at the Council of Europe said, during the debate, “don’t expect us to solve all our problems before December” but went on to stress the “incredible” reforms achieved by his country.

Selcan Yilmaz, a board member of the ARI movement, a civil society group, stated: “The countries which acceded to the EU on 1 May did not comply fully with EU standards either. They acceded nevertheless”.

But the Dutch Green MEP, Joost Lagendijk, urged the Turks to be even more open about this scenario.

“It will be impossible for Turkey to comply 100% with the EU’s political criteria. That will not happen before the end of the year. Turkish politicians should drop their claim that Turkey will fully comply”.

Civil-military relations
Similarly, the German researcher Heinz Kramer, working for the prestigious Berlin thinktank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, said that in the field of civil-military relations particularly, Turkey still had a long way to go.

“The way the military intervened in the recent debate on university reform shows that Turkey is still far from having reached EU standards when it comes to civil-military relations”.

But he pleaded for a “non-static approach” with regard to the EU’s political criteria - meaning that accession talks should be opened as soon as possible even if the criteria were not fully met.

“Turkey has made tremendous progress in political reforms in the last few years, which has significantly affected the political and social reality on the ground. If the EU does not give the green light for accession talks in December, this will produce serious backlashes for pro-reform forces in the country.”

No holiday for the Turks
“Small political circles in Turkey believe that the EU uses double standards towards us. As much as I disagree with these voices, they could be strengthened if we were treated unfairly”, said Ms Yilmaz.

However, the Turks will keep working hard to keep the reform process going, said Mr Mercan: “There will be no holiday for us this summer until - probably - we will get a date.”

http://www.euobserver.com/?sid=15&aid=16724
—-

Turkey’s accession to the EU: the final countdown

By Murat Mercan Heinz Kramer Selcan Yilmaz Date: 25-06-2004 Keywords: International Relations and Security   Turkey   EU enlargement   Wider Europe  
A Dialogue on “Turkey’s Accession to the EU: The Final Countdown” was held by the EPC in collaboration with the ARI Movement. Muran Mercan, Member of the Turkish Parliament and Vice-President of the AK Party gave an opening presentation and Dr Heinz Kramer, Director of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and Selcan Yilmaz, Board Member of the ARI Movement participated in the following panel discussion. The event was chaired by EPC Founding Chairman, Stanley Crossick. A question and answer session followed. This is not an official record of the proceedings, and specific remarks are not necessarily attributable.Opening the Dialogue, Turkish MP Murat Mercan, Vice-President of the governing Justice and Development Party (AK), and chairman of the Turkish delegation to the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, said his country had done a lot to meet the political accession criteria, especially in the areas of democratisation and human rights. There had been “incredible” constitutional changes – the introduction of a national security court, the abolition of the death penalty, the removal of all military representatives from higher education organisations and a free press. He acknowledged concerns about implementation, but despite shortcomings, Turkey had a strong fundamental commitment to tackling its problems, especially human rights violations. The question was whether Turkey had sufficiently met the Copenhagen Criteria.“I think we are entitled to be credited for what we have done. We deserve the goodwill and trust of the European community for the things we have done so far.”Turkey’s accession was an historic opportunity for Europeans to create a “world of values,” Christian or otherwise, rather than risking a “clash of civilizations.”Mr Mercan said: “If we can create a world where a value-based Union is possible, then there is always hope for others to be included in this club. That is why it is very strategic for all of us. Only then can we give hope to people living in the Middle East.” The decision over the acceptance or rejection of Turkey by the EU would be “a litmus test for whole world.”Chairman Stanley Crossick said that the question of religion had to be grasped and discussed openly: was Islam by its nature compatible with the EU and, if Turkey joined, how would the rights and obligations for all EU citizens be redefined?However, it was wrong to talk about Islam as if it is one uniform religion with a uniform set of beliefs and practices, although the involvement of Islam in daily life was evidently greater than in Christianity, even at Islam’s secular end he said.Panel DiscussionHe invited the panel to tackle the issue of whether Turkey had done enough to meet the Copenhagen Criteria, and whether Turkey’s membership would be an asset or a threat to the rest of the EU.Dr Heinz Kramer made a clear distinction: the issue of Turkey’s EU membership was not a debate about Islam joining Europe: it was a debate about a country joining the European Union. He did not think seeing the issue as an ideological question was helpful. Turkey was not attempting to achieve some “political Islam” by seeking to join a non-Islamic EU.Expectations were becoming more and more divergent; support was growing in Turkey but waning in the EU, where the public was concerned about the consequences of the latest enlargement, the ambiguities of the recently-agreed constitution, and the “disastrous” euro-elections results. But it would be a bad omen if Turkey was only half-heartedly backed by the EU-25 in December, even if there was a positive decision.Has Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria?It was a “mixed picture” said Dr Kramer. There had been tremendous progress, with a large amount of constitutional and legal reform affecting the political and social reality in Turkey. Politics in Turkey was changing, from an “ossified” system to one of a modern European liberal democracy.On the other hand, Turkey had not yet sufficiently met the criteria: military involvement in civilian life was still far from being in compliance with EU standards; the Kurdish problem was still far from resolved satisfactorily, with political, economic and social shortcomings in the Southeast particularly; legal reforms had not yet been implemented across the country; and there was no “broad-based ownership” of the reforms promised by the state and society. In simple terms, said Dr Kramer, more political effort was needed.That said, the EU had to support what was being done by giving the green light for the opening of accession negotiations – indeed, Turkey required the “anchor” of the EU’s support precisely to be able to successfully conclude its far-reaching reforms. Ever since Turkey was named an official candidate country at the Helsinki summit in December 1999, EU-Turkey relations had developed “a dynamic which would forbid any other decision.”Dr Kramer pointed out that the fate of the AK party was “indexed to the fate of accession.” Failure to agree to start accession talks in December would create “a serious political and economic backlash.” He dismissed the notion of Turkish accession as a threat to the EU: “That would be against political logic: the Union would not take a member it felt threatened by.”Turkish membership not the “end” of the EU, but the “biggest step”Selcan Yilmaz described the reforms going on in Turkey as the most significant since the country was founded. From the abolition of the death penalty to press freedom, rights of assembly, ethnic minority rights, and the ending of the state security courts, political and social life was being virtually reshaped. Responding to general complaints on the lack of implementation of the promised changes, she insisted “significant” progress had been made – some of the new EU countries which joined on 1 May this year still had not implemented all the necessary reforms for accession. She agreed with Dr Kramer that postponing a decision on opening negotiations would only weaken the drive for reform.Some had said Turkey was already too big, with a huge Muslim population and very different values from those of the EU. But Ms Yilmaz said the relevant EU values were democracy, human rights and respect for minorities. Religious and cultural values, she said, were not part of European integration. Turkish membership would enrich the EU culturally: “It would not be end of the European Union, but the biggest step.”The following discussion with the audience raised questions concerning integration, civil military relations in Turkey and the Kurdish situation. ConclusionStanley Crossick concluded on the day’s discussion by pointing out that, since signing the Association Agreement, the EU had a legal and moral commitment - provided that the criteria were “objectively” satisfied. “We live in an unstable world and whatever problems Turkish accession might bring, they would be far less than the problems of destabilisation in Turkey and beyond without accession.” It would take ten years to complete negotiations, which should be sufficient to ensure EU consolidation, satisfying the political criteria and convincing public opinion.

http://www.theepc.net/en/default.asp?TYP=ER&LV=427&PG=ER/EN/detail&l=&AI=427

L’éditorial du “Monde”

SPLENDIE ISOLEMENT

LE MONDE | 30.06.04 | 14h09 •  MIS A JOUR LE 30.06.04 | 16h05

Depuis quinze mois et le début de l’intervention américano-britannique en Irak, Jacques Chirac a une équation diplomatique difficile à résoudre : maintenir son opposition à la guerre sans passer pour un nostalgique honteux de Saddam Hussein - ce que les Américains ont insinué à plusieurs reprises - et sans manquer à ses devoirs d’allié. La situation en Irak a apporté des arguments au président de la République. L’absence d’armes de destruction massive a montré que l’intervention militaire était inutile pour désarmer Saddam. Les violences et les rébellions ont conforté la thèse française selon laquelle l’ingérence militaire de puissances occidentales dans un pays arabe nourrirait le terrorisme au lieu de l’étouffer.
Parmi ses pairs de l’Alliance Atlantique et de l’Union européenne, Jacques Chirac n’est pas le seul à le penser. Le problème pour la diplomatie française est qu’il est bien souvent le seul à le dire. Au sommet de l’OTAN qui s’est achevé mardi 29 juin à Istanbul, la France a été isolée dans son refus de céder aux demandes américaines et dans sa critique sans fard des prises de position publiques de George W. Bush. Que, devant les journalistes, le président de la République ait affirmé le contraire ne change rien à cette réalité.
Jacques Chirac a quelques raisons d’être irrité. George W. Bush n’a-t-il pas inauguré sa visite à Istanbul en faisant la leçon aux Européens quant à l’entrée de la Turquie dans l’UE ? Un “terrain” sur lequel il n’a rien à faire, a répliqué le président français, qui a ensuite profité de chaque occasion pour manifester sa différence avec la politique américaine, sur l’Irak, l’Afghanistan, le conflit israélo-palestinien…
La France peut tirer quelques satisfactions d’avoir poussé la Maison Blanche à renoncer à ses propositions les plus extrêmes concernant l’implication de l’OTAN en Irak ou le projet de Grand Moyen-Orient. Elle n’en a pas moins été obligée d’accepter, dans toutes les récentes réunions internationales, l’ordre du jour proposé par George W. Bush. Forts de leur statut de seule superpuissance, soutenus par un nombre croissant d’alliés avec les élargissements successifs de l’OTAN et de l’Union européenne, les Etats-Unis poussent leur avantage.
En Irak leur préoccupation est double : donner une légitimité internationale à leur intervention et relever une partie de leurs troupes par des forces de l’OTAN. La France a cédé sur le premier point en votant les récentes résolutions de l’ONU. Elle résiste sur le second sans pouvoir bloquer un engrenage susceptible de conduire, tôt ou tard, à une présence de l’organisation atlantique à Bagdad.
C’est un combat d’arrière-garde qui illustre le dilemme de Jacques Chirac : ne pas s’opposer à la reconstruction d’un Irak “souverain” sans pour autant se renier. C’est aussi une position d’attente qui est censée permettre de coopérer avec John Kerry, s’il gagne l’élection présidentielle, mais n’empêchera pas de vivre avec George W. Bush, s’il est réélu.
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L’EDITION DU 01.07.04

depuis www2.chinadaily.com.cn
***

NATO a dupe for Washington
Su Huimin
2004-06-28 06:22

On the surface it appears the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been penetrating Central Asia in recent years. However, the real “penetrator” is not NATO but rather the United States.

A geographic corridor linking Asia and Europe, Central Asia and Caucasia is the region’s main thoroughfare. This demonstrates clearly the strategic importance of the area.

More importantly, Central Asia and Caucasia occupy the “soft underbelly” of the former Soviet Union, the main Cold War rival of the US, and they border the Middle East, Washington’s key strategic target, and neighbouring the emerging China and India.

Strategically, Washington’s all-out penetration into this region conforms to its four goals.

First, pushing forward into the area under the “NATO” banner the US can lead Europe by the nose and force its European allies to go beyond Europe and expand their service to US global interests.

Second, the US can extend its political influence and military presence into the territory of the former Soviet Union and establish military bases at the frontier of Russia so as to further reduce Russia’s strategic space.

Third, it can contain Russia from the west and southwest to prevent Russia from staging a comeback some day to challenge the hegemonic status of the US.

Fourth, it can gain a toehold in the hinterland of Asia, which can both ensure US domination of the area and expand its influence to the Middle East, South Asia and the western border of China.

It is apparent that penetration into Central Asia and Caucasia is part of the US global strategy.

In fact, regardless of dismembering the former Yugoslavia on the excuse of “ethnic problems,” occupying Afghanistan in the name of hunting down terrorist Osama bin Laden, and waging war against Iraq on the groundless pretext that Saddam was stockpiling “weapons of mass destruction,” the real purpose behind the US actions is to seize the key belt from the Balkans to the Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasia. By taking advantage of its status as the world’s only superpower, America is plotting to lay the foundation for absolute hegemonic status in the 21st century.

Grabbing strategic resources, in particular oil and gas resources, is another reason for the US to covet this area. According to a German publication, 70 per cent of the world’s oil and gas resources is concentrated at the belt from West Siberia to the Middle East via the Caspian Sea. The most vigorous economies in the world, namely, the US, Europe Union, East Asia and Southeast Asia have differing degrees of dependency on the Gulf resources.

In 2001, the US imported 2.78 million barrels of crude oil every day from the Gulf region, which was 23.9 per cent of its daily import. Europe imported 3.35 million barrels every day, which was 30.7 per cent of its daily import. East Asia and Southeast Asia imported 11.31 million barrels of crude oil from that region every day, which was 72.6 per cent of its daily import.

Hence, if the US controls the oil and gas resources of this region, it controls the “energy gate” of Europe and in particular East Asia and Southeast Asia, which means that the US controls the “nervous centralis” of the world economy.

History has proved that many bloody wars have broken out in the Middle East for seizing the oil resources. There also exists such a danger that the oil and gas resources of Central Asia could become a factor igniting conflicts or triggering struggle between superpowers.

NATO’s activities in Central Asia and its neighbouring area are being carried out to help push the US agenda. So far, with the name of “peaceful partnership” initiated by the US, NATO has established contacts with Central Asian nations.

According to the interpretation of the NATO, the purpose of promoting “peaceful partnership” is to strengthen the political relations between member nations and provide them a platform for participating in the NATO’s political and military activities, which, in fact, is the attempt by the US to win over periphery alliances and expand its sphere of influence.

The US, through the eastward expansion of NATO, has gradually pushed its military front from the Baltic Sea to Central and Eastern Europe and then to the region near the heart of Russia. In the region of the Balkans and Southern Europe, Russia’s ex-allies have already come under the banner of the US. Recently, even Finland, which claims neutralism as its principle, indicated its intention to join NATO.

In this way, from the north to the south, the US has already tightly contained Russia. Caucasia and the eight Central Asian nations used to be a part of the former Soviet Union and is now the “backyard” of Russia, into which the US had no chance to penetrate before.

However, in the recent years, under the banner of “combating terrorism,” the US has greatly enhanced its political, economic and, in particular, military presence in that area, which is obviously a war of competition against Russia. Georgia can be viewed as a reflection of the competition between the US and Russia in that area.

Prior to the 1990s, Georgia was in fact a part of Russia. Nevertheless, the Americans have exerted increasing influence in this country. According to the US-Georgia Military Agreement reached in March 2003, the Americans can enter Georgia even without a visa or any travel documents and the US army can use Georgia’s military facilities according to their own needs.

There are two different opinions in Russia with regard to the US presence in Georgia. One of them regards that the US has no intention of remaining in Georgia for long and that Central Asia will join NATO as the traditional sphere of influence of Russia so that it will play a role as a “petite partner” in Central Asia as Russia plays in the new world structure.

The other opinion considers that Russia should be wary of the US. They realize that by attempting to transform former Soviet republics into “unsinkable aircraft carriers,” the US presence in Central Asia could have great impact upon Russia.

(China Daily 06/28/2004 page6)

An Army of One?
In the war on terrorism, alliances are not an obstacle to victory. They’re the key to it. By Gen. Wesley Clark September 2002

A few days after September 11, I happened to be walking the halls of the Pentagon, the scene of so many contentious meetings during my years as commander of NATO forces in Europe, and ran into an old acquaintance, now a senior official. We chatted briefly about TV coverage of the crisis and the impending operations in Afghanistan. At his invitation, I began to share some thoughts about how we had waged the Kosovo war by working within NATO—but he cut me off. “We read your book,” he scoffed. “And no one is going to tell us where we can or can’t bomb.” That was exactly how the United States proceeded. Of course, the campaign in Afghanistan, as it unfolded, wasn’t an all-American show. The United States sought and won help from an array of countries: basing rights in Central Asian states and in Pakistan; some shared intelligence from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other Muslim states; diplomatic backing from Russia and China; air and naval support from France; naval refueling from Japan; special forces from the United Kingdom, and so on. But unlike the Kosovo campaign, where NATO provided a structured consultation and consensus-shaping process, allied support in this war took the form of a “floating” or “flexible” coalition. Countries supported the United States in the manner and to the extent they felt possible, but without any pretenses of sharing in major decisions. European leaders sought to be more involved. At the Europeans’ urging, NATO even declared—invoking, for the first time, Article V of its founding treaty—that the attack on the United States represented an attack on every member. But even so, Washington bypassed and essentially marginalized the alliance. The United Nations was similarly sidelined. The first weeks of the Afghanistan campaign against the Taliban went well—an outcome that didn’t surprise anyone who has had the honor to exercise command over these magnificent outfits. But the early successes seem to have reinforced the conviction of some within the U.S. government that the continuing war against terrorism is best waged outside the structures of international institutions—that American leadership must be “unfettered.” This is a fundamental misjudgment. The longer this war goes on—and by all accounts, it will go on for years—the more our success will depend on the willing cooperation and active participation of our allies to root out terrorist cells in Europe and Asia, to cut off funding and support of terrorists and to deal with Saddam Hussein and other threats. We are far more likely to gain the support we need by working through international institutions than outside of them. We’ve got a problem here: Because the Bush administration has thus far refused to engage our allies through NATO, we are fighting the war on terrorism with one hand tied behind our back. All Together Now That day at the Pentagon, the senior official and I never had the opportunity to complete the discussion. But it was clear that he had totally misread the lessons of the Kosovo campaign. NATO wasn’t an obstacle to victory in Kosovo; it was the reason for our victory. For 78 days in the spring of 1999, the alliance battled to halt the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo’s Albanians being carried out by the predominantly Serb troops and government of then-President Slobodan Milosevic. It was the first actual war NATO had fought in its 50-year history. Like the U.S. war in Afghanistan, it was predominantly an air campaign (though the threat of a ground attack, I believe, proved decisive). America provided the leadership, the target nominations, and almost all of the precision strikes. Still, it was very much a NATO war. Allied countries flew some 60 percent of the sorties. Because it was a NATO campaign, each bomb dropped represented a target that had been approved, at least in theory, by each of the alliance’s 19 governments. Much of my time as allied commander was spent with various European defense officials, walking them through proposed targets and the reasoning behind them. Sometimes there were disagreements and occasionally we had to modify those lists to take into account the different countries’ political concerns and military judgements. For all of us involved—the president, secretaries of state and defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and me—it was a time-consuming and sometimes frustrating process. But in the end, this was the decisive process for success, because whatever we lost in theoretical military effectiveness we gained manyfold in actual strategic impact by having every NATO nation on board. NATO itself acted as a consensus engine for its members. Because it acts on the basis of such broad agreement, every decision is an opportunity for members to dissent—therefore, every decision generates pressure to agree. Greece, for example, never opposed a NATO action, though its electorate strongly opposed the war and the Greek government tried in other ways to maintain an acceptable “distance” from NATO military actions. This process evokes leadership from the stronger states and pulls the others along. Of course, this wasn’t a pleasant experience for any of the participants. For U.S. leaders during the war, it meant continuing dialogue, frictions, and occasional hard exchanges with some allies to get them on board. For some European leaders, the experience must have been the reverse: a continuing pressure from the United States to approve actions—to strike targets—that would generate domestic criticism at home. There was no escaping the fact that this was every government’s war, that they were intrinsically part of the operation, and each was, ultimately, liable to be held accountable by its voters for the outcome. In the darkest days before the NATO 50th anniversary summit in late April in Washington, British Prime Minister Tony Blair came to our headquarters in Belgium on very short notice. To be honest, it wasn’t altogether clear why he was coming. But as he and I sat alone in my office, it quickly became apparent. “Are we going to win?” he asked me. “Will we win with an air campaign alone? Will you get ground troops if you need them?” Blair made it very clear that the future of every government in Western Europe, including his own, depended on a successful outcome of the war. Therefore, he was going to do everything it took to succeed. No stopping halfway. No halfheartedness. That was the real lesson of the Kosovo campaign at the highest level: NATO worked. It held political leaders accountable to their electorates. It made an American-dominated effort essentially their effort. It made an American-led success their success. And, because an American-led failure would have been their failure, these leaders became determined to prevail. NATO not only generated consensus, it also generated an incredible capacity to alter public perceptions, enabling countries with even minimal capacities to participate collectively in the war. As one minister of defense told me afterwards, “Before Kosovo, you couldn’t use the word ‘war’ in my country. War meant defeat, destruction, death, and occupation. Now it is different. We have won one!” Squeezing Slobodan Milosevic was hoping the alliance would crack and the bombing campaign would fall apart. Instead, NATO’s determination increased over time and the bombing intensified. He was hoping that neighboring countries, such as Bulgaria and Romania, would not cooperate with the West, and indeed, large majorities of their citizens initially opposed the war. But the power of NATO extended even to these countries, which at that point were non-members. We simply made clear to their leaders that if they wanted to be considered for eventual membership in NATO—and they did, very much—then they’d have to help us against Milosevic, which they did, quickly. Faced with this remarkable unity of effort and determination, even the Russians, who strongly sympathized with the Serbs, also abandoned Milosevic in the end. Other international institutions helped us tighten the noose. The United States acted under the authority of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1199, passed in the autumn of 1998, and authorizing all available means to deal with the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo—language which helped give our military intervention international legal and moral authority. The threat against Milosevic of war criminal charges was additional leverage. When the International Criminal Tribunal indicted Milosevic for war crimes on May 25, 1999, the resolve of our European allies notably stiffened—a fact that today’s domestic opponents of the international court should keep in mind. In the end, NATO achieved every one of its aims. With the air war intensifying, a ground invasion being prepared, and no other country to turn to for help, Milosevic in early June pulled his troops, police, and weaponry out of Kosovo. A NATO-led international peacekeeping force entered to establish order. Nearly a million Kosovars returned to their homes. Weakened by his defeat, Milosevic lost an election he had tried to rig in his favor. When he still refused to cede power, a student-led uprising did the job for him. Milosevic is now behind bars at The Hague and is being tried as a war criminal. Though Serbia and Kosovo are still struggling with the aftermath of ethnic conflict and autocratic leadership, they are now governed by democratically elected leaders eager for good relations with the West. All this was achieved at a remarkably slight cost, minimal destruction on the ground, no NATO casualties, and relatively few civilian deaths despite the use of some 23,000 bombs and missiles. What caused this outcome was not just the weapons of war. Forces far beyond the bombs and bullets were at work: the weight of international diplomacy; the impact of international law; and the “consensus-engine” of NATO, which kept all the Allies in the fight. The lesson of Kosovo is that international institutions and alliances are really another form of power. They have their limitations and can require a lot of maintenance. But used effectively, they can be strategically decisive. Bin Laden, War Criminal The Kosovo campaign suggests alternatives in waging and winning the struggle against terrorism: greater reliance on diplomacy and law and relatively less on the military alone. Soon after September 11, without surrendering our right of self defense, we should have helped the United Nations create an International Criminal Tribunal on International Terrorism. We could have taken advantage of the outpourings of shock, grief, and sympathy to forge a legal definition of terrorism and obtain the indictment of Osama bin Laden and the Taliban as war criminals charged with crimes against humanity. Had we done so, I believe we would have had greater legitimacy and won stronger support in the Islamic world. We could have used the increased legitimacy to raise pressure on Saudi Arabia and other Arab states to cut off fully the moral, religious, intellectual, and financial support to terrorism. We could have used such legitimacy to strengthen the international coalition against Saddam Hussein. Or to encourage our European allies and others to condemn more strongly the use of terror against Israel and bring peace to that region. Reliance on a compelling U.N. indictment might have given us the edge in legitimacy throughout much of the Islamic world that no amount of “strategic information” and spin control can provide. On a purely practical level, we might have avoided the embarrassing arguments during the encirclement of Kandahar in early December 2001, when the appointed Afghan leader wanted to offer the Taliban leader amnesty, asking what law he had broken, while the United States insisted that none should be granted. We might have avoided the continuing difficulties of maintaining hundreds of prisoners in a legal no-man’s land at Guantanamo Bay, which has undercut U.S. legitimacy in the eyes of much of the world. Instead of cutting NATO out, we should have prosecuted the Afghan campaign with NATO, as we did in Kosovo. Of course, it would have been difficult to involve our allies early on, when we ourselves didn’t know what we wanted to do, or how to achieve it. The dialogue and discussions would have been vexing. But in the end, we could have kept NATO involved without surrendering to others the design of the campaign. We could have simply phased the operation and turned over what had begun as a U.S.-only effort to a NATO mission, under U.S. leadership. Even winning European approval of the air campaign need not have proved troublesome. The most serious difficulties we had in garnering European support for the Kosovo air campaign concerned bombing the so-called “dual-use” targets: bridges, power stations, TV towers, and government buildings in Belgrade. The United States believed such attacks were crucial to breaking Milosevic’s ability to wage war. The Europeans, deeply concerned about potential civilian casualties, preferred to hit Yugoslav military targets in Kosovo. In the end, we bombed both. But a similar disagreement in Afghanistan between the United States and Europeans would have been highly unlikely, for the simple reason that the American bombing campaign focused exclusively on military targets. The United States concentrated its firepower on Taliban and al Qaeda troops, hideouts, and weapons stores—precisely the kinds of targets the Europeans were most likely to have approved. Sleepers in Seattle NATO involvement would probably not have hastened our victory in Afghanistan. But had the Afghan campaign been waged with NATO, I believe we would have been in a stronger position to stay the course in Afghanistan and prosecute the coming stages of the war. As the president himself has warned, the struggle against terror requires far more than exclusively military actions. Indeed, as time goes on, the most important aspect of the war may be in law enforcement and judicial activities. Much of the terrorist network draws support and resources from within countries friendly or allied with us. Terrorists residing in Western Europe planned the September 11 attack, and the greatest concentration of their “sleeper cells” outside the Middle East is probably in Europe. Yet this is a threat that the American military can do little to combat. What we really need is closer alignment of our police and judicial activities with our friends and allies: greater cooperation in joint police investigations, sharing of evidence, harmonious evidentiary standards and procedures, as well as common definitions of crimes associated with terrorism. Through greater legal, judicial, and police coordination, we need to make the international environment more seamless for us than it is for the international terrorists we seek. U.S. officials inevitably say that they are getting “good cooperation” from their European counterparts. They say the same, however, about countries like Saudi Arabia, where we know cooperation is minimal at best. Even with the limited information publicly available, it’s clear that the police and judicial measures taken to detect, identify, track, detain, interrogate, arrest, charge, convict, and punish terrorists and their accomplices within friendly countries have thus far been less than fully successful. Since last fall, European governments have arrested, then released, numerous suspected terrorists whom the U.S. government would undoubtedly have preferred to see kept behind bars. In April, for instance, Spanish police arrested a Syrian-born al Qaeda suspect, but let him go, citing a lack of evidence. Yet, at the time of his arrest, he had in his possession hours of videotape of the World Trade Center from every conceivable angle, plus similar surveillance images of other planned al Qaeda targets such as Disney World. Fortunately, the Spanish police rearrested the man in July. But that same month, British courts released an Egyptian wanted in the United States for allegedly aiding a top terrorist leader. The full cooperation we seek is unlikely without an overall consensus-building mechanism, like NATO, to drive the process. It is hard enough getting the CIA and FBI to share information, even when both answer (in theory) to the president and Congress. Imagine how difficult it is to get cooperation among various U.S. agencies and their counterparts working bilaterally with 20 different European countries, when each agency is competing with others. The longer the war goes on, the more we are going to need cooperation and support from other nations—not just troops and ships and airplanes, but whole-hearted governmental collaboration. Instead, we seem to be getting less as time goes on. After September 11, the United States gave the United Nations a list of groups and individuals suspected of funding terrorists. European governments responded by freezing their assets. In the spring, the U.S. government provided an updated list with new names. This time, most European governments ignored the list, according to The Wall Street Journal, citing concern that the United States was providing insufficient recourse for those who claim they are innocent. Last fall, all of Europe understood that the attacks of September 11 had been planned on European soil, that European targets were on the terrorists’ lists, and that Europeans by the hundreds died in the World Trade Center. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder braved a no-confidence vote to win approval for German combat troops to be made available for Afghanistan. Even the French, long openly resentful of American power, expressed solidarity with us. Today, that support is being replaced by growing popular anger at the United States. Instead of focusing on the threat of terrorism, Europeans are focusing on the dangers of American hegemony. Their leaders are free to play to these fears because, without NATO involvement, the war is not seen as theirs, but ours. Not a single European election hinges on the success of the war on terrorism. As a consequence, European elected officials simply don’t have a personal stake in the outcome. Some Americans seem to take a certain delight in Europe’s outrage. But the fact is that this outrage is undermining our ability to carry out the next stages of the war, including, perhaps, toppling Saddam Hussein. We don’t necessarily need Europe’s full military support for a war against Saddam. But we need its diplomatic support now and its assistance in the aftermath. Without this support, others will have an excuse for not cooperating. This has already begun to happen. King Abdullah of Jordan recently explained to The Washington Post why his country, which borders Iraq, could not be used as a staging area for a U.S. invasion force: “If it seems America wants to hit Baghdad, that’s not what Jordanians think, or the British, [or] the French . . . ” Right Makes Might It’s still not too late to enlist NATO in the fight against terrorism—to handle peacekeeping duties in an increasingly chaotic Afghanistan, to deepen its involvement in the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to host the harmonization of judicial and law-enforcement activities. If there is to be a military operation against Iraq, then certainly NATO participation should be sought. Involving NATO more directly and deeply would give European leaders a personal political stake in the war. In particular, bringing NATO into an expanded peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan would go a long way toward convincing the Europeans that the United States is serious about stability in post-war Iraq or other post-conflict situations. That NATO framework can be expanded at the military level to encompass countries that do not belong to NATO, just as we did in Bosnia and Kosovo. In the twilight of World War II we recognized the need for allies. We understood the need to prevent conflict, not just fight it, and we affirmed the idea that we must banish from the world what President Harry Truman, addressing the founding of the United Nations, called “the fundamental philosophy of our enemies, namely, that ‘might makes right.’” Truman went on to say that we must “prove by our acts that right makes might.” Since September 11, America has been in a similar position: the most powerful nation in the world, but facing a deadly enemy. The United States has the opportunity to use the power of the international institutions it established to triumph over terrorists who threaten not just the United States, but the world. What a tragedy it will be if we walk away from our own efforts, and from 60 years of post-World War II experience, to tackle the problem of terror without using fully the instruments of international law and persuasion that we ourselves created. Gen. Wesley Clark, U.S.A. (Ret.), Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, from 1997-2000, is the author of Waging Modern War, available in paperback from Public Affairs.

http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0209.clark.html

The Atlantic Alliance at a New Crossroads Conference, Istanbul, Turkey
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), with sponsorship from DaimlerChrysler and additional support from the Parex Bank, is holding a conference of the transatlantic strategic community on June 25-27, 2004 in Istanbul, Turkey, in advance of the NATO Summit.
The themes that will be highlighted at the conference include the Alliance’s overall strategic reorientation, a new Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Black Sea, NATO’s future role in Afghanistan and possibly Iraq, as well as how the West can promote democracy in the Greater Middle East.

Several senior politicians from both sides of the Atlantic have agreed to address the audience among them Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, and NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.
http://www.gmfus.org/apps/gmf/gmfwebfinal.nsf/$UNIDviewAll/9DB4683D12AF6D9385256EA90071C6B9?opendocument&K2D3C7AA7

Dirigeants et experts définissent les nouvelles “missions mondiales” de l’Alliance atlantique
LE MONDE | 28.06.04 | 14h20

En marge du sommet d’Istanbul, le secrétaire général de l’OTAN a appelé à un “nouveau consensus post-Irak” qui permettrait à l’Organisation d’intervenir hors d’Europe.
Istanbul de notre envoyée spéciale
Que faire de l’Alliance atlantique lorsque ses membres fondateurs affichent leurs différends ? A la veille du sommet de l’OTAN à Istanbul, quelque 150 chercheurs, intellectuels et politiques américains et européens, réunis dans cette ville par l’organisation indépendante américaine German Marshall Fund et la Fondation turque des études économiques et sociales (Tesev) sur le thème “L’Alliance atlantique à un nouveau tournant”, loin d’en sonner le glas, se sont attachés à lui trouver toute une série de nouvelles missions.
Le premier ministre turc, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, qui a ouvert la conférence, a appelé la communauté internationale et l’OTAN à tout faire pour réussir en Afghanistan et à surmonter ses différends sur l’Irak afin d’œuvrer “pour le peuple irakien”. “Les valeurs de l’OTAN, a-t-il souligné, doivent s’étendre de l’Afrique du Nord à l’Eurasie.”
Comme beaucoup d’autres orateurs, M. Erdogan a mis un accent particulier sur les nécessaires efforts de démocratisation, à laquelle les pays “doivent procéder eux-mêmes”, souhaitant que l’exemple des réformes accomplies en Turquie ait un impact dans toute la région.
Président de la commission des affaires étrangères du Sénat américain, le sénateur républicain Richard Lugar, qui fait partie du courant modéré et multilatéraliste de la droite américaine, a rappelé les incertitudes et les divisions qui ont menacé l’Alliance atlantique à la fin de la guerre froide et au début des guerres des Balkans. “Le défi que nous affrontons aujourd’hui est bien plus grand”, a-t-il observé. Loin de s’en tenir aux frontières de l’Europe, “aujourd’hui l’OTAN doit penser mondialement et agir mondialement”. En Afghanistan, où l’OTAN compte 6 400 soldats, les progrès sont “trop lents” à cause des réticences nationales des pays contributeurs. Cette lenteur menace “tout l’effort de démocratisation afghan”.
Mais c’est en Irak, a ajouté M. Lugar, que “la réputation de l’OTAN résistera ou s’effondrera”, car l’Irak est devenu “le théâtre central de la guerre contre le terrorisme”. L’argument du sénateur américain est simple : si les alliés ne surmontent pas leurs différends sur l’Irak, ils en paieront tous les conséquences, car le terrorisme aura tôt fait de s’étendre en Europe.
A l’appui de son raisonnement, M. Lugar a cité un “orateur éloquent qui s’est exprimé à Washington cette année”: “La stabilisation de l’Irak est dans l’intérêt de tout le monde. Dans celui des Irakiens, bien sûr, celui du Moyen-Orient évidemment, mais aussi dans l’intérêt des relations entre l’Ouest le monde musulman.” Cet orateur, a-t-il précisé, était le ministre français de la défense, Michèle Alliot-Marie.
C’est, naturellement, aussi l’avis du secrétaire général de l’OTAN, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, qui, plus optimiste, décèle “une nouvelle dynamique dans la coopération transatlantique sur la sécurité”, sous l’effet conjugué de l’indispensable coordination de la lutte contre le terrorisme et le fait que, malgré leurs flagrantes divergences, l’Europe et l’Amérique du Nord demeurent “la communauté la plus étroitement liée”. M. de Hoop Scheffer a appelé à un “nouveau consensus post-Irak” fondé sur la possibilité pour l’OTAN d’agir hors d’Europe pour “étendre la stabilité”, sur la nécessité de nouvelles capacités militaires, “plus légères, plus rapides et plus efficaces”, et sur la reconnaissance de l’Union européenne comme “véritable acteur en matière de sécurité”.
L’exemple de l’Afghanistan, “où la crédibilité de l’OTAN est en jeu”, montre à quel point les transformations militaires sont nécessaires, afin que les engagements politiques puissent se traduire sur le terrain. Enfin, a-t-il poursuivi, ce nouveau consensus transatlantique doit aussi intégrer un engagement politique à l’égard du “Grand Moyen-Orient”, “car aucune autre région n’affecte plus la sécurité transatlantique”. “Si Rumsfeld -le secrétaire américain à la défense- et Fischer -le chef de la diplomatie allemande- pensent tous les deux que c’est une bonne idée, on devrait y arriver”, a-t-il ajouté.
UN CHANGEMENT DE FOND
L’Irak, a affirmé le secrétaire général de l’OTAN, sera “la lentille au travers de laquelle le sommet d’Istanbul sera jugé”: il est donc impératif de “changer d’état d’esprit”, car ce n’est plus des Américains mais désormais des Irakiens eux-mêmes qu’émane la demande d’assistance.
Deux études du German Marshall Fund, présentées lors de cette conférence, illustrent la portée de la réflexion politique au sein de l’Alliance : l’une sur une stratégie euro-atlantique dans la région de la mer Noire, dont ont débattu le nouveau président géorgien Mikhaïl Saakachvili, encore auréolé de son prestige de révolutionnaire pacifique, son collègue d’Azerbaïdjan, Ilham Aliev, fils de l’ancien dirigeant soviétique Gueïdar Aliev, et le ministre roumain des affaires étrangères, Mircea Geoana. Et l’autre sur la démocratie dans le “Grand Moyen-Orient” (Broader Middle East), dont les contours restent encore assez imprécis, même si M. Lugar l’a défini comme allant “de Marrakech au Bangladesh”.
Les auteurs de cette deuxième étude, européens et américains, appellent à un changement de fond dans l’approche de la région, en développant les contacts de personne à personne et les échanges intellectuels, en subordonnant l’aide économique au respect des droits de l’homme et des règles du jeu démocratiques et en assistant le plus possible les organisations non gouvernementales ainsi que les associations représentant la société civile.
Cette approche n’est pas sans précédent, et elle a porté ses fruits : c’était au XXe siècle, à l’égard de l’Europe centrale et orientale, qui fait aujourd’hui partie intégrante de la communauté transatlantique.
Sylvie Kauffmann
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L’EDITION DU 29.06.04
http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3210,36-370689,0.html
ENTRETIEN
Trois questions à Mikhaïl Saakachvili
LE MONDE | 28.06.04 | 14h20
Mikhaïl Saakachvili, président de Géorgie, vous avez plaidé, devant la conférence du German Marshall Fund à Istanbul, pour une intégration de la Géorgie dans la communauté euro-atlantique. Quel calendrier envisagez-vous ?
En ce qui concerne l’OTAN, au sommet de l’année prochaine, nous demanderons à intégrer le processus MAP (Membership Action Plan, plan préparatoire à l’adhésion).
Cette année, on a travaillé très dur pour y parvenir, mais l’OTAN a préféré attendre et souffler un peu après ses efforts d’élargissement. Pour l’Union européenne, beaucoup dépend du succès de l’intégration de la Roumanie et de la Bulgarie, et puis du sort de la Turquie. Mais cela peut aller très vite. C’est un processus qui peut aboutir en quelques années.
Vous en avez parlé au président Poutine, avec lequel vous avez par ailleurs quelques différends ?
Pourquoi en parlerais-je à Poutine ? Ce qui énerve les Russes, c’est la possibilité de bases étrangères sur notre territoire : nous avons dit à plusieurs reprises que nous n’avions pas l’intention de créer des bases américaines en Géorgie. Il faut séparer les deux questions, l’adhésion à l’OTAN et les bases étrangères. Quant aux bases russes, elles doivent nous quitter dans un avenir assez proche. Nous ne voulons pas aliéner la Russie, mais, d’un autre côté, elle doit savoir qu’elle a affaire à des pays indépendants. Au début, nos relations avec la Russie ont été difficiles. Maintenant, avec Poutine, je suis d’un optimisme prudent.
Quant aux conflits, le problème de l’Adjarie est résolu. Après, il va falloir s’occuper de l’Ossétie du Sud, c’est un petit conflit. L’Abkhazie, c’est plus compliqué, il faut prendre le temps de trouver la solution. L’Abkhazie est beaucoup plus importante, à la fois pour nous et pour la Russie. Les Russes y sont très présents. Mais ce problème freine beaucoup de choses : le développement économique, le chemin de fer du Caucase nord… Il faut débarrasser la région de ce conflit. On ne peut pas garder le statu quo, mais il faut aussi éviter un déclenchement de la violence. Nous sommes dans une phase délicate. Mais il ne faut pas accepter la fatalité des “conflits gelés”.
Depuis votre élection, il y a six mois, vous entretenez des relations aussi étroites avec les Etats-Unis qu’avec l’Europe. La Géorgie peut-elle être l’amie des deux ?
Ah, il y a de la jalousie… mais seulement émotionnelle. Notre ministre des affaires étrangères, Salomé Zourabichvili -ex-ambassadeur de France à Tbilissi-, vient de faire une visite à Washington, et elle y a été très, très bien accueillie.
Propos recueillis par Sylvie Kauffmann
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L’EDITION DU 29.06.04

Turkey in EU and Extended Nato are the two most critical external concerns for EU supranational buildup. As the last enlargement of the ten countries is straining the EU decision making process to be revamped by the Constitutional treaty, US leadership influence in EU Affairs, both through the questionable outcome of Turkey membership to EU and the overstretching of NATO “responsability” in MidEast (after Central Asian Afghanistan), leaves some european leaders no more options than a “hands off” rebuttal.

Turkey and EU becomes the latest battleground for Chirac and Bush
By Stephen Castle in Istanbul
29 June 2004
Turkey’s bid to join the European Union was at the centre of a new transatlantic rift yesterday, as the French president, Jacques Chirac, accused George Bush of meddling by supporting Turkey’s push for membership. With a decision due in December on whether the EU will start negotiations with Ankara over its efforts to join, Turkey’s application is at a highly delicate stage.
M Chirac warned the US president to mind his own business and said Mr Bush had gone too far , when he said at the weekend that the US believed Turkey was ready to take up EU membership. “If President Bush really said that the way I read it, well, not only did he go too far but he went into territory which is not his own,” M. Chirac said at a Nato summit in Istanbul.
The decision on whether to start membership negotiations with Turkey is the most sensitive issue facing EU leaders. Its population of nearly 70 million would make Turkey the second largest country in the bloc, and the first mainly Muslim nation. With a new voting system based in part on population size due to come into effect under Europe’s constitution, Turkish membership would have profound implications for the EU’s power balance.
To qualify for membership talks, the Turkish government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan has embarked on ambitious reforms to meet the so-called “Copenhagen criteria” on human rights and democracy. Whether or not it has achieved these goals will be assessed by the European Commission prior to a decision on membership talks by the EU leaders in December.
But on Saturday, after an EU-US summit at Dromoland Castle in western Ireland, Mr Bush prejudged that assessment when he argued: “Turkey meets the EU standards for membership. The EU should begin talks that will lead to full membership for the Republic of Turkey.”
Washington has a long-standing alliance with Turkey through Nato, but EU membership is in a different category since the countries inside the 25-nation bloc share legislative powers. An EU diplomat said: “It’s one thing to be an ally in Nato, and something else to join the EU where we make laws together.”
In 1999 the EU finally granted Turkey candidate status and, 18 months ago, Turkey was promised that its progress would be reviewed towards the end of the year. In the run-up to that decision, Ankara mishandled matters by trying to persuade Washington to lobby on its behalf, a move that proved counter-productive.
France and other EU states have warned that negotiations on Turkey’s membership of the EU are likely to go on for years. Never the less the opening of formal discussions would mark a huge moment in Turkey’s efforts to join the EU; no nation that has started negotiations has been refused entry.
Despite his attack on Mr Bush, M. Chirac was at pains not to oppose the principle of Turkish membership. The French President reaffirmed recent remarks backing Turkish membership when it has completely fulfilled entry criteria, adding that Turkey had an “historic European vocation”.
http://news.independent.co.uk/low_res/story.jsp?story=536291&host=3&dir=73
President is triumphant as Blair hopes for democracy
By Stephen Castle in Istanbul
29 June 2004
Robert Fisk: Restoration of Iraqi sovereignty - or Alice in Wonderland? 
US abruptly cedes power in attempt to spike guns of insurgents
British soldier killed in Basra bomb attack
President is triumphant as Blair hopes for democracy
Main players in the new Iraqi government
The toll of British dead from the war and its aftermath
What restored sovereignty means
A history of handovers (and their hangovers)
Michael Ignatieff: America must accept that it cannot reshape the world
Leading article: The violence will only end in Iraq if there is a genuine transfer of sovereignty
President George Bush yesterday celebrated the transfer of sovereignty in Iraq with a fresh defence of his “war on terror”, a green light to the possible imposition of martial law in Iraq and a scribbled note that read “Let freedom reign”.
At a Nato summit in Istanbul dominated by the early transfer of power in Iraq, Mr Bush and Tony Blair closed ranks in the face of continuing tensions among European leaders over the role of the 26-nation alliance in helping to stabilise the war-torn country. In the city’s streets hundreds of protesters hurled fire-bombs and stones at police, causing dozens of injuries, as the security forces used tear-gas and water cannons to stop them reaching the summit centre.
Because of French objections, the Nato alliance agreed to only the most minor increase in its training of Iraqi security forces. But the US President shook off the protests, the political tensions and the the continuing violence in Iraq, saying the transfer of sovereignty there had been a “proud, moral achievement”. “The Iraqi people have their country back,” Mr Bush said.
From the Hilton Hotel inside the security cordon, the President’s statements contrasted with more measured words from Mr Blair, who described the transfer of sovereignty as “an important staging post” as “democracy replaces dictatorship”.
The White House spokesman, Scott McClellan, said President Bush learned that the handover had been completed from his National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice. Handed the note, which said “Mr. President, Iraq is sovereign. Letter was passed from Bremer at 10.26am Iraq time - Condi”, Mr Bush passed it back, having scribbled: “Let freedom reign!” There was then a handshake with Mr Blair.
Later, at a joint press conference with the Prime Minister, the US President made an indirect link between the Iraq conflict and the events of 11 September. Iraq was, he said, a country where the war of terrorism was being conducted and “where we are finding them instead of waiting for them to strike us at home”. Mr Blair also argued Iraq was “in a genuine sense, the front-line in the battle against terrorism and the new security threats we face”.
But there were differences of emphasis as the US President gave his full backing to the Iraqi Government - “As we say in Texas, stand-up guys” - to impose martial law if it wishes. Mr Bush said: “He may take tough security measures to deal with [Abu Musab al-] Zarqawi, but he may have to. Zarqawi is the guy who beheads people on TV. He’s the person that orders suiciders to kill women and children.”
He added: “They can’t whip our militaries. What they can do is get on your TV screens, stand in front of your TV cameras, and cut somebody’s head off in order to try to cause us to cringe and retreat. That’s their strongest weapon. Prime Minister [Iyad] Allawi has said many times he will not cower in the face of such brutal murder, and neither will we.”
Mr Blair fought shy of the such rhetoric, saying that Mr Allawi’s use of tough tactics would be to create democracy, rather than to curb freedoms.
More acute tensions surfaced at the Nato summit despite the agreement of the 26 nations to go ahead with the training of Iraqi security forces. The deal falls well short of US ambitions to see a full Nato peacekeeping role in the country, and even the fudged agreement struck yesterday was being interpreted differently by the protagonists last night.
Mr Blair said the arrangement was “important” and Nato sources said some training would take place in the country, although they concede that the military details have yet to be agreed. Jacques Chirac, the French President, who has taken the lead in resisting a formal alliance role or the use of Nato flags and insignia, said that the deal allowed for training to take place abroad, unless individual nations wanted to deploy in Iraq.
“Every trace of a role for Nato on Iraqi soil was judged inappropriate,” M Chirac said, adding, “in my opinion justifiably so.” The alliance’s participation could have “negative consequences from a psychological and political point of view”.
Meanwhile the alliance gave the green light to an increase in its role in Afghanistan, where it has agreed to extend its presence to five centres beyond Kabul.
The current 6.500 troops will be increased to a potential total of 10,000, although about 2,000 will be on standby rather than being deployed immediately. That is in marked contrast to the more than 50,000 Nato troops once deployed in Bosnia.
REACTION AROUND THE WORLD
Kuwait: The Prime Minister, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah, said he hoped “that this important, historic step in Iraq’s modern history will contribute to establishing security and stability in brotherly Iraq”.
Jordan “welcomes this development and considers it a step toward rebuilding political, economic, security and social institutions in Iraq”.
Saudi Arabia: “We are pleased about the transfer of power in Iraq so that Iraq may regain its sovereignty and to pave the way to rebuild the country.”
France “expresses its wish for success to the interim government and the Iraqi people”.
Syria: The handover was “a step toward restoring independence and sovereignty in Iraq”.
Egypt: “This is what Egypt desires for the Iraqi people, an opportunity for them to take control of their own affairs and restore complete sovereignty.”
http://news.independent.co.uk/low_res/story.jsp?story=536300&host=3&dir=508

EDITORIAL - LA Times
The Disaster of Failed Policy

June 27, 2004

In its scale and intent, President Bush’s war against Iraq was something new and radical: a premeditated decision to invade, occupy and topple the government of a country that was no imminent threat to the United States. This was not a handful of GIs sent to overthrow Panamanian thug Manuel Noriega or to oust a new Marxist government in tiny Grenada. It was the dispatch of more than 100,000 U.S. troops to implement Bush’s post-Sept. 11 doctrine of preemption, one whose dangers President John Quincy Adams understood when he said the United States “goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy.”

In the case of Vietnam, the U.S. began by assisting a friendly government resisting communist takeover in a civil war, though the conflict disintegrated into a failure that still haunts this country. The 1991 Persian Gulf War, under Bush’s father, was a successful response to Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait — and Bush’s father deliberately stopped short of toppling Saddam Hussein and occupying Iraq.

The current president outlined a far more aggressive policy in a speech to the West Point graduating class in 2002, declaring that in the war on terror “we must take the battle to the enemy” and confront threats before they emerge. The Iraq war was intended as a monument to his new Bush Doctrine, which also posited that the U.S. would take what help was available from allies but would not be held back by them. It now stands as a monument to folly.

The planned transfer Wednesday of limited sovereignty from the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority to an interim Iraqi government occurs with U.S. influence around the world at a low point and insurgent violence in Iraq reaching new heights of deadliness and coordination. Important Arab leaders this month rejected a U.S. invitation to attend a summit with leaders of industrialized nations. The enmity between Israelis and Palestinians is fiercer than ever, their hope for peace dimmer. Residents of the Middle East see the U.S. not as a friend but as an imperial power bent on securing a guaranteed oil supply and a base for U.S. forces. Much of the rest of the world sees a bully.

The War’s False Premises

All the main justifications for the invasion offered beforehand by the Bush administration and its supporters — weapons of mass destruction, close ties between Al Qaeda and Iraq, a chance to make Baghdad a fountain of democracy that would spread through the region — turned out to be baseless.

Weeks of suicide car bombings, assassinations of political leaders and attacks on oil pipelines vital to the country’s economy have preceded the handover.

On Thursday alone, car bombs and street fighting in five cities claimed more than 100 lives. Iraqis no longer fear torture or death at the hands of Hussein’s brutal thugs, but many fear leaving their homes because of the violence.

The U.S. is also poorer after the war, in lives lost, billions spent and terrorists given new fuel for their rage. The initial fighting was easy; the occupation has been a disaster, with Pentagon civilians arrogantly ignoring expert advice on the difficulty of the task and necessary steps for success.

Two iconic pictures from Iraq balance the good and the dreadful — the toppling of Hussein’s statue and a prisoner crawling on the floor at Abu Ghraib prison with a leash around his neck. Bush landed on the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln in May 2003 to a hero’s welcome and a banner declaring “Mission Accomplished.”

A year later, more than 90% of Iraqis want the U.S. to leave their country. The president boasted in July that if Iraqi resistance fighters thought they could attack U.S. forces, “bring them on.” Since then, more than 400 personnel have been killed by hostile fire.

Iraqis hope, with little evidence, that the transfer of limited sovereignty to an interim government will slow attacks on police, soldiers and civilians. Another goal, democracy, is fading. The first concern remains what it should have been after the rout of Hussein’s army: security. The new Iraqi leaders are considering martial law, an understandable response with suicide bombings recently averaging about one a day but a move they could hardly enforce with an army far from rebuilt.

The new government also faces the difficulty of keeping the country together. In the north, the Kurds, an ethnically separate minority community that had been persecuted by Hussein, want at least to maintain the autonomy they’ve had for a decade. The Sunnis and Shiites distrust each other. Within the Shiite community, to which the majority of Iraqis belong, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and the violent Muqtada Sadr are opponents. Sadr was a relatively minor figure until occupation officials shut his party’s newspaper in March and arrested one of his aides, setting off large protests and attacks on U.S. troops.

The U.S. carries its own unwelcome legacies from the occupation:

•  Troops are spending more time in Iraq than planned because about one-quarter of the Army is there at any one time. National Guard and Army Reserve forces are being kept on active duty longer than expected, creating problems at home, where the soldiers’ jobs go unfilled and families go without parents in the home.

•  The Abu Ghraib prison scandal has raised questions about the administration’s willingness to ignore Geneva Convention requirements on treatment of prisoners. Investigations of prisons in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay must aim at finding out which high-ranking officers approved of the abuse or should have known of it. The U.S. also must decide what to do with prisoners of war. The Geneva Convention requires they be released when the occupation ends unless they have been formally charged with a crime. The International Committee of the Red Cross says fewer than 50 prisoners have been granted POW status. Thousands more detained as possible security threats also should be released or charged.

•  The use of private contractors for military jobs once done by soldiers also demands closer examination. Civilians have long been employed to feed troops and wash uniforms, but the prevalence of ex-GIs interrogating prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison raises harsh new questions. For instance, what, if any, charges could be brought against them if they were found complicit in mistreatment?

Investigate the Contracts

The administration also put private U.S. contractors in charge of rebuilding Iraq. Congress needs to take a much closer look at what they do and how they bill the government.

Halliburton is the best-known case, having won secret no-bid contracts to rebuild the country. A Pentagon audit found “significant” overcharges by the company, formerly headed by Vice President Dick Cheney; Halliburton denies the allegations.

Iraqis say they want the Americans out, but most understand they will need the foreign forces for many more months. A U.S. troop presence in Iraq should not be indefinite, even if the Iraqis request it. By the end of 2005, Iraq should have enough trained police, soldiers, border guards and other forces to be able to defend the country and put down insurgencies but not threaten neighboring countries.

The Bush administration should push NATO nations to help with the training. Once the Iraqis have a new constitution, an elected government and sufficient security forces, the U.S. should withdraw its troops. That does not mean setting a definite date, because the U.S. cannot walk away from what it created. But it should set realistic goals for Iraq to reach on its own, at which time the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad becomes just another diplomatic outpost. It also means living up to promises to let Iraq choose its own government, even well short of democracy.

France, Germany and others that opposed the war seem to understand that letting Iraq become a failed state, an Afghanistan writ large, threatens them as well as the U.S. and the Middle East. But other nations will do little to help with reconstruction if Iraq remains a thinly disguised fiefdom where U.S. companies get billion-dollar contracts and other countries are shut out.

A Litany of Costly Errors

The missteps have been many: listening to Iraqi exiles like Ahmad Chalabi who insisted that their countrymen would welcome invaders; using too few troops, which led to a continuing crime wave and later to kidnappings and full-blown terror attacks. Disbanding the Iraqi army worsened the nation’s unemployment problem and left millions of former soldiers unhappy — men with weapons. Keeping the United Nations at arm’s length made it harder to regain assistance when the need was dire.

It will take years for widely felt hostility to ebb, in Iraq and other countries. The consequences of arrogance, accompanied by certitude that the world’s most powerful military can cure all ills, should be burned into Americans’ memory banks.

Preemption is a failed doctrine. Forcibly changing the regime of an enemy that posed no imminent threat has led to disaster. The U.S. needs better intelligence before it acts in the future. It needs to listen to friendly nations. It needs humility.
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/editorials/la-ed-iraq27jun27.story

washingtonpost.com
Iraq Occupation Erodes Bush Doctrine
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10539-2004Jun27.html?referrer=email
By Robin Wright
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, June 28, 2004; Page A01
The occupation of Iraq has increasingly undermined, and in some cases discredited, the core tenets of President Bush’s foreign policy, according to a wide range of Republican and Democratic analysts and U.S. officials.
When the war began 15 months ago, the president’s Iraq policy rested on four broad principles: The United States should act preemptively to prevent strikes on U.S. targets. Washington should be willing to act unilaterally, alone or with a select coalition, when the United Nations or allies balk. Iraq was the next cornerstone in the global war on terrorism. And Baghdad’s transformation into a new democracy would spark regionwide change.
But these central planks of Bush doctrine have been tainted by spiraling violence, limited reconstruction, failure to find weapons of mass destruction or prove Iraq’s ties to al Qaeda, and mounting Arab disillusionment with U.S. leadership.
“Of the four principles, three have failed, and the fourth—democracy promotion—is hanging by a sliver,” said Geoffrey Kemp, a National Security Council staff member in the Reagan administration and now director of regional strategic programs at the Nixon Center.
The president has “walked away from unilateralism. We’re not going to do another preemptive strike anytime soon, certainly not in Iran or North Korea. And it looks like terrorism is getting worse, not better, especially in critical countries like Saudi Arabia,” Kemp said.
As a result, Bush doctrine could become the biggest casualty of U.S. intervention in Iraq, which is entering a new phase this week as the United States prepares to hand over power to the new Iraqi government.
Setbacks in Iraq have had a visible impact on policy, forcing shifts or reassessments. The United States has returned to the United Nations to solve its political problems in Iraq. It has appealed to NATO for help on security. It is also relying on diplomacy, with allies, to deal with every other hot spot.
“There’s already been a retreat from the radicalism in Bush administration foreign policy,” said Walter Russell Mead, a Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow. “You have a feeling that even Bush isn’t saying, ‘Hey, that was great. Let’s do it again.’ “
Some analysts, including Republicans, suggest that another casualty of Iraq is the neoconservative approach that inspired a zealous agenda to tackle security threats in the Middle East and transform the region politically.
“Neoconservatism has been replaced by neorealism, even within the Bush White House,” Kemp said. “The best evidence is the administration’s extraordinary recent reliance on [U.N. Secretary General] Kofi Annan and [U.N. envoy] Lakhdar Brahimi. The neoconservatives are clearly much less credible than they were a year ago.”
The administration would not make a senior official or spokesman available for quotation by name to support its policy. But top administration officials insist the Iraq experience has not invalidated Bush doctrine, and they contend its basic principles will endure beyond the Bush presidency.
Policy supporters argue that current realities will keep some form of all four ideas in future policy. “Despite all the problems of implementation and despite mistakes made by the Bush administration, I don’t see many other choices,” said William Kristol, editor of the Weekly Standard and chief of staff for Vice President Dan Quayle.
“No one thinks the Middle East pre-September 11 is acceptable, or that we should work with its dictators. No one says in a world of weapons of mass destruction we can rule out preemption or that they’re not worried about the linkage between terrorism and states producing weapons of mass destruction,” he said. “So I don’t see much of an alternative to the Bush doctrine.”
Challenges to its four central tenets, however, are likely to influence U.S. foreign policy for years, some analysts predict.
The Preemptive Strike
The most controversial tenet of Bush doctrine was also the primary justification for launching the Iraq war. In the president’s June 2002 address to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Bush said deterrence and containment were no longer enough to defend America’s borders. The United States, he said, had the right to take preemptive action to prevent attacks against the United States.
“We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act,” Bush told cadets.
In the policy’s early days, its supporters hinted that preemption could eventually justify forcible government change in Iran, Syria and North Korea as well as in Iraq. But that sentiment is evaporating, because Iraq showed the “pitfalls of the doctrine in graphic detail,” said Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute.
Preemption has been “damaged, if not totally discredited,” and the outcome in Iraq may prove to be “an inoculation against rash action” by the United States in the future, Carpenter said.
The administration is working overtime to reduce the sense of alarm that Washington is posed “on a hair trigger” to launch a new offensive against governments it does not like, said James F. Hoge Jr., editor of Foreign Affairs magazine. White House officials are relying on diplomacy to defuse confrontations over nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea, the two other countries with Iraq that Bush labeled the “axis of evil.”
The administration now contends its decision was discretionary, not preemptive, because Saddam Hussein had a decade to meet several U.N. resolutions. U.S. officials also say that after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, they had to learn to deal with threats faster—and proactively.
“The notion that preemption has been discredited is entirely mistaken,” said Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who has argued for a muscular approach to international affairs.
“It’s a fact of life in the international system, because of the reality of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,” Kagan said. “The normal lead time that a nation has to protect itself is not what it used to be, so preemption will have to be part of the international arsenal.”
Unilateralism
Bush has repeatedly made clear his intent to act alone or with a U.S.-led coalition when the international community balks at confronting perceived threats.
“I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons,” he said in his 2002 State of the Union address.
Later that year, he told the U.N. General Assembly that Washington would work with the world body to deal with the “common challenge in Iraq” but stressed that action would be “unavoidable” if Hussein did not comply. “The purposes of the United States should not be doubted,” he warned.
Yet Washington has made a grudging retreat after its limited coalition could not cope with all the problems in Iraq, analysts say. The shift was evident when the administration turned to a U.N. envoy to form an interim Iraqi government after two failed U.S. attempts. It has also deferred to the United Nations to oversee elections and to help Iraq write a constitution.
“Going it alone doesn’t really work in the world as it exists today,” said Mark Schneider, senior vice president of International Crisis Group, a nonpartisan Brussels-based group that tracks global hot spots. “We need allies. We become more vulnerable and exposed when we don’t have them.”
The administration counters that its coalition included more than 30 countries, including the majority of NATO members, and that the idea is far from new. “Every administration reserves the right with respect to protecting vital American interests to act alone, but every administration seeks to avoid it,” said a senior administration official involved in Iraq policy.
The War on Terrorism
Bush turned his sights on Iraq within weeks of the war in Afghanistan. “Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror,” he said in the 2002 State of the Union address. He added later: “The price of indifference would be catastrophic.”
Whatever the merits of deposing Hussein, foreign and domestic polls now consistently show that the failure to find concrete evidence of significant ties or joint actions between the Iraqi leader and al Qaeda has dissipated international support for the United States and generated skepticism at home about the benefits of the Iraq war.
The Iraq war may even have hurt U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, analysts say, noting the increase in car bombings, hostage abductions and beheadings in Iraq as well as oil-rich Saudi Arabia. “We have assisted al Qaeda in recruiting fresh adherents by the war in Iraq and the antagonism it’s generated,” Hoge said.
The administration is “drifting,” Carpenter said. It “clings to the idea of state-sponsored terrorism as a motive for the Iraq war, but it was wildly off the mark,” he said. “Afghanistan continues to be the real central front, to the extent there is a front at all.”
U.S. officials say waging war in Iraq was vital to eliminate a refuge for extremists after Afghanistan.
Early supporters of administration policy also say the problem is not with the principles, but with their implementation. Any government has limited chances to enact policy, and early setbacks in execution can lead the public or policymakers to back away even if the ideas remain valid, Kristol said.
Promoting Democracy
The most ambitious aspect of Bush doctrine is pressing for political and economic reform in the Islamic world, the last bloc of countries to hold out against the democratic tide that has swept much of the rest of the world. Iraq was to be the catalyst of change.
“Iraqi democracy will succeed—and that success will send forth the news, from Damascus to Tehran—that freedom can be the future of every nation. The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution,” Bush said in a November 2003 speech to the National Endowment for Democracy.
Although the administration is still pushing its new democracy initiative for the wider Middle East, Muslim disillusionment with the United States over Iraq has deeply hurt this goal, analysts warn. Democratic and Republican foreign policy experts almost unanimously predict that progress will be much slower than expected even six months ago.
“The idea that the Middle East can be repaired by external intervention has been seriously damaged. And the ideas of reform are going to be a much harder sell after Iraq,” said Moises Naim, editor of Foreign Policy magazine.
After six decades as the main mediator in the region, the United States may also be losing its standing as an honest broker because of Iraq and the U.S. failure to fulfill promises to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Naim said.
The Iraq intervention also discredited the president’s approach to regional peace. “The administration argued that if you removed the security threat in Iraq, you’d improve the chances of solving the Arab-Israeli conflict—that the road to Jerusalem went through Baghdad. If anything, we learned it’s just the other way around,” Hoge said.
Supporters of the administration’s efforts argue that promoting democracy is the oldest goal in U.S. foreign policy worldwide, dating back more than 200 years. Whatever the current problems, they contend, it will remain a top goal—particularly in the Islamic world as a key to countering extremism.
The overall impact of policy challenges in Iraq, analysts say, is that the Bush White House has been forced back to the policy center or scaled back the scope of its goals. They cite the president’s appeal for NATO assistance and cutbacks in the democracy initiative.
“It’s a lesson in hubris,” Carpenter said. “The administration thought it had all the answers, but it found out through painful experience that it did not.”
Yet administration supporters say Iraq has not produced backtracking or policy reassessment. “Enormously sharp distinctions are being made between different policy views, which are largely artificial,” Kagan said. “There was an enormous consensus going into this war and there’s a consensus now about what needs to be done. So we are having a huge, vicious debate, and yet I’m not sure what the debate is about.”
© 2004 The Washington Post Company

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10539-2004Jun27.html?referrer=email

“Arrogance impériale” ou les accusations dévastatrices d’un “anonyme” de la CIA
LE MONDE | 26.06.04 | 16h48
New york de notre correspondant

Au cours des derniers mois, les ouvrages dénonçant, aux Etats-Unis, les errements des services de renseignement avant les attaques du 11 septembre 2001 et sur la question des armes de destruction massive irakiennes se sont multipliés.  Mais aucun n’est aussi dévastateur qu’Imperial Hubris : Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (Arrogance impériale : pourquoi l’Ouest est en train de perdre la guerre contre le terrorisme), un livre de 309 pages dont des extraits ont été publiés par le New York Times et le Guardian.

Ce livre est écrit par un auteur anonyme… qui ne l’est pas tant que cela. Il appartient à l’Agence centrale de renseignement (CIA) américaine depuis vingt-deux ans, y travaille contre le terrorisme et a dirigé, de 1996 à 1999, une unité spéciale baptisée Ben Laden. Elle avait pour mission de capturer le fondateur d’Al-Qaida, mais son plan a été rejeté en 1998 par les dirigeants de l’Agence.

Il est peu courant, pour un officier de renseignement, de publier un ouvrage tout en étant encore en fonctions, a fortiori quand il s’agit d’une charge contre le gouvernement et contre ses supérieurs. Conformément aux règles de la CIA, le texte a été contrôlé avant que sa publication soit autorisée. L’Agence a exigé que l’auteur et les gens avec qui il travaille ne soient pas identifiés. “Anonyme” a déjà publié, en 2003, un autre livre moins polémique et plus analytique sur Al-Qaida, titré Through Our Enemies’ Eyes : Oussama Bin Laden, Radical Islam and the Future of America (A Travers les yeux de nos ennemis : Oussama Ben Laden, l’islamisme radical et le futur de l’Amérique).

“NOUS AVONS ÉCHOUÉ”

Imperial Hubris donne la mesure du ressentiment au sein des services de renseignement américains. “Les dirigeants des Etats-Unis ont refusé d’accepter la réalité. Nous menons une guerre mondiale contre une insurrection islamiste — pas criminelle ou terroriste —, et notre politique et nos procédures n’ont pas été capables d’infliger plus que quelques dégâts mineurs aux forces ennemies. Si les annonces officielles sont vraies, depuis le 11 septembre -2001-, les Etats-Unis ont porté des coups mortels aux dirigeants d’Al-Qaida et ont capturé des milliers de terroristes. Dans le même temps, nous avons échoué dans deux guerres menées à moitié et contribué à augmenter le sentiment antiaméricain en Afghanistan et en Irak pour en faire des terrains fertiles à l’expansion d’Al-Qaida et des groupes proches.”

L’auteur dénonce l’invasion de l’Irak comme “une guerre préméditée, non provoquée et motivée par l’appât du gain contre un ennemi qui ne présentait aucune menace immédiate. Ben Laden ne pouvait pas rêver mieux qu’une invasion et une occupation américaines de l’Irak”.

Le livre considère comme probable une “attaque d’Oussama Ben Laden aux Etats-Unis avant l’élection présidentielle pour assurer la réélection de George Bush. Je suis vraiment sûr qu’il ne peut pas y avoir de meilleure administration pour eux que celle que nous avons aujourd’hui. Une bonne façon de maintenir les républicains au pouvoir serait de monter une attaque qui unira le pays autour du président”. Il considère que l’attentat à venir pourrait être “plus large encore que celui du 11 septembre 2001 et utiliser des armes de destruction massive”.

L’auteur ne critique pas seulement les politiques, mais aussi ses supérieurs à la CIA et, notamment, George Tenet, directeur de l’Agence depuis 1997, qui a donné sa démission le 2 juin. Il l’accuse de “myopie” dans son approche d’Al-Qaida. “Bien sûr, après la prochaine attaque, les Américains se sentiront trompés et leurs représentants demanderont les têtes des responsables de services de renseignement et de sécurité. Que ces têtes ne soient pas tombées au lendemain des attaques du 11 septembre -2001- est peut-être notre plus grave erreur”, ajoute l’auteur.

Eric Leser

http://www.lemonde.fr/web/imprimer_article/0,1-0@2-3222,36-370547,0.html
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L’EDITION DU 27.06.04

Here is a good snapshot of the Bush’s wishfull geopolitical “beliefs” about Europe. In a single statement, all the misconceptions of the US political vision about the European destiny : the mandatory inclusion of Turkey in EU and the “responsability” of NATO in Irak. 

Bush courts Turks and presses NATO
Elisabeth Bumiller and Christine Hauser/NYT The New York Times Monday, June 28, 2004
Istanbul talks focus on Iraqi security
Just days before the June 30 handover of sovereignty in Iraq, President George W. Bush arrived in neighboring Turkey on Sunday for a NATO summit meeting that is expected to deal with issues in Iraq, including approval by the group’s heads of state and government of an agreement to help train Iraqi security forces.

Bush said in a meeting in Ankara with Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, that he was looking forward to working on regional matters, including Iraq, and on how to strengthen NATO. Bush expressed support for Turkey’s bid to join the European Union.

“I would remind the people of this good country that I believe you ought to be given a date by the EU for your eventual acceptance into the EU,” he said.

“I appreciate so very much the example your country has set on how to be a Muslim country and at the same time, a country which embraces democracy and rule of law and freedom,” he said in a photo session with Erdogan, according to a White House transcript. Bush’s courtship of Turkey was complicated by terrorist threats to decapitate three Turks held hostage in Iraq unless the country’s companies stopped aiding U.S. forces. (Page 5.) Bush’s trip to Turkey, his first, brought out tens of thousands of demonstrators in Istanbul protesting U.S. policies in the region. “Get lost Bush, get lost NATO,” the protesters chanted, according to the Reuters news agency, and, “Murderer U.S.A. get out of the Middle East.” Protesters had also dogged Bush’s visit to Ireland, where he said on Saturday that the “bitter differences” between the United States and Europe over the war in Iraq were over, and that NATO had a responsibility to help Iraqis with their own security. As Bush spoke at an outdoor joint news conference in Ireland with Prime Minister Bertie Ahern of Ireland and Romano Prodi, the president of the European Commission, the anti-Iraq war protesters blocked at least one of the main roads leading to Dromoland Castle, a 16th-century fortress turned luxury resort where Bush had stayed.

Bush had said he hoped NATO would agree at the talks in Istanbul to help with the training of Iraqi security forces.

The training commitment, which is close to alliance agreement, represents a greatly lowered expectation on the part of the White House since it became clear in recent weeks that NATO was not willing to commit any more troops to Iraq. “NATO has the capability and I believe the responsibility to help the Iraqi people defeat the terrorist threat that is facing their country,” Bush said.

Prime Minister Iyad Allawi of Iraq, he noted, had asked NATO for training help and equipment in a recent letter. “I hope NATO responds in a positive way,” Bush said. In Brussels on Saturday, the NATO secretary general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, confirmed that the alliance had reached a deal to train Iraqi armed forces. “NATO heads of state and government are expected to approve this agreement at their summit meeting in Istanbul on June 28,” he said in a statement.

Bush has acknowledged that he is not especially well-liked in Europe.

When asked in Ireland by a White House reporter how he could explain his unpopularity in opinion polls here and whether Americans should be concerned about it, Bush replied that he was most concerned about his re-election campaign in the United States. “I must confess, the first polls I worry about are those that are going to take place in early November this year,” he said. “Listen, I care about the image of our country.” He added that “as far as my own personal standing goes, my job is to do my job” and that “I’m going to set a vision, I’m going to lead, and we’ll just let the chips fall where they may.”

Bush said Ahern had questioned him in a meeting on Saturday morning about the Abu Ghraib prison abuse and the American treatment of other prisoners held at Guantánamo Bay, as did President Mary McAleese of Ireland in her own meeting with Bush. “I told them both I was sick with what happened inside that prison,” Bush said. “The actions of those troops did not reflect what we think. And it did harm.” Bush said he told both Ahern and McAleese that the United States would deal with the investigations into the prison abuse scandal “in a transparent way.” Ahern said: “These things happen. Of course, we wish they didn’t, and it’s important then on how they’re dealt with.” Bush was in Ireland for an annual EU-U.S. summit meeting, and both he and Ahern emphasized what they called the progress they had made: signing joint agreements on counterterrorism, counterproliferation, HIV and AIDS.