Bogiidar
05/11/2009
Votre style me plait de + en +.
Stephane Eybert
04/11/2009
L’album “Le photographe” et le film sur l’expedition de MSF en Afghanistant sont superbes.
Christophe de Ponfilly nous a quitte trop tot.
Stephane Eybert
04/11/2009
DeDefensa semble un peu voir les choses sous le prisme, fascinant il est vrai, de la psychologie.
Je reconnais d’ailleurs voir en moi un peu de ce voyeurisme, a partager avec DeDefensa l’analyse de ce grand malade qu’est l’Amerique et la valetaille Europeene.
Et puis une vision entropomorphique des choses est si naturelle. Dieu lui meme s’y ai plie.
Mais il ne faut pas oublier que les puissances de ce monde sont des acteurs froids et determines .
Roger Leduc
04/11/2009
Comme pour les mensonges sur soi, quand ils sont abondants, quand ils sont acceptés comme véridiques par ceux qui les produisent, arrive le jour où la crise psychique sannonce, puis sinstalle en permanence; au grand dam du malade, attaqué de toutes parts, qui ne peut suivre le fil dAriane qui la conduit à cette souffrance.
Celui qui nest pas obnubilé par sa somme de mensonges peut temporiser un temps, remettre à plus tard les décisions qui simposent, mais arrive toujours, ne serait-ce quà lapproche de la mort, le moment où la vérité doit être regardée en face. Lamertume, le ressentiment, la peur, tout ce qui éloigne du paisible bonheur, est inversement proportionnelle à notre somme dillusion, à notre virtualisme.
Le factice, lersatz, lartificiel, le faux, limité, le postiche, le simulé, le feint, cest le gros de nous-mêmes, cest laméricanisme. En prendre conscience, obligatoirement, cest un signe des temps. La prochaine civilisation sera qualitative, ou ne sera pas. Lentre-deux peut être long et souffrant!
CMLFdA
04/11/2009
Italy to withdraw Afghan reinforcements
Around 400 troops sent to boost forces for the August 20 poll will go home, following the cancellation of the run-off vote.
Italian military reinforcements sent to Afghanistan for the presidential election will start to return home next week, Italy’s defence minister said on Tuesday.
Around 400 troops sent to boost forces for the August 20 poll will go home, following the cancellation of the run-off vote.
Two weeks ago, Italy said the reinforcements would stay in Afghanistan for the second round of voting between incumbent Hamid Karzai and challenger Abdullah Abdullah, which was planned for November 7.
Karzai was declared president for another five years on Monday after Abdullah withdrew from the run-off.
- We said the troops would stay until the end of the election process, which has now been reached, so now we are staring their gradual repatriation - Defence Minister Ignazio La Russa said, in comments reported on the political news website Affaritaliani.
With 3,250 soldiers, the Italian contingent is currently the sixth largest in the 100,000-strong international military force in Afghanistan.
Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi congratulated Karzai on his election victory and urged him to work to stabilise the troubled country.
Objavljeno: 03.11.2009. u 14:36h
CMLFdA
04/11/2009
Obama and the U.S. Strategy of Buying Time
November 2, 2009
STRATFOR
By George Friedman
Making sense of U.S. President Barack Obama’s strategy at this moment is difficult. Not only is it a work in progress, but the pending decisions he has to make—on Iran, Afghanistan and Russia—tend to obscure underlying strategy. It is easy to confuse inaction with a lack of strategy. Of course, there may well be a lack of strategic thinking, but that does not mean there is a lack of strategy.
Strategy, as we have argued, is less a matter of choice than a matter of reality imposing itself on presidents. Former U.S. President George W. Bush, for example, rarely had a chance to make strategy. He was caught in a whirlwind after only nine months in office and spent the rest of his presidency responding to events, making choices from a menu of very bad options. Similarly, Obama came into office with a preset menu of limited choices. He seems to be fighting to create new choices, not liking what is on the menu. He may succeed. But it is important to understand the overwhelming forces that shape his choices and to understand the degree to which whatever he chooses is embedded in U.S. grand strategy, a strategy imposed by geopolitical reality.
Empires and Grand Strategy
American grand strategy, as we have argued, is essentially that of the British Empire, save at a global rather than a regional level. The British sought to protect their national security by encouraging Continental powers to engage in land-based conflict, thereby reducing resources available for building a navy. That guaranteed that Britain’s core interest, the security of the homeland and sea-lane control, remained intact. Achieving this made the United Kingdom an economic power in the 19th century by sparing it the destruction of war and allowing it to control the patterns of international maritime trade.
On occasion, when the balance of power in Europe tilted toward one side or another, Britain intervened on the Continent with political influence where possible, direct aid when necessary or—when all else failed—the smallest possible direct military intervention. The United Kingdom’s preferred strategy consisted of imposing a blockade—e.g., economic sanctions—allowing it to cause pain without incurring costs.
At the same time that it pursued this European policy, London was building a global empire. Here again, the British employed a balance-of-power strategy. In looking at the history of India or Africa during the 19th century, there is a consistent pattern of the United Kingdom forming alliances with factions, whether religious or ethnic groups, to create opportunities for domination. In the end, this was not substantially different from ancient Rome’s grand strategy. Rome also ruled indirectly through much of its empire, controlling Mediterranean sea-lanes, but allying with local forces to govern; observing Roman strategy in Egypt is quite instructive in this regard.
Empires are not created by someone deciding one day to build one, or more precisely, lasting empires are not. They emerge over time through a series of decisions having nothing to do with empire building, and frequently at the hands of people far more concerned with domestic issues than foreign policy. Paradoxically, leaders who consciously set out to build empires usually fail. Hitler is a prime example. His failure was that rather than ally with forces in the Soviet Union, he wished to govern directly, something that flowed from his ambitions for direct rule. Particularly at the beginning, the Roman and British empires were far less ambitious and far less conscious of where they were headed. They were primarily taking care of domestic affairs. They became involved in foreign policy as needed, following a strategy of controlling the seas while maintaining substantial ground forces able to prevail anywhere—but not everywhere at once—and a powerful alliance system based on supporting the ambitions of local powers against other local powers.
On the whole, the United States has no interest in empire, and indeed is averse to imperial adventures. Those who might have had explicit inclinations in this direction are mostly out of government, crushed by experience in Iraq. Iraq came in two parts. In the first part, from 2003 to 2007, the U.S. vision was one of direct rule relying on American sea-lane control and overwhelming Iraq with well-supplied American troops.
The results were unsatisfactory. The United States found itself arrayed against all Iraqi factions and wound up in a multipart war in which its forces were merely one faction arrayed against others. The Petraeus strategy to escape this trap was less an innovation in counterinsurgency than a classic British-Roman approach. Rather than attempting direct control of Iraq, Petraeus sought to manipulate the internal balance of power, aligning with Sunni forces against Shiite forces, i.e., allying with the weaker party at that moment against the stronger. The strategy did not yield the outcome that some Bush strategists dreamed of, but it might (with an emphasis on might) yield a useful outcome: a precariously balanced Iraq dependent on the United States to preserve its internal balance of power and national sovereignty against Iran.
Many Americans, perhaps even most, regret the U.S. intervention in Iraq. And there are many, again perhaps most, who view broader U.S. entanglement in the world as harmful to American interests. Similar views were expressed by Roman republicans and English nationalists who felt that protecting the homeland by controlling the sea was the best policy, while letting the rest of the world go its own way. But the Romans and the British lost that option when they achieved the key to their own national security: enough power to protect the homeland. Outsiders inevitably came to see that power as offensive, even though originally its possessors intended it as defensive. Indeed, intent aside, the capability for offensive power was there. So frequently, Rome and Britain threatened the interests of foreign powers simply by being there. Inevitably, both Rome and Britain became the targets of Hannibals and Napoleons, and they were both drawn into the world regardless of their original desires. In short, enough power to be secure is enough power to threaten others. Therefore, that perfect moment of national security always turns offensive, as the power to protect the homeland threatens the security of other countries.
A Question of Size
There are Obama supporters and opponents who also dream of the perfect balance: security for the United States achieved by not interfering in the affairs of others. They see foreign entanglements not as providing homeland security, but as generating threats to it. They do not understand that what they want, American prosperity without international risks, is by definition impossible. The U.S. economy is roughly 25 percent of the world’s economy. The American military controls the seas, not all at the same time, but anywhere it wishes at any given time. The United States also controls outer space. It is impossible for the United States not to intrude on the affairs of most countries in the world simply by virtue of its daily operations. The United States is an elephant that affects the world simply by being in the same room with it. The only way to not be an elephant is to shrink in size, and whether the United States would ever want this aside, decreasing power is harder to do than it might appear—and much more painful.
Obama’s challenge is managing U.S. power without decreasing its size and without imposing undue costs on it. This sounds like an attractive idea, but it ultimately won’t work: The United States cannot be what it is without attracting hostile attention. For some of Obama’s supporters, it is American behavior that generates hostility. Actually, it is America’s presence—its very size—that intrudes on the world and generates hostility.
On the domestic front, the isolationist-internationalist divide in the United States has always been specious. Isolationists before World War II simply wanted to let the European balance of power manage itself. They wanted to buy time, but had no problem with intervening in China against Japan. The internationalists simply wanted to move from the first to the second stage, arguing that the first stage had failed. There was thus no argument in principle between them; there was simply a debate over how much time to give the process to see if it worked out. Both sides had the same strategy, but simply a different read of the moment. In retrospect, Franklin Roosevelt was right, but only because France collapsed in the face of the Nazi onslaught in a matter of weeks. That aside, the isolationist argument was quite rational.
Like that of Britain or Rome, U.S. grand strategy is driven by the sheer size of the national enterprise, a size achieved less through planning than by geography and history. Having arrived where it has, the United States has three layers to its strategy.
First, the United States must maintain the balance of power in various regions in the world. It does this by supporting a range of powers, usually the weaker against the stronger. Ideally, this balance of power maintains itself without American effort and yields relative stability. But stability is secondary to keeping local powers focused on each other rather than on the United States: Stability is a rhetorical device, not a goal. The real U.S. interest lies in weakening and undermining emergent powers so they don’t ultimately rise to challenge American power. This is a strategy of nipping things in the bud.
Second, where emergent powers cannot be maintained through the regional balance of power, the United States has an interest in sharing the burden of containing it with other major powers. The United States will seek to use such coalitions either to intimidate the emerging power via economic power or, in extremis, via military power.
Third, where it is impossible to build a coalition to coerce emerging powers, the United States must decide either to live with the emerging power, forge an alliance with it, or attack it unilaterally.
Obama, as with any president, will first pursue the first layer of the strategy, using as little American power as possible and waiting as long as possible to see whether this works. The key here lies in not taking premature action that could prove more dangerous or costly than necessary. If that fails, his strategy is to create a coalition of powers to share the cost and risk. And only when that fails—which is a function of time and politics—will Obama turn to the third layer, which can range from simply living with the emerging power and making a suitable deal or crushing it militarily.
When al Qaeda attacked what it saw as the leading Christian power on Sept. 11, Bush found himself thrown into the third stage very rapidly. The second phase was illusory; sympathy aside, the quantity of military force allies could and would bring to bear was minimal. Even active allies like Britain and Australia couldn’t bring decisive force to bear. Bush was forced into unilateralism not so much by the lack of will among allies as by their lack of power. His choice lay in creating chaos in the Islamic world and then forming alliances out of the debris, or trying to impose a direct solution through military force. He began with the second and
shifted to the first.
Obama’s Choices
Obama has more room to maneuver than Bush had. In the case of Iran, no regional solution is possible. Israel can only barely reach into the region, and while its air force might suffice to attack Iranian nuclear facilities, and air attacks might be sufficient to destroy them, Israel could not deal with the Iranian response of mining the Strait of Hormuz and/or destabilizing Iraq. The United States must absorb these blows.
Therefore, Obama has tried to build an anti-Iranian coalition to intimidate Tehran. Given the Russian and Chinese positions,
this seems to have failed, and Iran has not been intimidated. That leaves Obama with two possible paths. One is the path followed by Nixon in China: ally with Iran against Russian influence, accepting it as a nuclear power and dealing with it through a combination of political alignment and deterrence. The second option is dealing with Iran militarily.
His choice thus lies between entente or war. He is bluffing war in hopes of getting what he wants, in the meantime hoping that internal events in Iran may evolve in a way suitable to U.S. interests or that Russian economic hardship evolves into increased Russian dependence on the United States such that Washington can extract Russian concessions on Iran. Given the state of Iran’s nuclear development, which is still not near a weapon, Obama is using time to try to head off the third stage.
In Afghanistan, where Obama is already in the third stage and where he is being urged to go deeper in, he is searching for a way to return to the first stage, wherein an indigenous coalition emerges that neutralizes Afghanistan through its own internal dynamic. Hence, Washington is negotiating with the Taliban, trying to strengthen various factions in Afghanistan and not quite committing to more force. Winter is coming in Afghanistan, and that is the quiet time in that conflict. Obama is clearly buying time.
In that sense, Obama’s foreign policy is neither as alien as his critics would argue nor as original as his supporters argue. He is adhering to the basic logic of American grand strategy, minimizing risks over time while seeking ways to impose low-cost solutions. It differs from Bush’s policies primarily in that Bush had events forced on him and spent his presidency trying to regain the initiative.
The interesting point from where we sit is not only how deeply embedded Obama is in U.S. grand strategy, but how deeply drawn he is into the unintended imperial enterprise that has dominated American foreign policy since the 1930s—an enterprise neither welcomed nor acknowledged by most Americans. Empires aren’t planned, at least not successful empires, as Hitler and Napoleon learned to their regret. Empires happen as the result of the sheer reality of power. The elephant in the room cannot stop being an elephant, nor can the smaller animals ignore him. No matter how courteous the elephant, it is his power—his capabilities—not his intentions that matter.
Obama is now the elephant in the room. He has bought as much time as possible to make decisions, and he is being as amiable as possible to try to build as large a coalition as possible. But the coalition has neither the power nor appetite for the risks involved, so Obama will have to decide whether to live with Iran, form an alliance with Iran or go to war with Iran. In Afghanistan, he must decide whether he can recreate the balance of power by staying longer and whether this will be more effective by sending more troops, or whether it is time to begin withdrawal. In both cases, he can use the art of the bluff to shape the behavior of others, maybe.
He came into the presidency promising to be more amiable than Bush, something not difficult given the circumstances. He is now trying to convert amiability into a coalition, a much harder thing to do. In the end, he will have to make hard decisions. In American foreign policy, however, the ideal strategy is always to buy time so as to let the bribes, bluffs and threats do their work. Obama himself probably doesn’t know what he will do; that will depend on circumstances. Letting events flow until they can no longer be tolerated is the essence of American grand strategy, a path Obama is following faithfully.
It should always be remembered that this long-standing American policy has frequently culminated in war, as with Wilson, Roosevelt, Truman, Johnson and Bush. It was Clinton’s watchful waiting to see how things played out, after all, that allowed al Qaeda the time to build and strike. But this is not a criticism of Clinton—U.S. strategy is to trade time for risk. Over time, the risk might lead to war anyway, but then again, it might not. If war does come, American power is still decisive, if not in creating peace, then certainly in wreaking havoc upon rising powers. And that is the foundation of empire.
Laurent Grisel
04/11/2009
Les français sont là peut-être aussi parce qu’ils ont des choses à défendre, s’ils s’en souviennent, un lycée français qui a formé beaucoup de dirigeants, un soutien au “commandant Massoud” et probablement la présence ancienne, ininterrompue, de services de renseignement, etc.
Voir les films de Christophe de Ponfilly.
Bilbo
04/11/2009
La Russie propose à l’OTAN son hélicoptère lourd, le Mi-26T.
Dedef
04/11/2009
Russia to boost Obama’s Nobel with nuclear treaty: report
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Russia_to_boost_Obamas_Nobel_with_nuclear_treaty_report_999.html
——————————————————————————————————————-
Top US adviser assures Russia at nuclear talks
Moscow (AFP) Oct 29, 2009
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Top_US_adviser_assures_Russia_at_nuclear_talks_999.html
US National Security Adviser James Jones stressed the White House’s desire for friendly relations with Moscow as he met Russian officials on Thursday for nuclear disarmament talks.
Jones, a retired US general, told Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that President Barack Obama remained committed to improving ties with Moscow that have been badly strained in recent years.
“I would like to… on behalf of President Obama, reassure you and your colleagues that the path that US and Russian relations are on right now is one that’s full of promise and potential,” Jones said.
“We want to do everything we can to bring that good state of affairs to a conclusion,” Jones added, at a meeting that also included the top US and Russian negotiators working on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
-etc-
“We do not fully understand the future qualitative and geographic parameters of this new missile defence system… A complex and long discussion is needed before we can draw any conclusions,” he told the Vremya Novostei daily.
Ryabkov added that Russia does not see eye-to-eye with the United States on the ultimate purpose of missile defence, which Washington says is needed to protect against the threat of missile strikes from Iran.
“We cannot come together with the Americans on how real the need for missile defence methods will be after N number of years,” Ryabkov said.
René Moreau
03/11/2009
Deux jours avant d’avoir lu cet article de Dedefensa voici mon commentaire sur un article de l’espresso quotidien Télérama
D’abord le lien de l’article qui est à lire ! :
http://www.telerama.fr/idees/allons-nous-tous-finir-emmures,48848.php
Article absolument remarquable aujourd’hui sur l’espresso de Telerama Félicitations !
Au fil des paragraphes je trouve des choses comme “Démocratie Emmurée”
Moi qui me suis fait une liste de qualificatifs pour décrire l’état de notre (nos) démocratie qui dérive et n’en est plus tout à fait une . tels que Démocratie truquée, falsifiée, manipulée, lézardée,etc. En voici une autre image “emmurée ” qui définit bien aussi son état !
Par ailleurs lorsque le Mur de Berlin est tombé et le rideau de fer dans son ensemble on a oublié ensuite qu’en fait, c’était deux colosses qui se battaient l’un était tombé l’autre demeurait et ivre de sa victoire dès lors.
De plus nous n’avons alors pas remarqué que le matérialisme du second le nôtre celui du monde dit libre, dans un genre et sur un mode différent valait largement celui du premier en plus hypocrite, se prétendant phare du monde démocratique mais en réalité avec sa prospérité matérielle basé en bonne partie sur l’exploitation des richesses du sud (période coloniale et décolonisation organisée pour prolonger celle ci sous forme déguisée) bref pillage du sud par le Nord
Étonnez vous après, de tout ces Murs qui se hérissent un peu partout .
Comment tout cela pourrait-il finir bien ? ?
Nous nous dirigeons par aveuglement sur nous mêmes et par matérialisme de toutes les règles de notre système (économiques financières politiques géostratégiques ) vers la faillite morale et l’effondrement de celui ci
Comme l’Est il y a 20 ans
Peut-être alors comprendrons nous après cet effondrement qu’il n’y a que la fraternité qui est vraiment viable .
L’Âge d’Or alors ? oui peut-être mais qu’aurons nous donc dû subir auparavant pour que lHumanité trouve enfin la sagesse ?
Pour l’heure Wall street (tiens ! Wall , encore un mur ) règne en maitre les Madoff et autreKerviel sévissent. les faucons demandent des renforts en Af-Pak d’autres ou bien les mêmes rêvent de"bombing in Iran” des fortunes totalement virtuelles car en réalité montagnes de dettes revendues de multiples fois (faut le faire ça quand même ! ! ) dont la somme défie d’ailleurs l’imagination
“Si tu crois que ça va qu’ça va qu’ça va qu’ça va durer comme ça…..? ”
Ni ANDO
03/11/2009
La motivation technique de cette acquisition reste douteuse. La carence avancée en moyens amphibies ne semble en rien avoir gêné le déroulement des opérations coté russe, si lon en croit cet article de Sapir de septembre 2008 sur la contre-attaque russe à lattaque géorgienne daoût 2008 (intéressant rappel). Où lon apprend en passant que cest en réalité un bataillon des troupes dassaut SpetNaz (800 hommes) qui mit en débandade les 8 et 9 août 2008 une armée géorgienne de 10/15.000 hommes dotée dartillerie lourde, de chars dassaut et daviation de chasse (larmée régulière russe, la 58 ième, semble surtout être intervenue pour occuper le terrain et plastronner devant les caméras occidentales).
A défaut de pouvoir moderniser une armée dun million dhommes, encore soviétique par certains aspects, bien quen progrès, les Russes se sont donnés les moyens de développer des troupes délite de qualité, bien entraînées, bien équipées, très réactives et dotées dun moral élevé : divisions parachutistes dexcellent niveau, commandos marine (un corps de fusiliers marins de 7.500 h), unités spéciales du ministère de lIntérieur et surtout unités dassaut SpetNaz (organisées en régiments de 1000 à 1500 hommes, peu connues à louest, elles recrutent sur la base du volontariat des candidats venus des meilleures troupes de larmée russe et après des épreuves de sélection considérées comme les plus dures du monde : 6 mois de préparation pour un taux de réussite de 30%).
Bilbo
03/11/2009
Le gouvernement US aurait fait, par l’intermédiaire de l’Arabie Saoudite et de la Turquie, une offre de cogestion de l’Afghanistan aux Talibans. Cette offre aurait été rejetée :
“
US negotiators had offered the Taliban leadership through Mullah Wakil Ahmed Mutawakkil (former Taliban foreign minister) that if they accept the presence of NATO troops in Afghanistan, they would be given the governorship of six provinces in the south and northeast,” a senior Afghan Foreign Ministry official told IslamOnline.net requesting anonymity for not being authorized to talk about the sensitive issue with the media. [...]
The Americans reportedly offered Taliban a form of power-sharing in return for accepting the presence of foreign troops.
“America wants 8 army and air force bases in different parts of Afghanistan in order to tackle the possible regrouping of Al-Qaeda network,” the senior official said. [...]
“But Taliban did not agree on that,” said the senior official. [...]
Ahmedi, the Taliban spokesman in southern Afghanistan, confirmed their principal position.
“Our point of view is very clear that until and unless foreign forces do not leave Afghanistan, no talks will turn out to be successful.”
“
Le fait que le gouvernement US en soit à proposer de tels arrangements est significatif à de multiples égards :
- il est conscient qu’il ne peut pas gagner la guerre. Le fait même de faire le premier pas est lourd de sens. Les Américains sont en train de perdre et ils savent qu’au mieux ils réussiront à conserver les positions actuelles. Les Talibans refusent et c’est logique car ils sont dans une dynamique victorieuse et car le temps joue pour eux.
- ça peut expliquer le fort retard pris par Obama quant aux suites à donner à la demande de McChrystal. Une offre était en cours. Dans ce cas le refus taliban devrait être suivi d’une décision US dans les prochains jours.
- le gouvernement de Karzaï n’est même pas mentionné. C’est comme s’il n’existait pas. Cependant l’ex-marionnette pourrait ne pas être d’accord et donner encore plus de fil à retordre.
Par ailleurs le rôle d’intermédiaire de la Turquie dans cette affaire est à souligner bien plus que celui de l’Arabie Saoudite qui était l’un des rares pays à avoir reconnu le régime taliban et qui avait un rôle d’intermédiaire logique.
Les Turcs jouent pleinement leurs cartes, s’appuyant sur les pays turcophones (Ouzbékistan, Turkménistan, Kirghizistan) et sur les Afghans turcophones habitant au nord-ouest du pays.
Acteurs jusqu’ici relativement discrets, ayant un pied dans chaque camp (ou finalement dans aucun ?), les Turcs montent progressivement en puissance. A l’instar de la Chine, la Turquie est la première puissance économique régionale. Ses dirigeants ont réglé ou règlent progressivement les tensions à leur porte avant de se lancer sur la scène mondiale : baisse des tensions à propos de Chypre, reconnaissance du génocide arménien…
La montée en puissance turque complexifie d’ailleurs énormément le Grand jeu en Asie Centrale, notamment le volet hydrocarbures, au point que même des analystes russes de Gazprom renoncent à faire des prédictions :
“Most Gazprom analysts at Moscow’s investment banks agree that the Black Sea’s waters are now too murky for them to predict what will happen next”.
Source : http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/KK03Ag01.html
Décidément il vaudrait mieux parler des BRICT.
Bilbo
03/11/2009
Le Monde a publié dans son édition du 02/11/09 une interview de ce grand homme :
http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2009/11/02/mikhail-gorbatchev-j-ai-perdu-mais-la-perestroika-a-gagne_1261460_3214_1.html
Interview parfois intéressante, notamment le passage où il juge l’action de Poutine et l’attitude de l’Occident. A déguster sans modération :
“Question : Que pensez-vous de la façon dont Vladimir Poutine et Dmitri Medvedev dirigent aujourd’hui la Russie? Assiste-t-on à un retour en arrière avec ce néo-autoritarisme assumé?
Réponse : Souvenez-vous que la priorité numéro un du pouvoir actuel était de remédier au chaos légué par Boris Eltsine, un homme tant célébré par l’Occident comme un vrai démocrate. Son legs: chaos dans l’économie, chaos dans l’armée, chaos dans l’éducation, chaos dans la démocratie. Dans tous les domaines, c’était la désintégration. Nos amis à l’Ouest semblent incapables de pardonner à Poutine d’avoir sorti le pays de ce chaos. La Russie a pu se redresser bien sûr avec une petite aide de Dieu. Dieu s’est dit, OK, aidons un peu ce Poutine! Et le prix du pétrole a commencé à grimper sur le marché international
“La première présidence de Poutine a consisté à consolider le pays. Désormais le pays est stabilisé. Le temps est venu de renforcer la démocratisation des institutions du pays. Mais retenez cela, nous ne sommes qu’à mi-chemin sur la voie de la transition démocratique. Nous affrontons certains problèmes qui ne peuvent pas facilement être réglés par un système démocratique. C’est pourquoi le pouvoir doit parfois user de méthodes autoritaires. On doit dire franchement et ouvertement que si ces méthodes autoritaires peuvent parfois se justifier, elles ne doivent en aucun cas devenir la règle. Nos dirigeants ne doivent pas recréer un système totalitaire. Je ferai de mon mieux pour que le point de vue démocratique l’emporte et que la société civile continue à se développer.”
Ni ANDO
02/11/2009
Sondage institut Pew.
« Paradoxalement, une majorité des sondés, dans beaucoup de pays, estiment que les gens sont moins à l’aise financièrement que sous le régime communiste. En Ukraine, 62% des personnes interrogées sont de cet avis. En Russie, 45% des sondés ont la même opinion, contre 33% qui disent que la situation est meilleure. Dans seulement deux pays, la République tchèque et la Pologne, une majorité des personnes interrogées affirment que les gens sont dans une meilleure situation financière depuis la fin du communisme ».
http://fr.news.yahoo.com/3/20091102/twl-berlin-mur-europe-est-sondage-0ef7422.html
Serge LEFORT
02/11/2009
Deux entretiens sur la presse gratuite/payante :
18/04/2008, La fin de l’information ? Entretien avec Bernard Poulet et Vincent Giret, La vie des idées (http://www.laviedesidees.fr/La-fin-de-l-information.html).
10/05/2009, La fin des journaux selon Bernard Poulet, Canal Académie (http://www.canalacademie.com/La-fin-des-journaux-de-Bernard.html).
-
Pour poster un commentaire, vous devez vous identifier